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J. M. Coetzee’s writing has consistently challenged the work of the critic, 
questioning the principles of literary criticism and preempting its ordinary 
procedures. A distinguishing trait of this challenge is the solipsistic dimension 
of Coetzee’s writing, described here as a form of self-sufficiency in relation to 
the role of the interpreter. This dissertation examines Coetzee’s interrogation 
of literary criticism and the response produced by the dominant strand in the 
scholarship on his works. The work of the critic is conceived in the 
phenomenological terms of proximity, which presupposes an empathetic and 
celebratory stance in relation to the author, and distance, commonly 
associated with detachment and impartiality. A rhetorical approach to 
narratives as communicative acts provides the theoretical framework to gauge 
Coetzee’s implied views about the work of the critic. 
Three central issues intersect in the argument presented here. The first is 
Coetzee’s role in paving the way for a fundamentally proximal response to his 
works, a response that is often deferential. The second is the consolidation of 
this celebratory practice in Coetzee scholarship and its tendency to ignore the 
resistance to critical paraphrase and containment performed by his works. The 
third issue is the disempowering effect of the self-sufficient dimension of 
Coetzee’s oeuvre on the critic’s interpretive authority. 
Self-sufficiency is projected by the scope of Coetzee’s literary project, 
which includes prose and criticism, and it becomes particularly evident in the 
context of his later self-referential or autobiographical works, two of which 
are discussed here: the novel Disgrace and the memoir Summertime. The self-
sufficiency of Coetzee’s writing disempowers the critic in two ways. First, the 
continuities between both spheres of his oeuvre give rise to a potentially self-
explanatory relationship between them because the critical pieces indirectly 
provide a congenial explanatory framework to elucidate the fiction. The 
critic’s intellectual autonomy becomes, therefore, a questionable issue. Second, 
Coetzee’s works enact what can be described as a preemptive awareness of 
critical procedures that undermines the critic’s interpretive authority by 
throwing into relief the inescapable bias and flaws of the interpretive process.
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 1 
Introduction 
In an essay that considers the future of British and Anglophone contemporary 
fiction, Thom Dancer identifies a challenge to the prevailing practices of 
literary criticism in the works of Zadie Smith, Ian McEwan, David Mitchell, 
Kazuo Ishiguro, and J. M. Coetzee. In different ways, these authors “challenge 
the habitual understanding of the relationship between the act of criticism and 
its object”, rejecting the traditional principles of distance, detachment, and 
neutrality, and welcoming instead a form of literary criticism that attends 
primarily to “the effect of the story’s work” on the reader (132, 5). Dancer 
calls this mode of response a “criticism of presence rather than 
distance”(132). The argument that he rehearses is familiar: at the heart of a 
criticism of presence is the belief that reading is “an event irreducible to the 
processing of information alone” because a text produces “a ‘thought’ that is 
‘never transferable, recognizable, paraphrasable, expoundable, or illustratable 
– meaning that [this thought] cannot be detached either from the text itself or 
from the moment of reading” (135, 6). All too often, however, Dancer 
continues, criticism fails to do justice to the unique experience of each 
individual work because its primary goals are to describe and evaluate the 
qualities of the text for the sake of a broader and more schematic knowledge 
of literature. Distance creates an “asymmetrical relationship of agency 
between the text and the critic”, a relationship of “emotional separation and 
intellectual mastery” (133). Presence, on the other hand, acts “as an injunction 
against the will to impose abstract concepts” upon the text (135). 
Dancer gives an example of the kind of criticism that can respond to the 
literary text in a more affective, or less intellectually removed, way by looking 
into Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year (2007). He discusses a passage in which 
Coetzee’s narrator describes his intense reaction after reading a chapter in 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. The passage in question, which makes 
the reader-narrator sob “uncontrollably”, is the famous one where Ivan 
Karamazov “hands back his ticket of admission to the universe God has 
created” (Diary 223). Dancer finds in this reader-narrator’s powerful reaction 
to the text a model for mutual agency between the critic and the author. The 
narrator’s tears are an indication “of an intense event of reading”, brought 
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about by “a transformation effected by the text”. The reader-narrator of 
Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year cries, he continues, because of the power of 
literary language: “Dostoevsky speaks well; he is able to transform the reader, 
to make [Ivan’s] anguish and arguments real” (140). 
Dancer is correct to identify in Coetzee’s writing a call for a critical 
practice that adopts a more open, receptive, and dialogical stance towards the 
text. His argument ties in with the critical consensus that Coetzee’s works 
carry out an interrogation of the grounds and the authority of knowledge. The 
key word in this interrogation is positionality: discourses of knowledge, 
understood as shared and recurrent assumptions about a specific object of 
inquiry, can never claim to be truly detached and unprejudiced because they 
issue from a subject who is inevitably embedded in a given context, and 
implicated with the cultural forces that act within this context. From this 
perspective, both what Dancer describes as a criticism of presence and 
Coetzee’s authorial discourse emerge as fundamentally suspicious of distance 
as a guarantee of autonomy or neutrality. But apart from this interrogation of 
distance that is detectable in Coetzee’s writing, concepts such as presence, 
proximity, and mutuality dominate the mainstream scholarship on his novels, 
of which the works of David Attwell and Derek Attridge are the foremost 
examples. The criticism of presence intersects with Coetzee twice, as it were: 
as Dancer suggests, his writing seems to lend itself naturally to a defense of a 
more personal, proximal, and contingent mode of engagement with the 
literary work, as opposed to a purportedly detached and impartial engagement; 
his major critics in turn, having identified this peculiarity of Coetzee’s writing, 
have responded by adopting and accommodating presence, proximity, and 
mutuality in their approach to his work. 
While it is certainly true that the principles of the criticism of presence 
attach both to Coetzee’s writing and to its reception, I will argue here that 
another defining trait of his authorial discourse is precisely the very rejection 
of proximity and above all mutuality between author and critic. Critical 
proximity depends on empathy: the critic seeks to identify with the authorial 
discourse manifest in the work in the effort to understand it as fully as 
possible. The ultimate goal of the critical work based on proximity is mutuality 
between author and critic, which presupposes in theory a symmetrical balance 
of discursive authority between both. Mutuality entails both commensurability 
and interdependence between literary and critical discourse: the discourse of 
the critic would offer an excellent explanation or paraphrase of the discourse 
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of the author, and the authorial discourse would in turn function as a perfect 
example of the critical discourse. 
Empathy, or proximity, as a defining feature of a very influential strand of 
the criticism of Coetzee’s works, carries significant implications for the 
prevailing perceptions of Coetzee’s writing and for the relationships among 
critics. One of the implications addressed here is the deference with which 
Coetzee is often treated and its consequences for the current understanding of 
his authorial discourse. The practitioners of critical proximity often invoke an 
ethical imperative to justify respect and admiration for the writer. Indeed, 
proximity departs from the assumption that the artistic expression is a token 
of an individual’s singularity, which must therefore be respected and preserved 
by the critic. The most apparent interpretive risk of this kind of approach is a 
loss of critical authority in relation to the author and the work, that is, the loss 
of the capacity to scrutinize and interrogate literary discourse. Yet proximity 
impacts on critical authority in more elusive ways as well. Proximity can allow 
such a degree of insight into the discourse of the author that the critic can 
absorb its distinguishing characteristics and convert them into theoretical 
principles or methods for the practice of literary criticism. In other words, 
proximity is no guarantee that the literary discourse will be preserved, that is 
to say, not reduced to an illustration of critical principles or concepts. On the 
contrary, proximity can also be a means of taking possession of the 
uniqueness of the literary discourse. 
Furthermore, considering that criticism entails not only a relationship with 
the authorial discourse but also with the work of other critics who share an 
interest in the author’s work, proximity affects the critical community at a 
larger scale too. The problem here is not proximity as such, but what it can 
give rise to once it circulates among critics and establishes itself as a dominant 
attitude or method, or indeed as a critical habit. Accompanied by expressions 
of admiration (out of genuine respect or adulation), proximity helps establish 
a culture of reverence which fuels the tendency of refraining from a sharper 
scrutiny of the discourse of the author. Finally, for the advocates of proximity 
who achieve a position of distinction among other critics, authority becomes a 
very dubious concept as it travels from the sphere of the relationship with the 
author to the sphere of the relationship with other critics. These distinguished 
practitioners of proximity become authoritative critics in the field, prominent 
names who affirm the value of the concept, but, ironically, their 
authoritativeness rests precisely on a principled resistance to the exercise of 
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authority. In theory at least, proximity makes a promise that criticism is 
fundamentally averse to authority and domination, for the critic does not want 
to engulf the literary discourse, but go hand in hand with it, complement it, 
produce a response that is commensurate with it. Obviously, this principled 
resistance to the exercise of authority contradicts itself in the broader context 
of the exchange of authority among critics. 
In the particular context of Coetzee scholarship, yet another issue arises in 
relation to proximity and the desired mutuality, or the balance of authority, 
between critical and literary discourses. Proximity underpins a particularly 
influential form of critical engagement with his works, but it also sits uneasily 
with his authorial discourse, especially with respect to the desired mutual 
agency between author and critic. The point here is not an apparent 
contradiction; rather, what brings the predominance of proximity and the 
rejection of mutuality together is Coetzee’s defense of fiction against critical 
containment. At the heart of Coetzee’s critique of criticism lies a consistent 
assertion of the discursive authority of his writing, grounded on a view of 
writing as a unique and inviolable creative act. The call for critical proximity 
constitutes one facet of this assertion; the rejection of proximity and mutuality 
constitutes another. 
The resistance to critical containment that is characteristic of Coetzee’s 
authorial discourse brings me to what I call here the self-sufficiency in his 
writing. One manifestation of self-sufficiency is the dialogue internal to 
Coetzee’s novelistic and critical practice. Coetzee is mainly known as a 
novelist, but he also has an extensive critical production. The continuities 
between his novelistic and his critical writings, noted by a number of critics, 
imply a degree of self-explanation, insofar as one illuminates the other. 
Typically, Coetzee’s criticism has served as a point of departure to elucidate 
his novels. In fact, there is a relationship of mutuality or complementarity 
between literary and critical discourse at stake here, but this mutuality is 
internal to Coetzee’s writing, and therefore it constitutes the self-sufficiency of 
the authorial discourse. The other manifestation of self-sufficiency is evinced 
by Coetzee’s awareness of his reception and the way in which he undermines 
the activity of the interpreter. This aspect becomes particularly clearer in his 
later works, whose recurrent thematic feature, as I will show, projects him as a 
remarkably solipsistic writer. 
The argument about the self-sufficiency of Coetzee’s writing will be 
developed here in two steps. First, I will examine how and why the principles 
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of proximity and mutual agency between literary and critical discourse have 
come to be so pervasive in Coetzee scholarship. This strand of my argument 
will focus on how Coetzee has indirectly appealed to a more dialogically open, 
sympathetic, and responsive attitude in relation to the text, and how the works 
of his major critics both respond to this appeal and, by means of their 
intellectual influence in the critical field, legitimize a proximal approach to 
Coetzee’s text. The second step hones in on the notion of self-sufficiency. I 
begin by exploring the potential self-explanatory capacity of the writing and 
then move to an interrogation of the appropriateness of critical proximity and 
mutuality. I show how Coetzee brings under fierce scrutiny the reasons 
behind one’s investment in proximity and mutuality with the discourse of the 
author. 
Coetzee and the Critic: The Question of 
Discursive Authority 
Coetzee has voiced his dissatisfaction about the relationship between author 
and critic a few times. In a well-known interview, for instance, he comments 
in a somewhat dispirited tone: “what is criticism, what can it ever be, but 
either a betrayal (the usual case) or an overpowering (the rarer case) of its 
object? How often is there an equal marriage?” (Doubling the Point 61) This 
comment on his part can be taken as an encouragement to a more generous 
and intense approach to the literary work. In other words, Coetzee seems to 
resent an “asymmetrical relationship of agency” between the literary work and 
the critical response, to borrow Dancer’s phrase once again (133). Another 
interview is more telling, however, in the context of a reflection on the ideal 
of mutual agency between authorial and critical discourse. Coetzee dismisses 
an intense literary response on the grounds that intensity does not belong with 
criticism: “you have to remember what is and what is not possible in [critical] 
discursive prose [as opposed to poetic language]. In particular you have to 
remember about passion, where a strange logic prevails. When a real passion 
of feeling is let loose in discursive prose, you feel that you are reading the 
utterances of a madman” (Doubling 60). 
Since Coetzee is a creative writer, it is not surprising that he defends the 
rhetorical power of literary language as a token of its uniqueness, and as 
something that escapes the critical parlance. Not even a passionate critical 
discourse, in his view, would therefore measure up to the power of literary 
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language: novelistic discourse, he continues, “allows the writer to stage his 
passion: Magda, in In the Heart of the Country [his second novel], may be mad … 
but I, behind her, am merely passionate. … In the medium of prose 
commentary I can’t be passionate without being mad” (60, italics in original). 
For Coetzee, criticism cannot say as much as literary language; put 
differently, criticism can be said to be an inferior discursive mode in 
comparison to literary language. This recognition of inferiority, or 
insufficiency, lies at the heart of what motivates the intensity, generosity, 
presence and, most importantly, the proximity of the criticism of presence. As 
I indicated previously, what Dancer calls criticism of presence does not 
formulate a new theoretical position about the study of literature. Rather, it 
rearticulates critiques of methods of literary criticism posed by, for instance, 
the phenomenological critics of the Geneva school, who viewed the critical 
work precisely as a balance of proximity and distance. Their premise for a 
critical work that does not “[smooth out] turbulent irregularity, scandal, 
contradiction, … [into] themes of a calm and coherent discourse”, as Jean 
Starobinski puts it, is the opposite pole of distance: their method relies on 
proximity, conceived as a remarkable identification of the discourse of the 
critic with the authorial discourse manifested in the work (The Living Eye 122)1. 
Among the Geneva critics, Starobinski deserves closer attention because his 
conception of the critical work brings to the fore the crisis of identity that 
affects literary criticism, and with which it attempts to cope by changing its 
principles: from distance, detachment, and objectivity, which might engulf the 
literary work, to proximity, empathy (or identification), and mutuality, which 
would presumably be more just grounds on which to claim interpretive 
authority. Yet these premises do not release the critic from the predicament of 
authority; they just shift the terms that create the predicament in the first 
place. 
The criticism of presence wants to avoid subjecting, or seizing control 
over, the work; therefore, it conceives of itself as sympathetic and generous. 
At the same time that it recognizes the power and the uniqueness of the 
literary discourse, however, it also recognizes its own inescapable limitations, 
or what it lacks in comparison with literary discourse: simply put, the critic 
                                     
1 The Geneva school critics are Marcel Raymond, Albert Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre 
Richard, and Jean Starobinski. Their sources in earlier criticism, as J. Hillis Miller notes, stretch back 
to “the critics of the Nouvelle Revue Française … and behind them through Proust to mid-nineteenth-
century writers like Pater and Ruskin, and so back to romantic criticism” (305). 
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does not dispose of the same wealth of rhetorical resources that the novelist 
can access. The anxiety of the criticism of presence becomes clear in 
Starobinski’s writing: in its reverence and openness to the unique energy of 
literary discourse, it aims at such a degree of proximity that it might find itself 
completely assimilated, reduced to an auxiliary or accessory form of discourse, 
an appendix that might have some interpretive value but is not indispensable. 
Ideally, the critic should both embrace the transformation brought about 
by the work and differentiate himself. But what does “differentiate” mean in 
this context? Neither Dancer nor Starobinski is clear on the notion of 
difference between author and critic. Dancer wraps up his discussion of Diary 
of a Bad Year with the very suggestive phrase “the artist as critic”, which is 
meant to capture how the critic’s imaginative sensibility can be enhanced, or 
inspired, by the creative writer’s power. In the context of Coetzee’s novel, the 
phrase is very appropriate: Dancer presumes that the reader-narrator of Diary, 
a model critic of presence, is a creative writer in fact, a recognizably 
autofictional Coetzee in the world of the narrative (139). The exemplary 
mutual agency is perfectly illustrated because writer and reader, equally 
sensitive and responsive, are indeed the same in Dancer’s reading. Starobinski 
concludes his thoughts about the critical work by suggesting that it must 
eventually promote itself as “a work of literature in its own right”, which is 
also a dubious formulation in the context of difference, even though it 
apparently reclaims interpretive authority (Eye 127). At precisely this point, 
however, the criticism of presence might find itself back at square one. 
Starobinski also insists that criticism must be an act of “assimilation” or 
“active appropriation” in order to secure its discursive authority (Eye 224; Jean-
Jacques Rousseau xxvii). What such a move implies, consequently, is that the 
“asymmetrical relationship of agency between the text and the critic”, which 
the proximity and receptiveness of the criticism of presence set out to remedy 
in the first place, might be introduced once again (Dancer 133). 
What emerges from Starobinski’s discussion of the critical relation is that 
proximity and mutuality are certainly desirable and engaging principles; yet 
they can also make the line between a sensitive but independent intellectual 
reflection, and a more or less elaborate echo of the authorial discourse, quite 
indistinct. Dancer is also aware of this, as he notes “the profound theoretical 
and practical difficulty” that a generous criticism faces (136). Coetzee, who 
speaks not only as a creative writer but also from his experience as a literary 
scholar, is even more skeptical of literary criticism. As he puts it, criticism 
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usually betrays or overpowers the literary work and, when it opens itself too 
much to the power of literary discourse, it might lose both its interpretive 
authority and its sense (producing “utterances” that liken the ones of “a 
madman”). This is an extravagant formulation, but Coetzee has also spoken 
about the deficiencies of criticism in a more sober manner. In the passage 
below, for example, he returns to the point of how constrained and limited 
critical writing seems to him, in comparison with novelistic writing: 
If I were a truly creative critic I would work toward liberating [critical] 
discourse – making it less monological, for instance. But the candid truth is 
I don’t have enough of an investment in criticism to try. Where I do my 
liberating, my playing with possibilities, is in my fiction. To put it in another 
way: I am concerned to write the kind of novel – to work in the kind of 
novel form – in which one is not unduly handicapped (compared with the 
philosopher) when one plays (or works) with ideas. (Doubling 246) 
Coetzee’s view here is similar to Martha Nussbaum’s famous argument for the 
superior “many-sidedness” of narrative prose, which allows it to explore the 
complexities of ethical questions with more richness and fullness than 
traditional argumentative writing (Nussbaum 283). This many-sidedness is a 
function of the discursive medium itself, that is, of the fact that form and 
content are inseparable: “forms themselves express a content and that content 
cannot be prized loose, without change, from the form in which it is 
expressed” (289, 90). The nub of Nussbaum’s argument, as well as of 
Coetzee’s view, is that creative writing is a superior form of discourse; the 
academic (the moral philosopher or the literary scholar, for instance) can learn 
from the creative artist. Essentially, there is indeed a form of mutuality 
involved here, but not commensurability as far as discursive authority is 
concerned. 
From Mutuality to Self-Sufficiency 
I trace Coetzee’s relationship with the reception of his works throughout his 
oeuvre, dividing it into two major phases in accordance with a salient thematic 
shift in the works. The first phase comprises the novels produced in apartheid 
South Africa between 1974 and 1990. Their overall thematic focus can be 
described as chiefly political: these works engage, in different ways and to 
different degrees, with the national situation, and their initial reception by a 
number of South African critics in particular was generally negative, on the 
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grounds that the narratives did not take a clear stand against apartheid 
oppression. Coetzee considered this kind of political approach to literature 
utilitarian or instrumental, and voiced his discontent about the reception of 
his novels, which hence paved the way for a critical approach more attentive 
and sensitive to the distinctness of his literary production. Sympathy and 
mutuality with Coetzee’s authorial discourse saw the light of day with David 
Attwell, who contributed a new view of the political potential of the novels. 
Later, critical proximity consolidated itself among scholars when Derek 
Attridge, partly in response to the political orientation of the critical discourse, 
brought to the fore the ethical content of Coetzee’s writing. 
The second major phase of Coetzee’s oeuvre is more significant in the 
context of my argument that his authorial discourse rejects mutuality and can 
be described as self-sufficient. This second phase coincides with the period in 
which critical proximity became the dominant approach among scholars. In 
contrast with the earlier oeuvre, this second phase, which comprises the works 
produced between 1990 and 2009, can be described as predominantly self-
referential and autobiographical, in the sense that the narratives put Coetzee’s 
life, to a greater or lesser extent, at the center of their interpretation. The 
change in the subject matter of the novels is key to my argument against 
critical proximity and mutuality, as well as to my description of Coetzee’s 
writing as self-sufficient. This self-referential or autobiographical thematic 
focus could be deemed particularly suitable to the creation of a natural 
environment for critical proximity, as though these works required or invited 
a critical engagement that is intrinsically more intimate. But it is also possible 
to approach their thematic orientation from a diametrically opposed 
perspective: Coetzee’s investment in self-referentiality could be taken as an 
indication of the works’ independence from, or indifference to, interpretive 
discourses, as though the novels were epistemologically self-sufficient. This is 
not to say that they cannot accommodate critical explanation, but rather that 
these novels are deliberately refractory to interpretation insofar as their 
autobiographical configuration is concerned. 
I elaborate on this self-sufficiency from two different angles: one is the 
sense of completeness of the authorial discourse, manifest in the dialogue 
between Coetzee’s critical and novelistic writings; the other is the 
undermining of the interpreter. I bring those perspectives to bear on Disgrace 
(1999) and on Summertime (2009). An essential point of reference for my 
argument about both works is Coetzee’s essay “Confession and Double 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT WRITER 
10 
Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky” (1985). This essay plays a central 
role in the context of the self-referential later works in two ways. First, it 
probes how self-examination can be compromised by the constant doubt 
about whether one is, in fact, completely clear-eyed about oneself. Second, 
Coetzee’s argument confronts directly the notion of mutuality in that he treats 
soul searching as a thoroughly private and solipsistic project. From an ethical 
point of view, self-examination, which an autobiographer carries out by means 
of writing, can be valid as a form of pursuit of an essential truth about the 
self. As far as its epistemological validity is concerned, however, Coetzee 
argues that soul searching is potentially endless and, therefore, inconclusive. 
Truth remains beyond the bounds of an autobiographical narrative; it cannot 
be treated as a proposition set forth for acceptance or refusal “because the 
basic movement of self-reflexiveness is a doubting and questioning movement 
… [It] is in the nature of the truth told to itself by the reflecting self not to be 
final” (Doubling 263). This displacement of truth is not only exclusive to the 
inward look of the autobiographer. Insofar as truth is also of interest to the 
one who reads an autobiographical narrative, the inconclusiveness of this 
“doubting and questioning movement” is also a potential predicament for the 
critic. Put simply, the argument of “Confession and Double Thoughts” 
challenges the epistemological authority of critical discourse, and therefore the 
desired mutuality between author and critic, by rehearsing a commonsensical 
argument: one interpretation can, in theory at least, always dislodge another. 
I read Disgrace and Summertime in light of the idea that self-examination is 
fundamentally a solipsistic and inconclusive project. In the fictional frame of 
Disgrace, Coetzee not only reenacts the problems of soul searching pointed out 
in the essay, but also represents the potential closure of self-examination that, 
as he argues in the essay, is deferred indefinitely. To borrow the words that he 
uses in a passage quoted above, the novel allows him to “play with ideas”, 
something which the logical argumentation in a critical piece cannot 
accommodate to the same extent (Doubling 246). In the reading of Summertime 
I address the other facet of the self-sufficiency of his authorial discourse, the 
radical skepticism of critical proximity and of its claims to interpretive 
authority. The focus of my reading is twofold: I explain how Summertime keeps 
Coetzee’s autobiographical truth hopelessly out of reach for its interpreters 
and how it discredits the process of interpreting a life narrative. In this 
respect, my reading of Summertime will project Coetzee as the only one who 
can have a say about the story of his life. 
INTRODUCTION 
 11 
 Insofar as the two major phases of Coetzee’s oeuvre are concerned, my 
perception of a thematic shift resonates with the developmental features 
pointed out both by Attwell and by Jarad Zimbler. What I am calling the first 
phase coincides with Attwell’s argument that Coetzee’s works from Dusklands 
(1974) to Age of Iron (1990) are positioned in relation to “key discourses 
produced by colonialism and apartheid”. Age of Iron represents in this context 
“both summation and departure”, in the sense that it develops “the 
questioning of narrative authority” posed in Foe (1986) (Politics of Writing 6, 
120). Zimbler also notes a shift from Foe to Age of Iron. Focusing both on style 
and on Coetzee’s reputation, he argues that Foe represents “a kind of 
watershed or fulcrum in Coetzee’s career” as a function of its “purposefully 
antiquated prose”. Besides, “by 1986”, he continues, “Coetzee was no longer 
a marginal upstart, but an internationally recognized novelist and critic. His 
fictions had changed the very shape and structure of South African literature” 
(23). The novels that followed Foe “are likewise marked by further shifts in 
mode, and in particular a concern with generic boundaries and the distinction 
between works of fiction and works of fact” (24). Among these later novels, 
Zimbler distinguishes the memoirs from Elizabeth Costello, Slow Man, and Diary 
of a Bad Year, which share a thematic orientation “towards a new literary 
environment, that of Australia” (24). Finally, he notes that a possibly new 
phase begins with The Childhood of Jesus (2013). Indeed, the sense of 
indeterminacy that prevails in The Childhood of Jesus, or “the spirit of limbo”, as 
Urmila Seshagiri describes it, appeals to an allegorical mode of reading, 
harking back to works such as Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of 
Michael K. “Coetzee invokes the allegorical” in The Childhood of Jesus, Seshagiri 
continues,  “only to thwart its symbolic correspondence with the real” (646). 
Proximity and Mutuality among Critics 
The implications of critical proximity when one deals with Coetzee’s texts 
have not been given any extensive consideration by scholars. At most, what 
has caught the eye of a few commentators is the degree of proximity and 
complementarity between Coetzee’s view of the writer’s work as ethical and 
creative and Attridge’s view of the critical work as also ethical and creative. 
Attridge mirrors the work of the critic in Coetzee’s account of creative writing 
as an act of openness to the unknown. He conceives of authorial and critical 
agency as mutual and commensurate, insofar as both issue from an ethical 
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commitment to being creative. Creativity is understood in this context as a 
willingness to let one’s mode of thinking be reshaped in the process of 
engaging with a literary work. Chapter 1 provides a discussion of this aspect 
of Attridge’s work, as well as of the influence of Attwell’s work in paving the 
way for critical proximity among Coetzee scholars. 
The fact that critical proximity has been noticed but not interrogated is 
worth looking into because of what it reveals about the diffuse manner in 
which power circulates in the field, often embedded in structures or practices 
that normally go unquestioned. Pierre Bourdieu’s view of the nature of the 
power relationships within the field of cultural production, of which the 
literary field is part, is useful here. Bourdieu describes the field of cultural 
production as a field of “competitive struggles” for what he calls “symbolic 
capital”, that is, “recognition and consecration” (In Other Words 141). Insofar 
as the relations among the participants in the field are fundamentally 
competitive, they are relations of power. Yet even though these are 
competitive relations, they cannot be described as being entirely based on “a 
genuine strategic intention” to accumulate capital (The Logic of Practice 62). 
Rather, for Bourdieu these relations are permeated chiefly by a “system of 
dispositions” or inclinations that he calls “habitus” (54). It is the habitus that 
“produces [the] individual and collective practices” particular to the field, 
regulating competition, as it were: habitus entails that all participants in the 
field have a common point of departure (for all share an interest in the 
symbolic capital) and a common understanding of how the relations among 
them develop. Habitus, he continues, guarantees “the ‘correctness’ of 
practices and their constancy over time” (54). 
As far as agency is concerned, what follows from Bourdieu’s habitus is the 
assumption that the agents in the literary field do not consciously and 
deliberately engage in shaping it; as he puts it, there is no “coherence-seeking 
intention or an objective consensus” behind perceptions and practices that 
have become dominant (The Field of Cultural Production 34). This amounts to 
saying that power is not explicitly exercised by someone with the aim of 
enforcing a specific view, method or theory; yet the views, methods or 
theories which attain recognition do exercise an important influence in the 
way the relations among the participants in the field will develop. Put 
differently, power transcends individual agency to a certain extent, but it is, 
nevertheless, felt on the agents in the field. 
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Among reviewers of Coetzee’s novels, for instance, Zimbler has noticed a 
form of “mutual influence” that is illustrative of the dynamics of power in the 
literary field: 
It is certainly possible that Coetzee’s reviewers were responding to one 
another, rather than to the novels themselves, and that the similarities of 
their judgements were therefore produced by mutual influence … it would 
be naïve to imagine that reviewers are unaffected by their predecessors and 
by the marketing efforts of publishers. Particular adjectives may well 
proliferate because they are sanctioned by the blurb and, seemingly, the 
author himself. (4) 
We can assume, following Bourdieu’s habitus, that what prompts reviewers to 
produce similar responses is both a shared disposition and the general 
perception that, if this disposition receives a particular orientation, it is more 
likely that the responses will attain recognition. As he puts it in The Logic of 
Practice, habitus does not presuppose the “simple mechanical reproduction of 
[an] original conditioning”, but it does set limits for the “production of 
thoughts, perceptions, and actions” insofar as the dispositions that constitute 
it are “historically and socially situated” (55). Bourdieu also refers to habitus as 
a “sense of the game”, which he explains as “a form of well-understood 
interest which does not need to ground itself in a conscious and calculated 
understanding of interest” (In Other Words 109). 
A similar line of reasoning can illuminate the influence that Attwell and 
Attridge, whose approaches to Coetzee are distinctly empathetic and 
proximal, have exercised on the work of other critics, an influence that has 
contributed to giving the field certain features (though without limiting the 
field to such features). Given their prominent position in relation to other 
critics, empathy and proximity can be described as powerfully effective means 
of claiming one’s share of the symbolic capital that is particular to the field. 
The relations among critics are essentially relations of force: all, regardless of 
the position that they occupy in the field, strive for recognition and prestige. 
This is not to say that the effort to attain recognition and prestige necessarily 
entails that one deliberately discredits or undermines the achievements of 
others in order to dislodge them from their position of distinction (even 
though this kind of attitude cannot be ruled out entirely). One’s intervention 
in the literary or critical field is informed both by natural dispositions and by a 
degree of calculation of interest. In other words, these dispositions, which 
constitute what Bourdieu calls habitus, are more likely to be granted 
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recognition when they are oriented in a certain direction. This is why he can 
say that habitus creates “a relatively constant universe of situations”; it “tends 
to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a 
milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible” (The Logic of Practice 61). 
In more ordinary terms, one could say that the relations among critics are 
both relations of cooperation and competition. A critical response usually 
entails giving credit to one’s peers but it also changes the configuration of 
power in the field (redistributing the symbolic capital, as it were) because it 
impacts on the positions occupied by all the participants in the field. One 
could, for instance, take the first monograph produced on Coetzee’s work, 
Teresa Dovey’s J. M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories (1988), as a starting point to 
illustrate what critical dialogue entails: on the one hand, recognizing the merits 
and building on the work of one’s predecessors is inescapable; on the other 
hand, much of the critical work itself is also about exposing the weaknesses of 
previous works. With hindsight, two aspects of Dovey’s work have retained 
their significance for the study of Coetzee’s novels: her recourse to 
poststructuralist theory as an interpretive framework and her identification of 
the characteristic self-consciousness of Coetzee’s writing that is key to 
understand how it anticipates and preempts the critical engagement. These 
aspects of Dovey’s work have also been an important point of departure for 
Attwell’s argument in his book, J. M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of 
Writing (1993). As he explains, he responds directly to Dovey’s claim that the 
polarization between those critics who read Coetzee for “political resistance 
and historical representation” and those who attended to the postmodern and 
poststructuralist dimensions of his writing “overlooks the potential area 
between the two, which is concerned to theorize the ways in which discourses 
emerging from different contexts, and exhibiting different formal 
assumptions, may produce different forms of historical engagement”.2 One of 
the major premises of his study, as Attwell himself defines it, is that 
“Coetzee’s novels are located in the nexus of history and text [and] explore 
the tension between these polarities” (2, 3 italics in original). 
Attridge has also engaged with the kernel of Dovey’s argument in his 
chapter “Against Allegory”, whose title is revealing of his disavowal of the 
terms she has proposed to read Coetzee.3 His position relative to Attwell’s 
                                     
2 Dovey, ”Introduction” 5, quoted in Attwell, Politics of Writing 2. 
3 By the way, as Mark Sanders notes, Attridge is “profoundly consonant with Coetzee on the matter 
of allegory” (643). 
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work, however, is more difficult to pin down in terms of agreement or 
disagreement, which attests to the dual, and even ambivalent, nature of the 
critical dialogue. In the beginning of the 1990s, Attwell publishes his J. M. 
Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing; about a decade later, Attridge 
compiles the essays that he has written on Coetzee during the 1990s in J. M. 
Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (2004). While one critic 
chooses “politics” and “writing”, the other chooses “ethics” and “reading”. 
Taken together, these weighty and highly complex terms create a conceptual 
framework in which they are both complementary and opposite. “Politics” 
can be seen as complementary or opposed to “ethics”, just as “writing” can be 
said to be complementary or opposed to “reading”. 
For other Coetzee critics, however, the connections between the terms 
“ethics”, “politics”, “writing”, and “reading”, which are the terms inextricably 
attached to Attwell and Attridge, have created a stable, constant environment 
in which innumerous articles and books have been produced engaging 
precisely with these terms. It is obvious that this extensive production of 
knowledge has carried the understanding of Coetzee’s writing further; but 
where does one draw the line between influence, which creates a point of 
departure or a common ground for dialogue, and circularity, which, by 
perpetuating prevailing views and practices, also discourages sharper or more 
fundamental disagreements? Once again, to say that these terms are dominant 
does not amount to saying that each and every critic of Coetzee has been 
forced to address them in order to be a Coetzee critic. Nevertheless, it is also 
true that no substantial challenge has been posed to the predominance of 
these terms and, therefore, to the influence of the critics who first 
appropriated these terms in Coetzee criticism. The titles of two recent 
important monographs, for instance, are indicative of how their authors 
follow in the footsteps of Attwell’s account of Coetzee’s political discourse in 
Politics of Writing, written more than two decades ago: the monographs are 
Patrik Hayes’s J. M. Coetzee and the Novel: Writing and Politics after Beckett (2010) 
and Jarad Zimbler’s J. M. Coetzee and the Politics of Style (2014). 
Another potential ambivalence that is characteristic of Coetzee scholarship 
is manifest in the frequency with which his fiction is read in light of his 
nonfiction. More often than not, this is indeed a very fruitful way of 
understanding the complexities of his writing. Nevertheless, discomfort about 
the circularity of the method and the excessive respect for Coetzee surfaces 
time and again. Stefan Helgesson, for instance, in a review of Hayes’s Writing 
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and Politics after Beckett and of Carrol Clarkson’s J. M. Coetzee: Countervoices 
(2009), notes how this method, despite its indubitable value, 
also illustrates the difficulties in finding the appropriate critical distance to 
Coetzee … [which] is aggravated by the vertiginous precision and self-
reflexivity of his work, and can result in a culture of reverence that risks a 
tautological reproduction of Coetzee’s own, strikingly canonical, values 
instead of engaging with them in a more agonistic fashion (446). 
As mentioned previously, the discussion of the exemplary features that 
Attwell’s and Attridge’s works exhibit and of the interpretive challenges that 
they face will be carried out in Chapter 1, given the decisive roles that both 
critics have played in promoting and consolidating critical proximity. In this 
section, I want to prepare the ground for my discussion in two ways. First, I 
want to tease out the most apparent continuity between the interrogation of 
impartiality, neutrality, and objectivity that Dancer reads in Coetzee’s recent 
work (and with which I opened this Introduction) and the long-standing 
influence of Attwell’s and Attridge’s approach to Coetzee. Second, I will also 
examine briefly a number of works that converge with my focus on critical 
proximity either by practicing it, notably by reading Coetzee’s fiction alongside 
his scholarly writings, or by acknowledging Coetzee’s awareness of how his 
critics work. 
In Politics of Writing, Attwell identified in Coetzee’s novels “a mode of 
fiction that draws attention to the historicity of discourses, to the way subjects 
are positioned within and by them, and finally, to the interpretive process, 
with its acts of contestation and appropriation” (20). He coins the concept 
“situational metafiction” to describe this characteristic of the novels. The key 
word in Attwell’s argument that resonates with Dancer’s reading of Coetzee is 
“positioned”: if the critic is positioned within a historical context or moment, 
criticism surely cannot define itself as a neutral or disinterested practice. After 
Attwell, it was Attridge who took up the issue of positionality in Coetzee’s 
writing again and rethought it in depth, expanding specifically on what it 
entails for the critic. In consonance with Attwell, Attridge reasserts how 
Coetzee’s novels consistently scrutinize “the many interpretive moves that we 
are accustomed to making in our dealings with literature, whether historical, 
biographical, psychological, moral, or political”. He calls such interpretive 
moves “allegorical”, in the general sense that “they take the literal meaning of 
the text to be a pathway to some other, more important, meaning”. 
Positionality surfaces clearly in Attridge’s thought when he proposes a mode 
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of reading that aims to counter the allegorical by being “grounded [on] the 
experience of reading as an event” (italics in original): 
That is to say, in literary reading … I do not treat the text as an object 
whose significance has to be divined; I treat it as something that comes into 
being only in the process of understanding and responding that I, as an 
individual reader in a specific time and place, conditioned by a specific 
history, go through. (Ethics of Reading 39) 
Dancer’s thinking about literary reading as “an event irreducible to the 
processing of information alone” is clearly indebted to the prominence of 
Attridge’s work (135). To be sure, Attridge was not the first one to think of 
reading as an “event”, but the currency that the concept enjoys among readers 
of Coetzee is undoubtedly inextricable from the impact of his work on the 
field. 
After Attwell’s intervention in the critical field in the beginning of the 
1990s both with Politics of Writing and with Doubling the Point, the immensely 
influential volume of interviews with Coetzee that contextualize several of his 
scholarly writings, Attridge was one of the first scholars who shifted the terms 
of the debate towards ethics, reading Coetzee via the works of Emmanuel 
Levinas and Jacques Derrida. In 2004, he released J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of 
Reading in conjunction with The Singularity of Literature, in which he proposes 
his ethical and creative theory of literary reading. 
Coetzee’s academic and public acclaim peaked in the 2000s, and he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2003. Since then, a number of 
works have appeared which adopt a broad perspective into his oeuvre, often 
by addressing important theoretical or contextual issues and by reading the 
fiction with the nonfiction as well. Among those that adopt this broad 
perspective, with contributions from several prominent scholars, is J. M. 
Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual (2006), edited by Jane Poyner. 
Another is Dominic Head’s The Cambridge Introduction to J. M. Coetzee (2009), 
which has a particularly valuable final chapter on Coetzee’s reception up to 
2006. Also in 2009 J. M. Coetzee in Context and Theory, edited by Elleke 
Boehmer, Robert Eaglestone, and Katy Iddiols, came out, a volume that 
brings a variety of contributions by several leading Coetzee scholars. 
Especially worthy of attention in Context and Theory is the editors’ response to 
Coetzee’s “elusive and indirect comments” on the “literary critic and [on] 
theoretical discourse” (2). 
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In the introduction to the volume, Boehmer, Eaglestone, and Iddiols 
reflect on how they aim to tackle critical “suspicion and bad faith”. What 
prompts their reflection is a comment made not by Coetzee himself, but by 
the autofictional JC of Diary of Bad Year, who objects to the principle that “in 
criticism suspiciousness is the chief virtue, that the critic must accept nothing 
whatsoever at face value” (Diary 33). The editors make it clear that “it is 
important not to confuse the author J. M. Coetzee with the author JC”, but 
wish, nevertheless, to take this objection into account. The position they 
adopt is familiar. In a typical statement of how one reads with respect for the 
discourse of the author but also strives for intellectual independence, they 
acknowledge the necessity of moving from the intensity of the spontaneous 
response to a questioning of the work: 
When we read, rather than simply being swamped by affect … we are also, 
surely, by necessity involved with thinking through, responding to, engaging 
with, questioning, the work we are reading: intellection, as well as emotion, 
is part of the way that literature, in Kafka’s phrase, breaks the frozen sea 
within us. This … might also be called facing a work with one’s whole self, 
or with all one’s faculties. The position of the dividing line between bad 
faith suspicion and good faith engagement is a question of judgement. We 
hope that these essays demonstrate the latter rather than the former. (2) 
Another important work that brings texts by well-known scholars such as 
Attridge, Mike Marais, Sue Kossew, and Carrol Clarkson and addresses 
dominant themes in the scholarship is A Companion to the Works of J. M. Coetzee 
(2011), edited by Tim Mehigan. Clarkson’s contribution to the Companion is of 
particular interest, since it intersects with my perspective into Coetzee’s 
relationship with criticism. She pursues two closely connected lines of inquiry 
in the chapter entitled “Coetzee’s Criticism”: “the first line”, as she presents it, 
“is to ask, what does a reading of Coetzee’s critical work hold for us?” The 
second expands on the first by reflecting on “the ways in which Coetzee 
explores the relation between creative and critical modes of writing”, which 
she sees as culminating in “an unsettling question: where does one draw the 
line between fiction and criticism in Coetzee’s writing?” (223, 4) The main 
focus of interest in Clarkson’s argument, in the context of my study, is her 
claim that “it is problematic to assume in advance that criticism is always 
secondary to literature” (230). A distinction must be made between her claim 
and my discussion of criticism as an inferior discursive mode in comparison 
with literary discourse. Clarkson argues that it is problematic to treat criticism 
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as secondary to fiction insofar as Coetzee’s own literary production is 
concerned (and indeed, as she notes, Coetzee’s body of criticism fills five 
volumes). Essentially, her point concerns the dialogue internal to Coetzee’s 
writings as a whole, which was first pointed out by Attwell in Doubling the 
Point. This dialogue between Coetzee’s fiction and nonfiction eventually leads 
her to pose the question as to whether it is worthwhile to draw a line between 
the novelist and the scholar. 
My approach to the relationship between literary and critical discourse 
differs from Clarkson’s in that I focus primarily on criticism of Coetzee, rather 
than by Coetzee. Yet her hesitation to draw a sharp line between Coetzee the 
writer of fiction and Coetzee the scholar also converges with my conclusions 
about the superior discursive authority of the creative writer. Clarkson 
touches on fictional works such as The Lives of Animals, which not only pose 
relevant questions for criticism, but that also function as pieces of critical 
writing.4 As she suggests, “to consider [texts such as Lives] as dialogical and 
creative acts of criticism, rather than as fictions raising philosophical 
questions, is to consider Coetzee’s oeuvre in an entirely different light … [in 
which] literary and critical texts would have a parallel and mutually dependent 
existence, alongside other texts in literature and philosophy” (232, 3). 
Similarly, the conception of “the artist as critic”, with which Dancer 
synthesizes the ideal mutuality between literary and critical discourse, issues 
from a vantage point akin to Clarkson’s (Dancer 139). From my perspective, 
both Dancer and Clarkson allude to a sense of completeness of Coetzee’s 
authorial discourse, which ties in with what I refer to as a form of self-
sufficiency in relation to other explanatory discourses. 
Clarkson’s chapter in the Companion is a smaller scale reworking of the 
argument of her monograph J. M. Coetzee: Countervoices (2009). Her discussion 
in the book is “an extended thinking through of the ethics and aesthetics of 
literary address”, which she understands as part of what she calls Coetzee’s 
“seriousness”, borrowing the concept from Coetzee himself. “Seriousness”, as 
he defines it, is “an imperative uniting the aesthetic and the ethical” (1, 2). 
More specifically, by approaching Coetzee “more broadly as a writer, rather 
than exclusively as a novelist”, Clarkson explores “the link between Coetzee’s 
explicit preoccupation with language from the perspective of the linguistic 
                                     
4 I will also present a reading of The Lives of Animals in Chapter 1. 
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sciences on the one hand, and the ethical force of his work, from a literary-
philosophical perspective, on the other” (2, 3 italics in original). 
Besides Clarkson’s Countervoices, two other recent monographs examine 
Coetzee’s scholarly writing in search for its connections with the fiction. I 
have mentioned them previously: Patrik Hayes’s J. M. Coetzee and the Novel: 
Writing and Politics after Beckett (2010), and Jarad Zimbler’s J. M. Coetzee and the 
Politics of Style (2014). Clarkson’s, Hayes’s, and Zimbler’s monographs, in their 
holistic approach to Coetzee’s writings, attest to the path-breaking influence 
of Attwell’s case for the continuities between Coetzee’s fiction and scholarly 
writings in Doubling the Point more than twenty years ago. Besides, as 
Helgesson points out in his review, both Hayes and Clarkson are preoccupied 
with the ethical seriousness of Coetzee’s work. Hayes in particular shows 
“how one of its distinctive features is the irruption of the comic – the 
bathetic, the foolish, the absurd – in his fictions” (Helgesson, “Review” 447). 
Zimbler’s J. M. Coetzee and the Politics of Style, apart from illustrating the critical 
habit of reading Coetzee with Coetzee, attends to the reading effects of his 
works, which are also important for my view of Coetzee’s authorial agency. 
Zimbler examines the “stylistic qualities” of the novels in order to “show what 
it is about the work that affects us and why this manner of being affected is 
important” (Zimbler 7). His perspective, hence, as he puts it, has affinities 
with “socio-linguistics, pragmatics and narrative rhetoric” (6). Pragmatics and 
narrative rhetoric, as I will elaborate on in the next section and in Chapter 1, 
are also central to my theoretical apparatus. 
Insofar as my recourse to narrative rhetoric is concerned, another 
monograph is worthy of mention here, if only because its title might 
misleadingly suggest a similarity with my approach: Gillian Dooley’s J. M. 
Coetzee and the Power of Narrative (2010). Dooley also looks into the nonfiction 
as well as into the fiction, but her focus is mainly thematic, and she does not 
bring any definite theoretical framework to bear on the novels. Her project, as 
she presents it rather loosely, consists not “in examining the ‘what’ or even 
the ‘why’ of Coetzee’s work in any detail”, but in “[discovering] the ‘how’: 
whence does Coetzee’s work derive its power” (2). 
Finally, the two biographies of Coetzee produced thus far can also be seen 
from the vantage point of the biographers’ treatment of their subject. In 2012, 
the first authorized biography of Coetzee, J. C. Kannemeyer’s J. M. Coetzee: A 
Life in Writing, was published. In 2015, Atwell’s J. M. Coetzee and the Life of 
Writing came out. If the titles of both biographies are similar, the approaches 
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adopted by the biographers are, however, radically different. As Boehmer 
notes, Kannemayer writes “in the manner of a historian: his self-appointed 
task is not only to produce a biographical narrative about his subject but also 
to enlist that subject in a national history”. His approach is traditionally 
“chronological, genealogical, and nationalist, sometimes even hagiographical” 
(“Reading between Life and Work” 441). Since the biographical subject in 
question is Coetzee, a writer who has explored “in depth … the fine 
connections between writing a life, life-writing, and writing fiction”, Boehmer 
continues, Kannemeyer’s “empirical and even unliterary approach” is a 
problem because of “the uncomplicated relation that it assumes between fact 
and fiction or narrative” (444). Attwell’s biography, unsurprisingly, engages 
with Coetzee’s life and writing in a completely different way. In fact, his 
approach is almost the perfect opposite of Kannemeymer’s: whereas 
Kannemeyer privileges “fact over writing”, Attwell’s assumption is that “the 
writer’s art encodes the negative of the personal stuff, the mould, or imprint 
but not the substance” (442, my italics). 
In light of the argument that I will develop in the following chapters, 
namely, that Coetzee is very keen on preserving the integrity of his authorial 
discourse, Boehmer makes an interesting comment about his awareness of the 
kind of approach that a literary historian such as Kannemeyer would adopt. 
Her point is that Kannemeyer “does not himself feel qualified to offer critical 
commentary”, which, Boehmer suggests, might have suited Coetzee 
particularly well: 
The degree to which Kannemeyer as his first biographer subscribes to a 
severe, even minimalist portrayal of the writer raises the speculation that the 
self-protective Coetzee may have felt drawn to Kannemeyer as his first 
biographer precisely because he was aware that by doing so he might keep 
his writerly persona and his personal privacy relatively intact (with the added 
advantage of being reclaimed for his birth-nation at a time when he was 
widely perceived to have abandoned it) … The irony that follows from this 
is that [Kannemeyer’s] knowing autre-fictional subject always keeps in some 
sense one step ahead of the biographical narrative … (“Reading between 
Life and Work” 444,5 italics in original) 
Unlike Kannemeyer’s, Attwell’s focus lies “on the life, and on how the art 
encodes the life, no matter how obliquely; on how the self is woven into, and 
then out of, the work” (italics in original). His project is clearly an interpretive 
one, since “he approaches each of Coetzee’s published fictions armed with a 
set of working hypotheses, like provisional road maps or navigational devices” 
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(446).5 Once again, proximity is his guiding principle: Attwell follows in the 
tracks of Coetzee’s slipperiness and rehearses it once again, reinforcing the 
widely known view of how the author’s life informs the writing in all but a 
straightforward way. This view, it is important to note, is first and foremost 
Coetzee’s own, most expressively conveyed in his memoirs, especially 
Summertime, as I will show in Chapter 3. Most telling, however, is the persistent 
impulse, or imperative, to pay a tribute, to lift Coetzee to the pantheon of 
great authors (as though a Nobel Prize of Literature did not suffice to do so). 
As in Politics of Writing, the tone of deference and homage is present in several 
passages of Life of Writing, like the one below: 
Most ordinary readers, among whom I include myself, remain fascinated by 
biography, especially the insights it affords into the creative processes that 
produce the fictions we treasure most. When I introduced J. M. Coetzee: 
South Africa and the Politics of Writing twenty years ago, I said that I was 
uncertain whether the book was a tribute or a betrayal, ‘infinitely wishing’ 
that it were the former. I am caught in the same quandary today. I respect 
the novels as public documents no less that I did then, but my admiration 
has undergone a major change, from the finished work to the immense 
labour, and the openness to the difficult and the strange, that have 
produced one of the exemplary authorships of our times. (22, 3) 
Coetzee is unanimously respected and admired by his readers and critics, and 
this admiration is certainly just. But, once again, the return to a celebratory 
approach when one is dealing with a remarkably authoritative and by now 
widely celebrated writer (who, besides, is so skeptical of the critical industry) 
raises the question of the extent to which criticism can indulge in passion. To 
be sure, Attwell is writing a biography, so his objective is primarily to 
understand Coetzee’s creative process, rather than interrogate it. Nevertheless, 
given the overflow of critical recognition that Coetzee has received through 
the years, what does deference add, at this point, to the shared critical project 
of establishing a dialogue with the literary discourse, testing its principles and 
assumptions, casting new light upon them, and refining the understanding of 
literature? 
                                     
5 Note that Attwell himself distinguishes his biography from his previous criticism: “Now, twenty 
years [after Politics of Writing], I take an entirely different approach, a step back in order to look 
again, this time not as a literary critic would, which is to say at the finished works, but at the 
authorship that underlies them: its creative processes and sources, its oddities and victories – above 
all, at the remarkable ways in which it transforms its often quite ordinary materials into 
unforgettable fiction” (18). 
INTRODUCTION 
 23 
Celebration of the author, as I will discuss in the next section, can be seen 
as a matter of principle. The writing of a literary work is a unique individual 
act, and this individuality, as the phenomenological critics of the Geneva 
school advocated, must always be recognized and asserted. This is the reason 
why proximity must inform the critic’s approach: without coming close to the 
author, one cannot detect his or her uniqueness. In the end, however, the 
critic should strive to see the author and the work from a certain distance, put 
both into a wider perspective and, most importantly, say something different 
from what the author says. The mutual agency between author and critic, in 
Starobinski’s conception, is grounded on difference. 
With Coetzee, proximity is particularly problematic because, writing as a 
critic as well, he indirectly furnishes his interpreters with the terms to read his 
novels, which makes the ultimate differentiation between author and critic 
particularly ambiguous. As far as the mutual agency between author and critic 
is concerned, Coetzee projects and protects the integrity of his writing to such 
a degree that the critical dialogue, as I will argue in connection with his 
autobiography, does not seem to be welcome. The next section develops the 
theoretical framework I employ to identify the internal contradictions of a 
criticism based on proximity and to address Coetzee’s preemptive awareness 
of his reception. Those two issues require two different, but complementary, 
theoretical perspectives: phenomenological criticism, which dwells on 
proximity and distance, and rhetorical narrative theory, which accounts for 
how authorial views can be gauged with basis on narrative input. 
Author and Critic: Phenomenological and 
Rhetorical Perspectives 
The phenomenological critics of the Geneva school practiced a form of 
criticism that aimed to gain access to the unique interiority of the artist. 
Despite the idiosyncrasies in each critic’s thought, their approaches converge 
around identification, indeed coincidence, between the critical and the 
authorial consciousness that is manifested by the work. The dominant feature 
of their thinking is empathy, the passive act of letting oneself be taken over 
and transformed by the other. It is by means of an empathetic reading that the 
other is made familiar to the critic. As Hillis Miller puts it, the 
phenomenological criticism of the Geneva school aimed to bring the inner life 
of the creative artist “into the interior space of the critic’s mind” (307). 
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The emphasis on identification and coincidence between the authorial and 
the critical consciousness comes from the work of George Poulet, who is a 
common formative influence for the Geneva critics. Poulet subscribes to a 
Cartesian view of the creative consciousness as “intransitive [and] 
preconceptual”, a mode of consciousness that “precedes any consciousness of 
something” (Morrissey xxvii, italics in original). His objective is to identify 
totally with this pure consciousness, so that criticism in effect redoubles it, or 
becomes an extension of it. Empathy and complete coincidence do not only 
inform his thinking about criticism from beginning to end; in fact, they are the 
very end, or the goal, of the critical practice that he advocates. 
Jean Starobinski has a different conception of the end of the critical work: 
he imagines it as a trajectory from proximity, which encompasses the 
empathetic reading, to distance, in which there is a differentiation between the 
critical and the authorial consciousness. This difference stems from his 
conception of the creative consciousness. Unlike Poulet, Starobinski adopts 
an essentially anti-Cartesian, that is to say, relational view of consciousness. In 
this respect, his critical work is typically phenomenological: there is no pure 
consciousness that is not inextricably intermingled with the world, no 
consciousness that is not already consciousness of another. The theoretical 
consequence of this stance necessarily leads to differentiation between author 
and critic. For Starobinski, the initial empathetic moment of reading provides 
the critic with a vantage point into the other as other and, hence, into the self 
as other to the text. Therefore, the task at issue for the critic cannot simply 
involve, and end with, identification. The recognition of difference is already 
in place, so that the critical work cannot limit itself to being a simple extension 
of the creative consciousness. 
An empathetic reading, as Starobinski argues in a long explanation of 
Rousseau’s Confessions, incurs the risk of ending in an interpretive tautology. 
To use the object of interpretation as a model for the interpretive method 
applied to it implies that “a single discourse travels, reverberating back upon 
itself … always certain of confirmation by its object” (The Living Eye 224). To 
a great extent, circularity is inescapable: “our theories are turned back upon 
themselves, in which everything begins and ends with what we say but only 
after passing through our object, which functions much as a crystal does when 
it diffracts a beam of particles or rays focused upon it” (224). This circularity 
to which Starobinski refers is that of Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle, which 
“begins with a particular, distinctive, significant occurrence and ends with the 
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same occurrence, only now legitimized in its particularity and significance” 
(227). The idea is that interpretation also presupposes above all a dialogical 
thought process in which “it is not my discourse that assimilates and absorbs 
the object, but the object that elicits and absorbs my discourse” (227). 
Yet Starobinski’s conception of the critical work as ultimately a linear 
trajectory from proximity (or heteronomy, as he calls it) to distance 
(autonomy), rather than a circle, undoubtedly indicates that distance from the 
authorial consciousness is imperative in order to avoid the appropriation or 
subordination of the critical discourse by the authorial discourse. It is the 
assertion of difference that grants the critical work interpretive authority by 
preventing it from being a tautological second-hand reflection of the literary 
work. If criticism does not change its relation to the literary text from the 
“spontaneous sympathy” of the first reading, in which the critic “[tries] to 
identify quite closely with the law of the work”, towards a “free” or 
“autonomous reflection about the work and the history of which it is a part”, 
it limits itself “to the role of providing a sensitive echo, an intellectualized 
reflection of the work, docilely obedient to the uniquely seductive qualities of 
each individual text, … whose evocative magic [one has] endured without 
resistance and without reflective examination” (113, 14, 17). 
More than a trajectory, Starobinski envisions the critical work as an 
encounter of two unique creative personalities, one artistic and the other 
critical, on an equal footing. He borrows a concept from stylistic analysis, the 
écart, in order to provide the theoretical basis for the equality between author 
and critic.6 As Morrissey explains, the écart, a notion that applies both to the 
production and the interpretation of literature, signals a deviation from the 
norm, an individual’s “refusal to be determined by the structures in place”: 
From the point of view of production or writing as an existential act, the 
écart is a divergence implying the revolt of the individual against the norm. 
… Here writing is, in its very essence, an “oppositional act” in that, on the 
one hand, it expresses the adhesion to an acceptance of the norm and 
determining structures inherent in language and, on the other, it reveals at 
the same time an intention of refusal or revolt, be it conscious or not.  (xviii, 
italics in original). 
As a token of the individuality of a creative consciousness, the écart functions 
on a theoretical level as an index of balance between the two unique 
                                     
6 The écart is a concept from the theory of stylistic analysis proposed by the German scholar Leo 
Spitzer. 
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personalities of the author and the critic. From the perspective of the critic, 
the écart is a kind of guarantee of autonomy; it distinguishes the critic’s refusal 
to be assimilated by that to which he or she responds. 
From a theoretical point of view, the critical trajectory from proximity to 
distance, which leads eventually to the perfect encounter between two unique 
intellectual sensibilities, is extremely attractive. Thus conceived, criticism is 
ideally a movement from the initial commitment to letting the intense 
experience of a text pervade and guide the response, which opens the critic to 
a unique creative sensibility and celebrates the “existential act” of an 
individual, as Morrissey put it in the quote above, towards reflective freedom. 
Starobinski theorizes an “ideal critical work” that, in his words, “seeks both to 
abolish difference (through an inclusive and totalizing discourse) and to 
preserve distance (by understanding the other as other)” (Eye 227). One could 
argue that, by describing it as an “ideal” criticism, Starobinski is not only 
articulating what is most desirable, but also already indirectly communicating 
that this trajectory is potentially unachievable in practice. Nevertheless, what 
emerges most clearly from his writing is that his phenomenological criticism 
proposes for itself a very difficult task when it attempts to reconcile passion, 
from which it originates, and power, which it must in the end exercise. 
Starobinski moves back and forth in his thinking, at times underscoring the 
need to do justice to the work and the author by recognizing and celebrating 
their singularity, at times safeguarding the authority of criticism, which, as a 
posterior existential and individual act, cannot be secondary in the sense of 
being submissive or thoroughly passive. For instance, criticism must, on the 
one hand, “wed the work and avoid becoming a ‘celibate machine’” (and this 
metaphor of a marriage between author and critic is one which Coetzee also 
uses). The critic, though, “is never more than the prince consort of poetry, 
and the offspring of their union cannot inherit the throne” (124). Obviously, 
as the “prince consort”, criticism is in a subordinate position; Starobinski, 
thus, shifts the balance of power with another metaphor: “My reading must 
breathe life into the work … I must bring the work back to life in order to 
love it; I must make it speak in order to respond to it … Hence one might say 
that the work always begins as ‘our dearly departed’, awaiting resurrection 
through us” (124). 
At the end of “The Critical Relation”, Starobinski raises the critical work to 
such heights that it loses itself, becoming its beloved other: 
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If criticism is to be up to all of its tasks, … then it cannot remain within the 
confines of verifiable knowledge. It must become a work of literature in its 
own right, and incur the risks associated with any such work. Hence it will 
bear the stamp of a personality, but a personality that has been subjected to 
the impersonal ascetic discipline of “objective” knowledge and scientific 
technique. It will be knowledge about language incorporated into a new 
language of its own, an analysis of the poetic “event” that becomes an event 
in its own right. By delving into the material substance of the work, by 
exploring the details of its construction, its formal makeup, its inner 
harmonies and extrinsic relations, criticism enhances its capacity to 
recognize the trace of an action. Rehearsing that action in its own way, it 
judges and thereby bestows upon it a heightened meaning … (127, 8) 
At this point, Starobinski comes precisely to the change of nature aspired by 
Dancer’s criticism of presence, encapsulated in the ambiguous phrase “the 
artist as critic”, with which he synthesizes the kind of imaginative, creative 
sensibility required from (or desired by) the critic (Dancer 139). But neither 
Dancer nor Starobinski seems able to sustain the aspired mutuality between 
author and critic. Dancer’s phrase suggests that this superior creative and 
analytical sensibility is the artist’s, not the critic’s. Starobinski, in contrast, 
restores the imbalance of power, putting the critic once again in the higher 
position from which he “judges and thereby bestows” meaning upon the 
work. 
Looking into the criticism of presence through the lens of 
phenomenological criticism, mutuality between author and critic is 
unattainable. As I will show in Chapter 1, Attridge’s ethical and creative 
criticism, inspired to a great extent in Coetzee’s work, also rests on similarly 
very attractive but unstable grounds: it purports to aspire to mutuality and 
commensurability between both, but also ends up with an ambiguous 
differentiation between same and other. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, I will 
examine one instance of Attridge’s practice and argue that it takes over 
Coetzee’s literary discourse (or, to borrow Coetzee’s phrase, it “overpowers” 
the work). 
I will also explore mutuality from the perspective of Coetzee’s authorial 
discourse, which brings me to the theoretical concepts that enable me to do 
so. My argument about Coetzee’s views about proximity and mutuality 
presupposes that narratives can communicate authorial views. In other words, 
I assume that the elements that constitute a narrative can serve as a basis for 
inferences about an author’s views on a given subject. This orientation of my 
argument can be described as rhetorical, for it places emphasis on the 
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communicative dimension of Coetzee’s writing. Such emphasis naturally 
introduces a concern with the intentional component of the authorial 
communication, that is to say, with the assumption that the author deliberately 
shapes the text with the aim of communicating something in particular. 
Approaches to narrative as a communicative act have, in diverse ways, dealt 
with this assumption under the rubric of authorial intent. The much-debated 
concept of the implied author, for instance, testifies to the attention that 
authorial intent has received from theorists, as well as to the disagreements 
that prevail about the premise that a text can be approached as a vehicle of its 
author’s prior communicative intentions. 
In the context of Coetzee’s literary production, one of the most salient 
aspects of his creative process poses a challenge to the concept of authorial 
intent: Coetzee has made manifest that the potential meanings of his works 
exceed his conscious participation in, and control of, the creative process. A 
crucial feature of his communicative act, in other words, is precisely the 
emphasis on the author’s abdication, as it were, of influence over the 
meanings of a text, which implies a shift from the focus on authorial intent to 
the implication of the interpreter in the creation of those meanings. 
This aspect of Coetzee’s view of authorship requires an understanding of 
authorial agency within a rhetorical framework that strikes a balance between 
two poles. On the one hand, it must subscribe to the commonsensical 
principle that a text communicates an authorial desire to express something 
(otherwise, it could not approach a text as a communicative act). On the other 
hand, this rhetorical perspective must also make explicit that what it reveals 
about Coetzee’s views on the subject of critical proximity and mutuality is the 
product of inferences that have arisen as a consequence of the specific context 
in which his novels are read. 
The claims about Coetzee’s authorial agency made here rely, therefore, on 
an interpretive context in which certain inferences about his views emerge as 
more likely to be accurate than others. Broadly speaking, this shift from 
intentionality to context has affinities with what Jerrold Levinson defines as 
hypothetical or constructive intentionalism. A hypothetical intentionalist view 
attaches meaning primarily to the context in which an utterance is produced 
and received, which includes, apart from “directly observable features of the 
utterance”, also “something of the characteristics of the author who projects 
the text, something of the text’s place in a surrounding oeuvre and culture, 
and possibly other elements as well” (223). Intention is, as Levinson puts it, 
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“optimally hypothesized”, so that the meaning of an utterance is tied to “our 
best appropriately informed projection of author’s intended meaning” (224). 
As far as the interpreter is concerned, Levinson also conceives of something 
like an optimally hypothesized reader that he calls, simply, “an appropriate 
reader … versed in and cognizant of the tradition out of which the work 
arises, acquainted with the rest of the author’s oeuvre, and perhaps familiar as 
well with the author’s public literary and intellectual identity and persona” 
(228). 
From a specifically rhetorical perspective, a hypothetical intentionalist view 
on the authorial communicative act resonates with Richard Walsh’s approach 
to narrative production and reception. Walsh’s primary concern is with 
fictionality, which he distinguishes from the common understanding of fiction 
as generic category. In order to propose a conception of fictionality “as a 
particular way of meaning”, Walsh sees the communicative exchange between 
writer and reader from the perspective of the pragmatics of communication, 
whose emphasis lies on the context in which a communicative act occurs (6). 
A pragmatic approach to communication understands intention in minimal 
terms as the intention to communicate; as for what is communicated, 
meanings of utterances are gauged with basis on literal content (what is said) 
and, most importantly, with basis on the so-called non-literal content of an 
utterance, which comprises inferences produced within the specific context of 
communication. 
The minimal take on authorial intent and the attention to contextual 
meaning provide the foundation for my understanding of Coetzee’s 
communicative act and, therefore, for my claims about his implied views 
about the activity of the critic. This perspective informs the argument as a 
whole, but it becomes particularly clearer in the literary chapters when I 
account for the responses to Disgrace and to Coetzee’s memoirs. The point of 
departure for the discussion of these works is the assumption that the 
authorial communicative act can be discerned in tandem with the 
configuration of narrative elements, relevant extratextual sources, and 
responses to the works in question. In the case of Disgrace, these three 
elements reveal the provocative dimension of Coetzee’s communicative act 
that is an important piece in my characterization of his resistance to critical 
containment or appropriation. In the case of the memoirs, the element that 
initially defines the authorial communicative act is absolute truthfulness, or 
“truth-directedness”, which is a concept coined by Coetzee himself. As the 
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Swedish Academy puts it in its Press Release, Coetzee is a “scrupulous 
doubter”, a statement which attests to the shared critical view of his 
autobiographical writing as extraordinarily honest (“The Nobel Prize in 
Literature to John Maxwell Coetzee”). My own perspective into the 
configuration of the memoirs, the extratextual sources that illuminate them, 
and into the responses that they have elicited prompt me, however, to 
characterize the authorial communicative act in different terms. In line with 
my description of Coetzee as a provocative writer, the autobiographer that 
emerges in the memoirs is markedly refractory in relation to the critic; more 
than a truth-directed writing, what Coetzee produces in his autobiographical 
narratives is a writing that interrogates and rejects the work of the critic. 
Rhetorical narrative theory also plays an important role in my reading of 
Summertime as a work that evinces Coetzee’s rejection of critical proximity and 
mutuality. Summertime is a narrative that forces the reader to scrutinize the 
purported proximity between its fictitious character narrators and the 
autobiographical subject, that is, Coetzee. To be read as a memoir, Summertime 
requires that the reader take these fictitious character narrators as authorial 
voices. My reading focuses on the extent to which these character narrators 
can be taken as spokespersons for Coetzee, as well as on the implications of 
the assumption that Summertime is the memoir of a truth-directed writer. In 
order to do this, I build on the work of two narratologists: Susan Lanser, who 
reflects on how the authority of a character narrator as an authorial voice is 
construed throughout the narrative by means of mimetic and diegetic factors; 
and James Phelan, who addresses the inescapable unreliability that is intrinsic 
to character narration. 
In part, Coetzee’s relationship with critical proximity and mutuality can be 
described as a progression, insofar as it is possible to identify the emergence 
and the consolidation of these concepts. A bird’s eye view over his works and 
their reception reveals the broad contours of two different phases in this 
relationship, in which his authorial agency in relation to proximity and 
mutuality changes. Yet insofar as Coetzee’s works keep eliciting responses, the 
relationship between author and critic can also be thought of as a recursive 
one, for the grounds and the terms of this relationship keep on changing.7 
                                     
7 The idea of a recursive relationship that involves “authorial agency, textual phenomena, and 
reader response” is a cornerstone in Phelan’s conception of narrative as a rhetorical act (Living to 
Tell About It 18, 19). 
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The overview of the chapters that follow specifies the function of each 
chapter in my characterization of this relationship. 
Overview of the Chapters 
I begin Chapter 1 with a discussion of the emergence and the consolidation of 
critical proximity and mutuality among Coetzee scholars by looking into 
Attwell’s and Attridge’s works. As regards the emergence of proximity and 
mutuality, two aspects are significant: the intellectual climate in South Africa 
and Coetzee’s dialogues with Attwell in Doubling the Point. Attwell is keen to 
tell his readers in the introduction to the book that his proximal engagement 
with Coetzee does not “install” the author as “the final authority” on the 
issues discussed (3). Yet a closer look into their exchanges reveals that the 
balance of authority between both is questionable. When Attridge publishes 
Ethics of Reading and The Singularity of Literature about a decade after Attwell’s 
intervention in the field, he consolidates proximity as a congenial method to 
read Coetzee. Mutuality in particular is the focus of attention in my discussion 
of Attridge’s work, since his theory of reading seems to be the perfect 
counterpart to Coetzee’s authorial discourse. The question that arises is 
whether a writer such as Coetzee would welcome a theoretically ideal reader, 
someone who not only understands the work perfectly but who can 
paraphrase its singularity and, therefore, potentially erase it. Turning from the 
critics to look more closely into Coetzee’s authorial discourse, I examine some 
of his fiction and nonfiction and start outlining the picture of the self-
sufficient writer, keen on preserving the integrity of his writing against certain 
types of reading. This aspect of my discussion pivots on the analysis of the 
self-referential later oeuvre and of the specificities of the autobiographical 
contract proposed by Coetzee. I conclude that, with “Confession and Double 
Thoughts”, Coetzee effectively furnishes the interpretive framework for his 
autobiography. Most importantly, if one abides by the argument of the essay 
to read his autobiography, one must account for the way in which Coetzee 
discredits the interpreter by conceiving of interpretation not simply as fallible 
or provisional, but as self-interested too. This aspect of his authorial discourse 
is the kernel of what I refer to as his rejection of critical proximity and 
mutuality. 
From proximity and mutuality in Chapter 1, I move to self-sufficiency in 
Chapters 2 and 3, and offer two different perspectives into Coetzee’s authorial 
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discourse as self-contained. Chapter 2 presents a reading of Disgrace in light of 
“Confession and Double Thoughts”. I read Disgrace as a conversion narrative 
in which the protagonist’s inward look reenacts the oscillation between truth-
directedness and the double thought that are central to Coetzee’s analysis of 
confession and truth in the essay. But the novel does not simply reproduce 
the argument of the essay; it also responds to it by configuring the 
protagonist’s journey towards a secular form of grace in such a way as to 
present the possibility of closure for his self-examination. From this point of 
view, one can argue both for mutuality and self-sufficiency within the 
authorial discourse. It is possible to think of a degree of mutual agency 
between novel and essay, as though Coetzee had first explored the problems 
of self-examination and truth in “Confession and Double Thoughts” and then 
reimagined them in Disgrace. However, insofar as the novel contains within its 
narrative form a possibility of closure that escapes real-life soul searching, it 
offers what could be described as a fuller and perhaps even more satisfactory 
treatment of the problems of self-examination and truth. In other words, the 
discourse of the novel suffices to expose and to show the way out of the 
impasse of self-examination. 
Chapter 3 addresses the self-sufficiency of Coetzee’s autobiographical 
writing. I begin by discussing how his memoirs Boyhood and Youth have been 
read, and devote special attention to Attridge’s reading. This part of the 
argument returns to the question posed in Chapter 1 about the implications of 
an ideal Coetzee reader. I argue that Attridge claims such proximity to the 
story of Coetzee’s life as to overinterpret it, as it were, removing the ambiguity 
of the oscillation between truth-directedness and the double thought that is 
the defining feature of all of Coetzee’s self-referential writing, fictional or 
autobiographical. I then read Summertime as Coetzee’s critique of proximity 
when one interprets his life writing. Coetzee’s autobiographical truth, told by 
all but himself in the narrative, seems to be everywhere and nowhere at the 
same time: the truth about him is depicted as assumptions, beliefs, judgment 
calls, all of which are tainted by the very close attachment of the interpreters 
to the author. By discrediting the interpreters of his life writing in Summertime, 
Coetzee seems to propose a form of readerly engagement with his 
autobiography in which the reader has no say, or no interpretive authority. 
The dialogical dimension of his autobiographical writing seems to disregard 
the interpreter: it is confined to the writer and the medium. In this sense, the 
authorial discourse can be thought of as self-contained. 
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The conclusion sums up the main arguments developed in each chapter 
and considers where Coetzee’s self-sufficiency and the inescapable 
ambivalences of proximity, both in relation to the authorial discourse and to 
the dynamics that prevails in the critical field, leave the Coetzee critic at this 
point. 
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Chapter 1 – Proximity and Mutuality: 
Critical Ambitions, Authorial Limits 
This chapter addresses the reasons why proximity and mutuality create very 
unstable grounds to engage with Coetzee. First, I examine why it has once 
made sense to adopt a proximal approach to his writing: to a great extent, 
proximity with Coetzee can be justified on the basis of historical context. The 
particular context of reception of his writing contributed to making proximity 
something close to an intellectual imperative. Yet the dynamics of the critical 
field also comes into play here, compelling critics to respond to one another 
in such a way as to establish proximity as an almost irrevocable principle to 
read Coetzee. My tracing of the origins of proximity and my effort to 
understand its rationale do not overlook what I consider the main challenge to 
a proximal approach to Coetzee, namely, his characteristic resistance to 
criticism. The second half of the chapter elaborates on this aspect of the 
argument in greater detail. I discuss two instances of Coetzee’s nonfiction, his 
Nobel lecture, and The Lives of Animals. Finally, I consider the self-
referentiality of Coetzee’s later works and the way it projects the self-sufficient 
author. 
The Political Discourse about Coetzee’s 
Novels: Before and After Attwell 
In a few words, one can describe the impact of Attwell’s work as follows: in 
Politics of Writing, he does a great deal to undermine the assumptions about 
Coetzee’s writing that prevailed during the 1980s; in Doubling the Point, the 
volume of interviews with Coetzee in which Attwell is the editor, he paves the 
way for a new kind of critical engagement with Coetzee. 
The change of perspective that Politics of Writing and Doubling the Point 
brought to Coetzee criticism must be seen against the background of the 
South African literary scene in the 1980s. Literary criticism in South Africa at 
that time was marked, as Michael Chapman puts it, by “the binaries of 
apartheid/liberation politics”: a novelist’s social commitment to the struggle 
for liberation was measured against the degree to which literature explicitly 
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bore witness to the state oppression. The realist text was considered a bearer 
of political truth, whereas texts which employed more figurative or less 
mimetic techniques allegedly “reduced content to formal device”, with the 
result that their authors were often found “guilty of social irresponsibility” on 
the grounds of a refusal to engage with historical events (“The Case of 
Coetzee” 105). In this polarized setting, it is not surprising that Coetzee’s early 
works produced between mid-1970s and mid-1980s, intricate and oblique 
metafictional narratives, were generally deemed politically evasive or 
downright socially irresponsible. In contrast, as has been exhaustively pointed 
out, Nadine Gordimer’s realist novels were taken as a more straightforward or 
undisguised challenge to apartheid politics.8 
Dominic Head also comments on this polarization of South African 
criticism. By the mid-80s, there were critics who believed Coetzee’s works, 
and the earlier novels in particular, to be “either complicitous, or weak, in a 
political sense, an inadequate response to the horrors of apartheid South 
Africa and its legacy”. Other critics, however, identified a more imaginative 
critique of the South African situation in his works, arguing from the late 
1980s onwards that “where issues of complicity are treated …, they are 
treated self-consciously, as part of the writer’s project” (Cambridge Introduction 
95, 6). With hindsight, this literary political agency of Coetzee’s writing during 
the 1980s could be described, as Stefan Helgesson suggests, as disruptive: 
given that “representational convention itself” was part of the problem of 
responding to the crisis of the 1980s, Coetzee (but also writers such as 
Njabulo Ndebele or even Nadine Gordimer) deliberately disrupted 
“representational and generic expectations” upon the fiction (Writing in Crisis 
4). 
Before I go on to examine the impact of Attwell’s work, I want to 
acknowledge here (if only to dismiss it in the end) a widely debated and 
complex issue that hovers over my brief discussion of Coetzee’s insertion in 
the South African context. I am referring to the debate about the literary 
agency proposed by writers who were suspicious of struggle literature and its 
socio-political realism. It would be impossible for me here to account for the 
complexity of the South African situation in this respect, let alone to address 
the South African situation against the backdrop of what could be described 
                                     
8 See also Michael Chapman’s “Coetzee, Gordimer and the Nobel Prize”, and Kelly Hewson’s 
“Making the ‘Revolutionary Gesture’: Nadine Gordimer, J. M. Coetzee and Some Variations on the 
Writer’s Responsibility”. 
PROXIMITY AND MUTUALITY: CRITICAL AMBITIONS, AUTHORIAL LIMITS 
 37 
as a much broader African context in which writers from other African 
countries have explored the possibilities of writing as a reaction to European 
domination. What is relevant for the specific argument about criticism 
advanced here is the present consolidated view about the nature of the 
intervention made by Coetzee’s postmodern/poststructuralist kind of writing 
in apartheid South Africa: in other words, many scholars would agree by now 
that the critique of realism embedded in his early writing was all but apolitical. 
Attwell’s book J. M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing responds 
directly to the critical consensus that prevailed in the 1980s about Coetzee’s 
political slipperiness. Attwell gives a powerfully persuasive account of the 
political import of Coetzee’s postmodern strategies in the fractured South 
African context. He focuses on the novels’ peculiar combination of basic plots 
that explore the national historical narrative of colonialism and decolonization 
with a general sense of indeterminacy that undermines the truth claims and 
political certainties of the realist postcolonial novel. Dusklands (1974) and In 
the Heart of the Country (1978) begin the historical narrative of colonialism by 
depicting the violence of the colonizer and the settlement. Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1981) portrays the state of uncertainty at the end of colonial 
imperialism. Civil war provides the backdrop for both Michael K’s and Mrs. 
Curren’s narratives, in Life and Times of Michael K (1983) and Age of Iron (1990), 
respectively, whereas Foe (1986) calls into question the power and authority of 
the metropolitan canon. Even though these novels elicit readings that 
privilege the historical context depicted or alluded to in the narratives, or that 
surrounds their production, they also disrupt responses that align the text with 
an external historical reality.9 In Waiting for the Barbarians, for example, Coetzee 
gives no clear indication of when and where the story unfolds, and the novel’s 
main characters have no proper names, being simply referred to as the 
Magistrate or the barbarian girl. Michael K, wandering in a country in turmoil, 
resembles “a kind of Derridean trace, refusing to occupy a fixed place in the 
system”, as Attwell suggests in Doubling the Point (245). 
The claim that author and narrative are inevitably implicated in questions 
of power, representativeness, legitimacy and, above all, cultural authority in 
South Africa was a major turning point in Coetzee criticism: it went a long 
way towards redressing the accusations of political evasiveness or complicity 
                                     
9 Head reiterates Attwell’s argument: Coetzee “puts his readers through the experience of being 
enticed to overlay a work with a template of meaning before realizing the incompleteness or even 
complicity of such readings” (“A Belief in Frogs” 104). 
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leveled at him. Undoubtedly, this change in the perception of Coetzee’s 
writing must, to a great extent, be attributed to the impact of Attwell’s work, 
but what has given this perspective into Coetzee’s novels almost unquestioned 
authority was Coetzee himself. Politics of Writing marks a change in Coetzee 
criticism because the new critical perspective that Attwell offers in his book is 
sanctioned by Coetzee in the interviews that he gives to Attwell in Doubling the 
Point. As Attwell himself put it in a conversation with Elleke Boehmer, Politics 
of Writing and Doubling the Point were “mutually reinforcing” projects 
(“Doubling the Writer” 59). The mutual reinforcement between both works is 
evident in the context of the key argument about positionality. In Politics of 
Writing, Attwell explores what he describes as Coetzee’s “reflexive 
examination of the constitutive role of language in placing the subject within 
history” (3). In Doubling the Point, Coetzee describes himself as “not only blind 
but, written … as a white South African into the latter half of the twentieth 
century, disabled, disqualified – a man-who-writes reacts to the situation he 
finds himself in of being without authority, writing without authority” (392). 
One can begin examining the impact of Attwell’s work in Doubling the Point 
by addressing two different but interrelated aspects: the significance of the 
interviews for Attwell’s career as a Coetzee scholar and the significance of the 
interviews for scholarship on Coetzee. Not only does Doubling the Point lend 
considerable credibility to the new political discourse about Coetzee that is 
shaped in Politics of Writing, but it also distinguishes Attwell as the critic who 
has made Coetzee speak. When Doubling the Point came out, Coetzee was 
known among literary scholars as a tight-lipped intellectual who did not 
welcome questions about the diverse ethical, political, aesthetic, and 
philosophical issues taken up in his novels. Against the background of this 
recalcitrance with interviewers, itself a token of his wariness of critics who 
either “betray” or “overpower” the literary work, the responses to Attwell in 
Doubling the Point offer extraordinary insight into his fiction (61).10 The second 
aspect, the significance of the interviews for scholarship on Coetzee, reveals 
how Attwell’s work in Doubling the Point has transformed Coetzee criticism to a 
greater degree than his work in Politics of Writing: Attwell identified the 
formative role of Coetzee’s academic background in his novelistic writing, an 
insight that still generates productive interpretations of his oeuvre. Attwell 
                                     
10 Coetzee published other collections of essays as well. Before the work with Attwell, he had 
published White Writing (1988). After Doubling the Point, Giving Offense came out in 1996; Stranger 
Shores, in 2001; and Inner Workings, in 2007. 
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promotes Coetzee’s fiction as a consolidation of his academic expertise, 
capturing two different facets of his intellectual activity that were unknown at 
the time: “The intensity and accomplishment of Coetzee’s life in literature and 
scholarship … as linguist and stylistician, critic of metropolitan and modern 
South African literatures, translator, essayist in popular culture, reviewer, 
polemicist, and autobiographer … are borne out finally in the novels” (2). 
 Given Coetzee’s aversion to interviews, the fact that Attwell has managed 
to prompt elaborate and sometimes even lengthy responses from him is worth 
looking into. It is clear that Attwell had read extensively in preparation for the 
interviews; he shows that he is well acquainted not only with Coetzee’s 
writing, but with its sources too, which testifies to his effort to create an 
intellectual common ground for the exchanges. Typically, Attwell inquires into 
Coetzee’s work from a theoretical angle; Coetzee responds by showing that he 
knows the theory and then offers a more personal response that evinces his 
experience of literary works and novelistic writing. The fact that Coetzee does 
speak to Attwell as he had not done to any other interviewer or critic at that 
time is, undoubtedly, proof of the success of Attwell’s approach. However, 
one can also wonder to what extent Coetzee speaks not only because he meets 
a genuinely interested interlocutor, but also because he is not faced with any 
real resistance on Attwell’s part. Put differently, Attwell does not seriously 
disagree with Coetzee’s views in any moment. Aware of the trap that such an 
accommodating attitude sets up for a critical work, he is careful to define his 
critical agency in terms of resistance both in Doubling the Point and in Politics of 
Writing. In his view, the dialogical nature of his approach goes beyond a 
restatement of Coetzee’s views (which is irresistibly suggested by the word 
“doubling”) insofar as he strives to “conduct a conscientious inquiry in which 
Coetzee is not installed as final authority” (Doubling 3). From Attwell’s 
perspective, “doubling” is meant to capture Coetzee’s characteristic reflexive 
self-consciousness that, prompted by the interviews, adds another layer of 
meaning to his authorial discourse (2, 3). In Politics of Writing, Attwell assures 
his readers that despite the ambiguous historical engagement of the novels, he 
will “read Coetzee ‘against the grain’ … [asserting] again and again the 
historicity of the act of storytelling [and] continually reading the novels back 
into their context” (6, 7). 
 I want to touch on two issues which attach to Attwell’s accommodating 
critical attitude. Most immediately, one can consider whether and to what 
extent it would be correct to assume that Coetzee is not installed as the final 
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authority in a project such as Doubling the Point. The book is, after all, Coetzee’s, 
not Attwell’s. The words of Frank Kermode on the back cover of the book 
make it clear: the interviews “give a strong impression of the author on his 
own view of what he is trying to do”. The second issue is the reverberation of 
critical proximity in the interpretive community of Coetzee scholars. While it 
would be inaccurate to claim that all critics have simply avoided disagreeing 
with Coetzee’s views, one must nevertheless consider whether “doubling” has 
not become an apt description of the scholarly tendency to come back to the 
theoretical questions and literary themes explored in the interviews, a 
tendency often accompanied by admiration for Coetzee’s intellect. To be sure, 
after Doubling the Point Coetzee was met with a storm of disagreement and 
even disapproval by his readers when Disgrace came out in the end of the 
1990s. This disapproval, however, has not shaken or undermined critical 
admiration, on the contrary. With the increase of his readership and of the 
scholarship on his works since Disgrace and the Nobel Prize, Coetzee’s 
intellectual authority has only grown. In 2010, that is to say, almost a decade 
after the publication of Doubling the Point, the critical doubling of Attwell’s 
approach to Coetzee was one of the issues that Boehmer put to Attwell in an 
interview. She referred to the far-reaching impact of the narrative that he 
created about Coetzee’s intellectual development: “Here we find ourselves 
reading Coetzee through Attwell reading Coetzee; we regard him through the 
lens of your former critical perceptions of Coetzee developed in the 
interviews with him” (“Doubling the Writer” 60). Attwell recognizes that a 
“community of readers” has been formed, and adds that “there are 
surprisingly few serious schisms” in this community (60). 
Finally, one can also reflect on the extent to which admiration, insofar as it 
distorts critical vision, might serve dubious purposes. I am not suggesting here 
that Attwell’s admiration for Coetzee serves dubious purposes; the issue at 
stake here is whether admiration is a dubious element in the work of the critic. 
Put differently, could turning a blind eye to the vehemence of the attacks on 
literary criticism carried out by works such as The Lives of Animals and 
Summertime, for instance, both of which I will discuss further on, involve some 
kind of gain for the critic? Apparently, it should not, because blindness is 
disempowering. But if a measure of blindness is calculated and contributes to 
create a special attachment to the author, it becomes in effect an instrument 
of power in relation to other critics. 
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Among the responses that Attwell’s work in Doubling the Point and in Politics 
of Writing has generated, Derek Attridge’s books The Singularity of Literature and 
J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, published as companion volumes in 2004, 
are surely among the most notable. My use of the word “response” implies 
here, as I anticipated in the Introduction, both a development and a reaction. 
Attridge shares with Attwell the attempt to do justice to Coetzee’s 
interrogation of the social role of literature. He also complements Attwell’s 
argument that Coetzee’s novels explore the tension between narrative and 
reality with his own case against literary instrumentalism, or “the treating of a 
text … as a means to a predetermined end: coming to the object with the 
hope or the assumption that it can be instrumental in furthering an existing 
project … [such as] a political or ethical cause” (Singularity 7, 8). In the terms 
that Attridge poses for his inquiry, however, one can also infer a reaction to 
the impact that Attwell’s work has exerted on the field: whereas Attwell’s 
monograph addresses “the politics of writing”, Attridge’s project is dedicated 
to the “ethics of reading”. 
Regardless of whether one sees the dialogue between both critics in terms 
of complementarity or opposition, I want to call attention to the fact that they 
have a clearly distinct conception of critical agency in theory. Attwell aligns 
critical agency with difference when he proposes to resist Coetzee’s authorial 
discourse by reading him “against the grain”, or by reading the novels “back 
into their [historical] context” (Politics of Writing 7). When it comes to practice, 
however, this allegedly resistant agency becomes a lot more ambiguous. As I 
will show, Attridge’s theory of criticism put forward in The Singularity of 
Literature and illustrated with his readings of Coetzee’s novels in Ethics of 
Reading puts emphasis not on agency, but on its opposite, passivity, as the 
prerequisite for the mutuality and agreement that his approach aims at. 
Essentially, though, both critics invest primarily in proximity with Coetzee’s 
authorial discourse. Attwell showed that proximity could be a very rewarding 
method of exploring Coetzee’s writing; Attridge, in turn, legitimized it as an 
ethical approach to literature, and a congenial approach to a writer such as 
Coetzee. 
Finally, it is important to note that the shift from a political (post-Attwell) 
discourse to an ethical discourse about Coetzee’s novels is closely related to 
the thematic shift in the novels themselves towards a mode of self-
referentiality that, on the surface, favors or prompts a notion of mutuality 
between author and critic. The last section of this chapter will examine the 
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self-referential focus of Coetzee’s later works and consider its main 
interpretive implications. The next section reflects on Attridge’s response to 
Coetzee’s work and on what it entails for other readers of Coetzee. 
Attridge’s Ethical Discourse about Coetzee’s 
Novels: Passivity vs. Agency 
Attridge’s conception of the critical work is openly indebted to Levinas’ and 
Derrida’s ethical thinking about the asymmetrical encounter of the self with 
an alterity that demands a response. More specifically, he views both the 
writer’s and the reader’s contact with a literary work along the lines of the 
Derridean hospitable welcoming of the other into “the existing configurations 
of an individual’s mental world” (Singularity 19). Attridge begins by exploring 
authorial accounts that describe the literary creation as engendered by an 
unknown and irresistible force. This encounter impels an authorial 
“relinquishment of intellectual control”, as well as receptiveness to “hints of 
relationships, to incipient arguments, to images swimming on the edges of 
consciousness”, which eventually “[break] down the familiar” (24, 23, 26). He 
then builds on the argument that the creative process opens an author to this 
inscrutable force that escapes authorial intention and control in order to urge 
the reader to adopt an equally receptive stance towards the literary work. By 
engaging the literary work with a “passive, though alert consciousness”, and 
being therefore ready “to have one’s purpose reshaped by the work to which 
one is responding”, the reader or critic engages in what Attridge calls a 
“creative reading” (26, 80).11 
Attridge’s theory of an ethical readerly engagement shares a great deal with 
the progression from proximity to distance in Starobinski’s phenomenological 
criticism. What he sees as the passive openness of the self to the other 
amounts essentially to the initial moment of heteronomy in Starobinski’s 
trajectory, in which the critic should seek complete identification with the 
authorial discourse. Unsurprisingly, Attridge also has to address the 
interpretive tautology intrinsic to the closeness between author and critic. 
First, he rearticulates the phenomenological situatedness of interpretation with 
                                     
11 Attridge’s alterity is a situated one and, in this respect, it clearly differs from the Levinasian 
absolute other. He has a specific concept to describe this situatedness: idioculture, on which I will 
elaborate in the following pages. For definitions of the concept, see for instance pages 21 and 22 of 
The Singularity of Literature. 
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his concept “idioculture”, that is, “the deposit of our personal history as a 
participant in a number of ill-defined and often conflicting cultural fields, 
overlapping with or nested within one another”.12 He then goes on to 
conceive of the contact between an author’s and a critic’s idiocultures in terms 
reminiscent of the phenomenological fusion of horizons: “Any text we read – 
like any person we encounter – is the product of a unique cultural formation 
of this kind; the process of reading, therefore, is the process of subjecting my 
assumptions of the cultural fields that make up my own distinctive idioculture 
to those which the work embodies” (82). This encounter with the work is also 
recognizably phenomenological in its transformative aspect. Attridge 
conceives of it as an “act-event”, a “movement into the unknown … 
experienced as something that happens to the reader” and that “opens new 
possibilities of meaning and feeling (understood as verbs)” (59, italics in 
original). 
In the notion of an act-event that happens to the alert passive reader 
within a particular cultural, social, and political configuration reside both the 
appeal and the ambiguity of Attridge’s ethical and creative criticism. The 
appeal of the creative reading originates in an ethical stance of openness to the 
unknown, a willingness to let the literary work “[remold] the self” (Singularity 
24) On the other hand, the unknown is not coming from nowhere, but from 
an idioculture. For the critic, the alterity encountered always emanates from a 
creative consciousness whose particular prejudices and interests are “never 
entirely insulated from the contingencies of the history” of which it is part 
(59). Reviewers of Attridge’s book have taken issue precisely with the act-
event, raising the question of a critic’s interpretive horizon and autonomy in 
relation to the situatedness of the discourse of the author, and thereby 
remarking on the critic’s excessive assent to the author’s agenda. For Rob 
Pope, the event “as pure (or mere) ‘happening’ … is ultimately fraught with 
respect to matters of agency … [because] it tends to neglect historical change 
and lack political direction” (385). For Tzachi Zamir, the problem is the 
“horizons and limitations” which Attridge’s creative critic has to step beyond: 
                                     
12 What Gadamer calls “hermeneutical situatedness” is the very condition of knowledge in 
phenomenological thinking. Gadamer’s concept is grounded on the phenomenological view of 
understanding as determined by the interpreter’s prior involvement with that which is to be 
understood, as well as by the object of inquiry itself. Seen in this way, prior involvement is not a 
barrier to understanding, but a condition that enables it. Gadamer assigns a positive role to 
prejudice as pre-judgment, or foreknowledge, rather than as a bias that has to be minimized or 
eliminated. 
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“[We] are never in the hypothetical location Attridge requires us to inhabit in 
order to appreciate the singularity of literature … Intellectual maps are 
imposed and, once this is conceded, pressing us to look for the singularity of 
literature in remolding boundaries sounds more unstable than what first meets 
the eye” (420). 
As with Starobinski’s ideal critical work, Attridge’s choice of words when 
he defines creative criticism creates a double bind between abolishing 
difference and preserving distance. His creative reading “must simultaneously 
bring [the work] into the field of the same – so that readers for whom it is a 
blank can begin to appreciate it – and affirm and sustain its otherness – so 
that readers can register its power” (Singularity 118). It is interesting to notice 
that, whereas Starobinski’s use of “ideal”, insofar as it hints at an unreality, 
almost immediately suggests a conflict between theoretical aspirations and 
practical achievements, Attridge’s preference for “creative” evokes a more 
possible, or attainable, critical engagement.13 Essentially, however, his creative 
reading cannot confine itself to sympathy with the authorial discourse if it is 
to secure interpretive autonomy; it must betray it: a creative reading is also in 
fact “a necessarily unfaithful reading … that is not entirely programmed by 
the work”; its aim is to convey “the singularity of the experience of reading 
for a given reader, a singularity that lies in its resistance to the very interpretive 
methods that give it its existence” (80, 118). 
It is clear that there are significant affinities between Starobinski’s 
phenomenological criticism and Attridge’s ethical and creative approach. A 
significant difference, however, concerns how explicitly both critics tackle the 
tension between passivity and agency. In Attridge’s writing, this tension is 
obscured by the ethical focus of the argument. He envisions a pacific 
coexistence between passivity and agency in the authorial creative process and, 
by implication, assumes that this pacific coexistence should prevail in the 
reader’s engagement as well: 
Most of the time, our accounts of [the creative] process have to veer 
between narratives that suggest the energetic reshaping of existing 
configurations in order to produce the new – forging it in the smithy of 
one’s soul, for instance – and narratives that suggest the passive experience 
of the other’s irruption into the settled order – the most common of which 
                                     
13 It is difficult not to hear Coetzee in Attridge’s choice of “creative”. “If I were a truly creative 
critic”, Coetzee tells Attwell in Doubling the Point, “I would work toward liberating that discourse – 
making it less monological” (246). 
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has been inspiration by the Muse or some other external and inscrutable 
power. Thinking creatively about creation means thinking of these as two 
sides of the same coin. (Singularity 24, 5) 
Attridge is primarily interested in the ethical potential of the literary response, 
and he elaborates on this potential by mirroring the critical agency on the 
authorial agency. To put it differently, he is interested in how a relationship 
(an ethical and creative one) can be established between writer and reader via 
the literary work. In order to illustrate how Attridge builds on this 
relationship, I will draw a brief parallel between hospitality, which is a defining 
aspect of his conception of authorial and critical agency, and the unconscious 
as a source of inspiration. Walsh pursues a similar line of reasoning, though 
from a rhetorical angle, when he discusses the unconscious in terms of how 
authors usually attribute to it the openness and the richness of the creative 
process. When both writer and reader recognize that inspiration (or the 
unexpected) is a significant aspect of creation, Walsh argues, a “common 
frame of reference” is created within which both can engage with the work on 
similar grounds (133). In Attridge’s creative criticism, hospitality, understood 
as the opening of the self to the unknown other, constitutes this common 
frame of reference for authorial and critical agency; it becomes the shared 
mode of engagement with the literary work that establishes a mutual 
agreement or pact between author and critic.  
Attridge’s conception of hospitality and what it can potentially offer to the 
reader is also closely connected with his experience of Coetzee’s writing and, 
because of this, it carries specific implications for readers of Coetzee. Attridge 
is explicit about this influence. For instance, when he describes the creative 
impulse arriving “in fits and starts”, “a gradual process of false starts and 
wasted efforts, erasures and revisions, slowly inching nearer to an outcome 
that, one can only hope, will be the desired one”, he quotes Lurie’s opera 
emerging “astonishingly, in dribs and drabs” in Disgrace (Singularity 25; Disgrace 
183). In other passages of Attridge’s writing, one notices that Coetzee’s 
presence is subtler, though not less formative. This is so, for instance, when 
he characterizes the creative impulse as an act of resisting the “mind’s 
inclination toward repetition, its tendency to process any novelty it encounters 
in terms of the familiar” (Singularity 18). This formulation is noticeably 
reminiscent of Coetzee’s much cited account of writing as 
… an interplay between the push into the future that takes you to the blank 
page in the first place, and a resistance. Part of that resistance is psychic, but 
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part is also an automatism built into language: the tendency of words to call 
up other words, to fall into patterns that keep propagating themselves. Out 
of that interplay there emerges, if you are lucky, what you recognize or hope 
to recognize as the true. (Doubling 18) 
There is plenty of evidence in Coetzee’s novels to sustain Attridge’s emphasis 
on the connection between hospitality and creation. In this sense, not only 
does Attridge build on the novels to formulate his theory of literary response; 
most obviously, he identifies and elucidates a defining feature of Coetzee’s 
writing (another facet of the écart, as it were). Hospitality speaks directly to a 
recurrent motif in the novels: that of the writer as medium for what Coetzee 
calls “the true”, a kind of channel for creation, rather than an actively creative 
agent (Doubling 18). This is the case in, for instance, The Master of Petersburg, in 
which the protagonist Dostoevsky, after spending almost all of the novel 
trying to conjure up the other (his deceased stepson Pavel) as his inspiration, 
finally lets himself “[follow] the dance of the pen” urged by an immaterial 
presence in the room (236 – 42). The writer Elizabeth Costello draws on the 
same metaphor when she introduces herself as “a secretary of the invisible, 
one of the many secretaries over the ages. That is my calling: dictation 
secretary. (…) I merely write down the words and then test them, test their 
soundness, to make sure I have heard right” (Elizabeth Costello 199). In a 
similar vein, Magda in In the Heart of the Country wishes to be “the medium, the 
median … Neither master nor slave, neither parent nor child, but the bridge 
between, so that in me the contraries should be reconciled!” (133). When 
David Lurie composes his Byronic opera in Disgrace, he likewise imagines 
himself as “being held in the music itself” (184). 
It would be possible to imagine a degree of coincidence, more than 
mutuality, between Attridge and Coetzee within the common frame of 
reference that they share as intellectuals who have engaged with the South 
African literary environment (in Attridge’s terms, this coincidence could be 
described as an overlap between his and Coetzee’s idiocultures). Even though 
Attridge has not pursued his career in South Africa, where Coetzee 
experienced that several of his novels were read in a reductive or instrumental 
way, it makes sense that a theoretical discourse about literature based on the 
experience of Coetzee’s writing should be premised on the opposite of 
appropriation, that is, hospitality. Yet the degree of proximity between the 
ethical foundation of Coetzee’s authorial discourse and Attridge’s critical 
theory inevitably brings up the issue of its impact on “the community of 
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readers” of Coetzee, as Attwell refers to it (“Doubling the Writer” 60). Head, 
for instance, comments on “the apparently close fit between Attridge’s theory 
of responsible reading … and Coetzee’s own implied views”: 
Attridge’s construction of the critical reading as an ethical event finds its 
perfect exemplar in Coetzee, whose novels seem, in a way, to agitate 
precisely for the critical school that Attridge advocates. Is this ‘the equal 
marriage’ between critic and work that Coetzee implies is virtually 
impossible – or something close to it? It would appear to be so … Yet we 
must also wonder whether or not such an equal marriage is desirable. For 
many academic literary critics this will surely indicate a loss of proper critical 
distance. (Cambridge Introduction 103, 4) 
Head himself, however, does not think that there is a problem with critical 
distance in Attridge’s case, and he raises two objections to potential charges. 
One is “the academic impulse to reject the close fit between a critic and a 
writer”, which he takes as proof of the prevalence of “the instrumental 
professionalism that Attridge and Coetzee are both at pains to resist”.14 
Another is the fact that this perfect attunement between the critical response 
and the literary work, according to Head, “may become more or less visible” 
in accordance with “the shifting emphases in successive works” (104). 
Brian May, another Coetzee scholar who has reviewed Attridge’s J. M. 
Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, the companion volume to The Singularity of 
Literature, has also remarked on the “almost perfect aligning of sensibilities” 
between Attridge and Coetzee, and he goes farther than Head towards 
interrogating it. Hospitality, in May’s view, equates with naïveté: reading 
creatively and responsibly as Attridge advocates amounts to reading as “we all 
tend to read, naturally or … more or less ‘naïve[ly]’”. He also argues that the 
inextricable attachment of Attridge’s criticism to Coetzee’s authorial discourse 
creates something akin to a model reader of Coetzee: “The properly naïve 
reader of Coetzee”, he continues, “is the properly ‘responsible’ (ethical) one” 
(634).  
The potential creation of a model reader of Coetzee has a direct bearing on 
the extent to which other critics negotiate the presence and the influence of 
this exceptionally tuned interpreter when they engage with Coetzee’s works. 
                                     
14 In a review of Attridge’s J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, Mark Sanders also hints that 
Attridge does not detach himself from Coetzee as much as he should: “For all its consonance with 
Coetzee’s writing project, there is at times something overprotective about J. M. Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading, which stops Attridge’s writing from letting itself go” (643). 
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Yet it also prompts one to consider how the existence of an ideal critic could 
be viewed from an authorial perspective. An ideal critic, more than an ideal 
reader, would not only understand the work perfectly, but would also project 
himself (at least in theory) as someone who could elucidate the work 
completely, incorporating, as Starobinski puts it, “into a fabric of 
comprehension the very rips it reveals, [and] thereby abolishing them” (Eye 
122). How would a creative writer perceive the proximity of such an 
interpreter? In particular, how would a creative writer such as Coetzee, who is 
so protective of his writing’s integrity, perceive it? The following comment by 
May is particularly suggestive in this light: “In the future it will be hard to 
think of Derek Attridge without thinking of Coetzee; it may be hard to think 
of Coetzee without thinking of Attridge” (630). 
The remaining sections of this chapter elaborate on my view of Coetzee’s 
position in relation to critical proximity. This discussion cannot be carried out 
fully in this chapter, and I will return to it in Chapter 3 to develop two strands 
of my argument. First, I will examine Attridge’s reading of Coetzee’s first two 
memoirs, Boyhood and Youth, having in view what Coetzee refers to as a 
betrayal or overpowering of the authorial discourse. Second, I will propose a 
reading of the third memoir, Summertime, and argue that Coetzee is thoroughly 
skeptical of proximity. The next section prepares the ground for my 
examination of his authorial agency by presenting the central rhetorical 
aspects of my perspective.  
Coetzee’s Authorial Agency: From Ethics to 
Rhetoric  
Passive receptivity to the unknown, as Attridge shows, accounts for one 
dimension of creative writing, by which the broadening of an author’s creative 
horizon is set in motion. Nevertheless, an author must also determine to what 
extent those ideas that have exceeded an original creative plan will in reality 
shape the work and, thus, by being allowed into the sphere of the reader’s 
response, pave the way for a specific kind of reading. This other aspect of the 
creative process, it is important to notice, is not secondary to what Attridge 
calls hospitality in any temporal sense; passivity and agency are, as he puts it, 
“two sides of the same coin” (Singularity 25). But this other side of the coin 
does involve the author’s awareness of his readership, that is to say, it entails 
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that there is a degree of purposeful authorial intervention in the 
interpretations that a narrative might generate. 
Narrative theorists have given this issue a great deal of attention, in 
particular after Wayne Booth described a narrative as consisting essentially of 
“an elaborate system of controls over the reader’s involvement along various 
lines of interest” (123). Since Booth, the debate about the best way of 
attaching narrative meanings to authorial design has taken many turns. Yet 
there is consensus among narratologists about the inescapability of bringing 
those two poles to bear on each other. Theorists such as James Phelan, for 
instance, share Booth’s view to a great extent. His rhetorical theory 
emphasizes the role of authorial intention in narrative understanding, and he 
is particularly attentive to how a narrative’s construction guides, more or less 
implicitly, readers’ ethical judgments. For him, the reader’s apprehension of a 
narrative as an organic whole that articulates a set of ethical principles entails 
the identification of someone who, by having started and sustained the 
creative process, has raised those ethical issues in the first place.15 An author’s 
stylistic choices, the use of the narrator, and the management of the 
progression all reveal what Phelan calls the “ethics of rhetorical purpose” 
intrinsic to the narrative, delineating “the ethical dimension of the overall 
narrative act” (Experiencing Fiction 11 – 15). Cognitive narratologist David 
Herman adopts an approach that is, in many ways, different from Phelan’s, 
but his point of departure is fundamentally the same. For him, literary 
interpretation hinges necessarily on inferences about authors’ communicative 
intentions (Narrative Theory: Core Concepts 44 – 50). 
The common denominator for these approaches is that the text is the 
product of the author’s prior communicative intentions, which constitutes a 
problematic point of departure for an account of Coetzee’s authorial agency. 
A defining feature of his communicative act is precisely the claim that a prior 
creative plan is secondary to the discovery of unexpected meanings during the 
writing itself. In other words, by detaching the author from the potential 
meanings that a text can generate, Coetzee attributes conscious intention a 
minimal role in the production of those meanings. An account of his authorial 
agency cannot, therefore, have intention (understood as a prior, conscious, 
                                     
15 Porter Abbott also addresses intentionality as “a fundamental necessity in our ethical thinking” in 
“Reading Intended Meaning where None is Intended” (478). 
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deliberate plan) as its central term, but it must certainly factor in intentionality 
as part and parcel of his communicative act. 
A more suitable rhetorical standpoint to gauge Coetzee’s authorial agency 
could be provided by a perspective on narrative production and reception 
such as the one that Walsh adopts for his project of a rhetoric of fictionality. 
The merit of his understanding of rhetoric lies in its shifted emphasis from 
the intention supposedly behind (or underlying) a communicative act to the 
effects than an utterance produces within a specific context. Walsh 
approaches rhetoric from the perspective of the pragmatics of 
communication. Along general lines, pragmatics deals with the meanings of 
utterances as inferred in a specific context. A pragmatic approach to 
communication engages with the basic facts of an utterance by means of so-
called “ampliative inference”, that is, “induction, inference to the best 
explanation, … or [the] application of general principles special to 
communication” (Korta and Perry, “Pragmatics”). The basic facts 
surrounding an utterance include when and where it was produced; 
knowledge of relevant conventions that apply to it; and knowledge of facts 
about the speaker, such as his or her identity, which beliefs he or she holds, to 
whom he or she speaks and, crucially, knowledge of information on which 
inferences about what the speaker intends to communicate can be made. On 
this account, intention is minimally understood as the intention to 
communicate.16 As for what is communicated, this is tied both to the literal 
content of the utterance (what the speaker says) but, most importantly, to its 
non-literal content, that is, the implicatures that the utterance, produced 
within a context shared by speaker and hearer, generates. Inferences about 
what the speaker means belong, therefore, in the domain of the implicatures 
(Korta and Perry, “Pragmatics”). 
Context, which is a term almost synonymous with pragmatics given its 
centrality for the pragmatics of communication, requires some explanation. 
Broadly speaking, context is commonly understood as “a matter of common 
                                     
16 Paul Grice’s theory of conversation is a classic example of a pragmatic approach to 
communicative acts. Grice made a distinction between what the words used by a speaker literally 
mean and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using those words. What the 
speaker implicates is bound to rational principles or maxims that govern successful communication. 
In his conception, communicative intentions have the following minimal properties: “they are 
always oriented towards some other agent, the addressee; they are overt, that is, they are intended to 
be recognized by the addressee; their satisfaction consists precisely in being recognized by the 
addressee” (Korta, Kepa and Perry, John, "Pragmatics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
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ground” or “shared beliefs that serve as common presuppositions for the 
interpretation of assertions”. In practice, it applies to “the indefinitely large 
surrounding of an utterance, from the intentions of the speaker to the 
previous topics of conversation to the objects discernible in the 
environment”. One usually makes a distinction between narrow and wide 
context. Narrow context refers to “the list of parameters … that correspond 
to basic facts about the utterance”, such as “speaker, place, and time”. Broad 
or wide context, in contrast, “is understood as all other kinds of information, 
in particular, information relative to the speaker's communicative intention”, 
that is to say, information that can serve as basis for inferences about the 
speaker’s communicative intention (Korta and Perry, “Pragmatics”). 
Put simply, the interpretive context on which I base my assumptions about 
Coetzee’s authorial agency is the same that every informed reader of Coetzee 
has in view: his fiction and his nonfiction. The texts chosen make it possible 
to understand another major defining aspect of his writing, from a perspective 
that, to a certain degree at least, is opposite to Attridge’s. Alongside the ethical 
thinking epitomized in the notion of openness to the other as an essentially 
enriching experience for the self, another characteristic that brings a distinct 
sense of coherence to Coetzee’s authorial discourse is resistance to having 
one’s individuality accommodated, appropriated, or subverted by the other. 
The remainder of this chapter expands on this claim. I begin the next section 
by briefly discussing two essays in which he speaks of writing in terms very 
different from passivity and openness, namely, direction and purpose: writing 
can also consist of a deliberate effort to subvert certain types of reading in 
order to open up possibilities for other types of reading. I then move on to 
two fictional texts that unsettle and manifest suspicion of the proximity and 
mutuality between writer and reader. Finally, in the last section, I consider the 
self-referentiality of Coetzee’s later works as a particularly difficult challenge 
to critical proximity and mutuality. 
 “Into the Dark Chamber”, “The Novel 
Today”, “He and His Man”, and The Lives of 
Animals 
Among Coetzee’s nonfictional writings of the 1980s, the period when his 
quarrel with the politics of the South African literary environment was 
probably most intense, one finds two pieces that project his authorial agency 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT WRITER 
52 
in terms radically different from the passive openness to meanings that is 
often portrayed in his fiction.17 The essays “Into the Dark Chamber: The 
Writer and the South African State” (1986), included in Doubling the Point, and 
“The Novel Today” (1988) are deeply embedded in the specificities of 
Coetzee’s situation in South Africa, attesting chiefly to his refusal to have his 
works put to use for ideological ends, or read as a kind of historical record.18 
Coetzee is concerned with the autonomy of novelistic discourse in relation to 
“master-form[s] of discourse” whose interpretive authority lies in the 
consensus that they command about the significance of the literary work (qtd. 
in Attwell, Politics 14).19 In “Into the Dark Chamber”, he addresses the so-
called obscenities of the torture room, known by all and yet “accessible to no 
one but the participants” (Doubling 363). When the apartheid state bans such 
obscenities from the novelist’s eyes, it “unwittingly creates the preconditions 
for the novel to set about its work of representation” (364). It does so because 
such obscenities exert an irresistible fascination over the novelist’s 
imagination. Yet if novelists let themselves be seduced by the dark room, 
“making its vile mysteries the occasion of fantasy”, and thereby produce 
representations of what happens in the torture room, they surrender their 
creative authority to the state (364). Therefore, “the true challenge” that 
Coetzee poses for the novelist “is how not to play the game by the rules of 
the state, how to establish one’s own authority, how to imagine torture and 
death on one’s own terms” (364). 
In “The Novel Today”, Coetzee launches a similar attack on this 
secondary representational role ascribed to the literary work. A novel that 
provides the reader “with vicarious first-hand experience of living in a certain 
historical time, embodying contending forces in contending characters and 
filling our experience with a certain density of observation”, only supplements 
the discourse of history (qtd. in Attwell, Politics 14). Coetzee emphatically 
rejects this ancillary role of novelistic discourse; he wants “a novel that 
operates in terms of its own procedures and issues in its own conclusions, … 
that evolves its own paradigms and myths … that is prepared to work itself 
out” of pre-established frameworks of meaning (qtd. in Attwell, Politics 14). 
                                     
17 Another such moment was of course the late 90s, when Disgrace came out. I will have more to say 
about this in the next chapter. 
18 “The Novel Today” was first given as an address in 1987 and, surprisingly, not included in 
Doubling the Point. 
19 Quoted in Attwell’s South Africa and The Politics of Writing, p. 14. 
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Among Coetzee’s fiction, I want to single out two texts that strengthen the 
assumption of an authoritative creative agent skeptical of the claims, 
procedures, and ambitions of interpretation: the Nobel lecture “He and His 
Man” (2003) and The Lives of Animals (1999). “He and His Man” is a very 
suggestive piece that allegorizes the encounter with the otherness of a literary 
work, alluding to a kind of commensurability between writer and reader in this 
encounter, along the lines of Attridge’s argument. On a closer look, however, 
the lecture also lends itself to a reading that subverts this alleged equivalence, 
presenting the author as the one who takes a privileged precedence in this 
encounter: the writer is, in fact, the first one who encounters the other, or, as 
Coetzee likes to express it elsewhere, “the true” (Doubling 18). Coetzee returns 
to the displacement of authorial control represented with the metaphor of the 
medium in In the Heart of the Country, The Master of Petersburg, Disgrace, and 
Elizabeth Costello. He borrows from Defoe once again as he had done in Foe 
and creates what reviewer D. J. Taylor has called a “devious little metafictional 
fragment”, inverting the roles of Crusoe and Defoe (The Guardian, 13 
December 2003). In Coetzee’s Nobel lecture, Crusoe becomes the historical 
writer and Defoe becomes his creation, referred to as “his man”. Robinson’s 
man is thus depicted as a kind of second self to the historical author, a literary 
persona or agent who goes out into the world and brings the materials for the 
stories that Robinson, the historical author, will eventually write. 
Coetzee in effect blurs the degree to which Robinson and his second 
writer self are and are not the same, equivocating who is at the service of 
whom.20 The idea is familiar: the historical author, subjected to the distinct 
exigencies of the writing practice, is more of a channel for creation; his role is 
less controlling than instrumental. Once again, it is possible to make a parallel 
with his reflections in Doubling the Point. In one of the interviews, he suggests 
that it is the writing which “writes” the writer, for it “shows or creates (and we 
are not always sure we can tell one from the other) what our desire was, a 
moment ago” (18). In the Nobel lecture, Robinson’s deference to being an 
instrument, or channel, in this way is evident when his man, that second 
writer, writes through him: 
                                     
20 Hilary Mantel’s apt description of the affinities between Coetzee and Costello, for example, also 
applies to the relationship between the writer and “his man” in the Nobel lecture: there is no 
“perfect fit” between both, but they come “unnervingly close” to one another (“The Shadow Line”, 
The New York Review of Books). 
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How then has it come about that this man of his, who is a kind of parrot 
and not much loved, writes as well as or better than his master? For he 
wields an able pen, this man of his, no doubt of that. Like charging Death 
himself on his pale horse. His own skill, learned in the counting house, was in 
making tallies and accounts, not in turning phrases. Death himself on his pale 
horse: those are words he would not think of. Only when he yields himself 
up to this man of his do such words come. (n. pag. Web. italics in original) 
Robinson, the historical author, is in effect the first reader of the narrative 
brought to him. Attridge has not missed the interpretive potential of the 
metaphor of the writer as first reader: “It is only when the event of this 
reformulation [of existing norms] is experienced by the reader (who is, in the 
first instance, the writer reading or articulating the words as they emerge) as an event … 
that we can speak of the literary” (Singularity 59, my italics).21 In the context of 
Attridge’s readerly hospitality, the metaphor of the writer as first reader surely 
strengthens the argument that the reader’s and the writer’s agency in relation 
to the literary work can be commensurate. In particular, it strengthens his 
invitation to the reader to adopt a creative stance similar to the author’s. In 
the context of Coetzee’s defense of the writer’s intellectual authority, 
however, the metaphor of the writer as first reader is an oblique manifestation 
(in Coetzee’s typical fashion in his fiction) of the author’s precedence in the 
encounter with the other, understood as the internal laws of the narrative that 
are determinant for its interpretation, and therefore of the author’s privileged 
and superior role in passing on to the reader/critic the new (perhaps even the 
“true”) meanings. 
On a more general level, one could also read a challenge to the mutuality 
between the creator and the interpreter in a narrative technique that Coetzee 
makes frequent use of, namely, the focus on one single narrating 
consciousness, which captures the impossibility of transcending the limits of 
the self and encountering the other. His predominantly self-centered 
protagonists, who, unsurprisingly, are usually intellectuals or writers, time and 
again misread the other. Works such as Waiting for the Barbarians, Age of Iron, 
and Disgrace, to mention but a few, revolve to a great extent around the failure 
of understanding the other, or the other as undecipherable. In Waiting for the 
                                     
21 Walsh also sees the possibilities of the metaphor of the writer as first reader: “The novelist as 
medium is a kind of privileged first reader – privileged with a selectivity and control over the 
narrative which is analogous to the privilege, in another sphere of narrative creativity, of a lucid 
dreamer; engaged in a teasing out, an elaboration and development, according to laws or 
imperatives already in place, but only to be fully unearthed in the process of writing” (131). 
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Barbarians, for example, this failure of interpretation often evokes some form 
of reading. The Magistrate cannot read the script in the poplar slips that he 
believes tell a story about an ancient barbarian settlement (15, 16). In several 
passages, he imagines the barbarian girl’s body as an impenetrable surface 
whose marks of torture, “the traces of a history her body bears”, are symbols 
“beyond comprehension” (33; 44 – 46; 52; 70). In other passages, he thinks of 
his efforts at understanding his involvement with the girl with metaphors that 
could apply to textual interpretation: he “[swoops] and [circles] around the 
irreducible figure of the girl, casting one net of meaning after another over 
her” (89); he refuses to find “meanings and correspondences” between 
himself and her torturers (47 – 49). In Disgrace, one of the first passages in 
which Lurie questions Lucy about her motives for not reporting the rape 
presents his attempt to see things from her perspective. Significantly, the 
passage captures how it starts to dawn on Lurie that there might be a parallel 
between what Melanie Isaacs experienced with him and what his daughter has 
undergone at the hands of the three rapists. When he alludes to this 
correspondence, however, Lucy replies categorically: “This has nothing to do 
with you, David. … [As] far as I am concerned, what happened to me is a 
purely private matter. … It is my business, mine alone.” When he tries 
another explanation, she responds emphatically again: “No. You keep 
misreading me.” (111, 12) 
One text in particular imparts a great deal of skepticism about the premises 
and the ambitions of proximity and mutuality: The Lives of Animals, which 
comprises the two 1997 – 98 Tanner Lectures delivered by Coetzee at 
Princeton University.22 The lecture that Coetzee reads for his audience offers 
a philosophical reflection on the way human beings treat animals, but the 
conventionally rational, explanatory, and argumentative philosophical thinking 
is embedded in a cleverly contrived metafictional narrative. Coetzee puts 
Elizabeth Costello, a renowned novelist who performs at least partly as his 
alter-ego (like the reader-narrator of Diary of a Bad Year), before an academic 
audience disconcertingly like the audience he has before himself at Princeton 
University. Costello is about to deliver two honorific lectures at Appleton 
College but declines to talk about the areas of her expertise, namely, literature 
and literary criticism, venturing instead a passionate argument for animal 
                                     
22 The Lives of Animals was published in a single volume in 1999 and later included in Elizabeth 
Costello (2003). 
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rights. A committed vegetarian (like Coetzee himself), Costello urges her 
academic fellows to change their attitude towards the animal industry, 
censuring them for taking part, however indirectly, in “a crime of stupefying 
proportions” (Lives 69). 
Costello mounts a case against the abstractions and universal standards of 
traditional philosophical thinking which accords more value to a human life 
than to an animal life because humans have the capacity to reason. For her, 
the moral deliberation that must underlie one’s attitude towards animals 
cannot be exclusively based on the assumption that animals, as one of her 
interlocutors puts it, “live in a vacuum of consciousness” (44). As opposed to 
“thinking” and “cogitation”, she proposes “fullness, embodiedness, the 
sensation of being – not a consciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly 
reasoning machine thinking thoughts, but on the contrary the sensation – a 
heavily affective sensation – of being a body with limbs that have extension in 
space, of being alive to the world” (33)23. Therefore, she entreats the members 
of her audience to stretch the bounds of what she calls their sympathetic 
imagination and “think [their] way into the existence of … any being with 
whom [they] share the substrate of life”, making themselves present, even if in 
a surrogate manner, to the embodied reality of an animal about to be 
butchered (35). Costello opposes sympathy, presence, and mutuality, 
ultimately by means of the concrete effort of walking side by side with the 
animal, to intellectual detachment: 
If I do not convince you, that is because my words, here, lack the power to 
bring home to you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintellectual nature, of 
that animal being. That is why I urge you to read the poets who return the 
living, electric being to language; and if the poets do not move you, I urge 
you to walk, flank to flank, beside the beast that is prodded down the chute 
to his executioner. (65) 
The ethical argument presented in passages like the one above gains 
complexity in light of how the narrative is constructed; more specifically, it 
gains complexity in light of how Coetzee’s exposition of a philosophical 
argument is embedded in the fictitious Costello’s exposition of her moral 
convictions. Just as Costello urges her audience to share the being of an 
animal and sympathize with its fate, so does Coetzee prompt his readers to 
                                     
23 Costello explains her conviction not as a moral imperative, but as “a desire to save her soul” (43). 
David Lurie in Disgrace also often resorts to this kind of religious vocabulary. 
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vicariously think themselves into Costello’s emotional confusion, to 
sympathize with her grief, and finally to weigh it as a significant component 
that makes her ethical position legitimate. Coetzee makes Costello a frail 
ageing intellectual who refuses to put up with academic protocols because she 
feels that “[she does] not have the time any longer to say things [she does] not 
mean” (18). When challenged by interlocutors, she does not have the energy 
to defend her point of view in a manner that they consider satisfactory. To her 
son John, she breaks down: 
I no longer know where I am. … I must be mad! Yet every day I see the 
evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer 
it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money. 
… Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. 
This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t 
you? (69, italics in original) 
Although Costello is a sharp and highly articulate thinker, her attacks on 
philosophical reasoning have only a limited effectiveness. It is against the 
background of the particular circumstances of her life, circumstances out of 
which she acts and tries to persuade an audience of skeptical academics, that 
her ethical vegetarianism emerges as strong and compelling. A crucial aspect 
of the legitimacy of Costello’s radical and arguably irrational moral choice is 
that it springs, to a great extent, from a more visceral than intellectual 
perception of the worth of the lives of animals. 
First and foremost, however, the legitimacy of Costello’s moral choice 
rests on a significantly more radical claim for the superior ethical authority of 
fiction and, thus, the superior discursive (and moral) authority of the creative 
writer. For Costello, the imaginative faculty that enables one to be present to 
the being of another is exercised most powerfully by the creative artists, who 
can furthermore sensitize their readers to the value and place of emotion in 
ethical reflection: “The poets” can “return the living, electric being to 
language” (65). Her point, which concerns the capacity of literature to offer a 
perspective into ethical questions that the conventionally disinterested and 
analytical philosophical discourse cannot adopt, has been made before. 
Martha Nussbaum, for instance, makes a lengthy and elaborate case for 
fiction’s invaluable contribution to moral philosophy. “Certain literary texts”, 
she argues, 
are indispensable to a philosophical inquiry in the ethical sphere: not by all 
means sufficient, but sources of insight without which the inquiry cannot be 
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complete. … Certain truths about human life can only be fittingly and 
accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative 
artist … [and] only the style of a certain narrative artist (and not, for 
example, the style associated with the abstract theoretical treatise) can 
adequately state certain important truths about the world, embodying them 
in [the shape of the narrative] and setting up in the reader the activities that 
are appropriate for grasping them. (5, 6, 23-24)24  
Costello’s and Nussbaum’s positions imply initially a degree of 
complementarity between analytical and creative narrative discourse in their 
grappling with ethical questions, that is, a mutual ethical agency between the 
philosopher and the creative artist akin to the mutuality between the critic and 
the author. On this view, philosophical inquiry can profit from the attention 
that literature devotes to local, particular, and practical contexts that affect 
important moral choices. But both Nussbaum and Costello take their 
arguments further: certain truths about life are indeed explored with more 
depth, density, subtlety, and complexity by narrative than by abstract logical 
prose. Costello imparts that the writer’s art has more power and authority 
than analytical discourse when she attributes to “the poets” the power of 
developing a special sensitivity to, or a distinct kind of perception for, the 
particular. 
The defense of the superior ethical authority of fiction becomes more 
evident if one puts Costello’s argumentative agency as a moral persuader in 
the narrative world side by side with Coetzee’s real-world authorial agency as 
the author of The Lives of Animals. Although Costello comes across as a 
passionate defender of the value of a sympathetic engagement with animals, 
all she does is argue (rather unsuccessfully) before her audience. Coetzee, in 
contrast, by proposing a more humane treatment of animals in an academic 
lecture inside his fictional narrative, outsources the theoretical or abstract 
philosophical argument about a highly divisive issue to his fictitious 
protagonist. His own persuasive work as the author of The Lives of Animals is 
realized in the narrative of Costello’s personal history that he has created, a 
narrative in which the emotional commitment he has given her, although it 
prompts her to speak in affect and undermines her authority before her 
                                     
24 As Anton Leist and Peter Singer put it in their introduction to J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives 
on Literature, Coetzee is “surely” a writer who “provokes philosophers to read him”. More specifically, they 
detect three characteristics in Coetzee’s novels that make them “philosophical: First, an unusual degree of 
reflectivity, meaning thereby a reflective distance to the conventional understanding of everything … [Second], 
a [deep]-layered intellectual attitude of paradoxical truth seeking … [And finally], an ethics of social relationships that 
is especially at the thematic center of most of his stories” (1, 6-8, italics in original).  
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audience, makes her an authoritative surrogate proponent of his argument to 
the extent that it elicits our sympathy for her. Within the sphere of novelistic 
discourse, the inappropriate or awkward fervor with which Costello advocates 
ethical vegetarianism is persuasive. Narratives, like moral persuasion, invest in 
attitude formation. As Ward E. Jones observes, moral persuasion hinges at 
least as much on the “attitudinal element” of our engagement with the 
persuader as on the argument itself (218): 
Exposure to a narrative is exposure to the narrative creator’s (perhaps 
pretended) view of her characters. As such, a narrative necessarily manifests 
attitudinal evaluations of its characters in the various ways that it invites 
spectators to follow what they do and what happens to them. One of the 
richest mechanisms that a narrative creator can use to influence her 
spectators to take an attitude toward the narrative’s characters is that of 
encouraging the spectator to respond with certain emotions. … This 
invitation to emotion both reveals the narrative’s attitude toward the 
characters and calls upon spectators to share that attitude, along with the 
evaluative desires and thoughts that are a part of that attitude. (210, 11) 
Coetzee’s persuasion work in The Lives of Animals hinges finally on his 
rhetorical skill to elicit in the reader an intense, reciprocal, generous response 
to Costello’s moral choice, a rhetorical skill that Costello lacks in the narrative 
world that he creates for her. The appeal to Costello’s experience is a call for a 
sympathetic readerly engagement with her struggle; it is an appeal for the 
reader to engage with her ethical position in its fullness, a position that is 
“grounded, embedded, embodied in [the] messy particulars” of her life 
(Dancer 141). From this perspective, The Lives of Animals celebrates proximity 
and mutuality: the sympathetic imagination that Costello demands from her 
predominantly academic audience epitomizes the generous, open, receptive 
attitude on which proximity and mutuality depend. 
From another perspective, however, the text can also make a very different 
claim: proximity can be deceitful. One of Costello’s most mistrustful, indeed 
hostile, opponents in the audience is her daughter-in-law Norma, a 
philosopher whose name is suggestively evocative of the systematic, more 
evenly ordered and composed qualities of academic discourse. In theory, the 
close nature of their family connection could naturally open up for a more 
sympathetic understanding, on Norma’s part, of Costello’s plight. Unlike the 
other members of the audience, Norma does have a private or more direct 
access to the reasons that have led Costello to bare her personal anguish the 
way she does. The narrative itself, however, gives clues that Norma exploits 
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this closeness to betray Costello. Sitting in the audience, she listens with 
impatience to her mother-in-law’s digressions: “She is rambling. She has lost 
her thread.” (Lives 31) At the honorific dinner hosted by the university, she 
addresses Costello by her first name, unlike the other guests, out of cunning 
and treachery; the narrator signals that she claims “intimacy” before leading 
Costello “into a trap” (42). Norma launches a fierce attack on vegetarianism 
on the grounds of being an expression of power, “a quick, simple way for an 
elite group to define itself” (42). Ultimately, Coetzee makes Norma show no 
sympathy for Costello’s unrestrained speech: “It has nothing to do with 
sincerity. She has no self-insight at all. It is because she has so little insight 
into her motives that she seems sincere. Mad people are sincere.” (67) 
Norma’s depreciative words about the passion and energy with which 
Costello speaks are also worthy of attention for another reason: they resemble 
Coetzee’s own words about the inappropriateness of “a real passion of 
feeling” in critical discourse, which makes it sound like the disjointed 
“utterances of a madman” (Doubling 60). In The Lives of Animals, the academy 
is not the place for emotions. When Costello presents her philosophical 
argument with passion, she does not bring her interlocutors closer and 
persuade them; rather, she estranges, alienates, or even antagonizes them 
because they perceive her vehemence as incoherence or irrationality. In the 
sphere of creative novelistic writing, by contrast, in which Coetzee offers The 
Lives of Animals, Costello’s passion of feeling is potentially more powerful than 
her argument. The authorial consciousness projected by the text seems acutely 
aware of the rhetorical power it can exercise within the domain it chooses to 
speak: Coetzee does not develop a passionate ethical argument as a scholar, 
but as a novelist. In ethical matters, one can conclude from reading The Lives of 
Animals, the discourse of the novelist is more powerful than the discourse of 
the scholar. 
To further my claim that a rejection of the mutuality between author and 
critic is a defining feature of Coetzee’s authorial discourse, I will look into his 
later oeuvre, which comprises the essentially self-referential and 
autobiographical works written between 1990 and 2009, in the last section of 
this chapter. To be sure, these works also hark back to the earlier, more 
explicitly political ones in that they call for readings which unavoidably bring 
the real-world context surrounding the fiction to bear on its interpretation. 
Their affinities with life writing, however, align them primarily with the 
biographical project Doubling the Point, as though they were a natural 
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development of the project.25 The focus of my discussion lies on how the 
concept of autobiographical truth at stake in them goes against the principle 
that the meanings of an autobiography are established by means of a pact, or 
agreement, between writer (or autobiographer) and reader, itself another 
expression of the aspired mutuality between both. 
One can think of this turn to a self-referential or autobiographical mode of 
writing along the lines of the phenomenological, or more precisely, relational 
terms explored both by Coetzee and Attridge. Nevertheless, the relational 
aspect of writing that in theory makes the mutual agency between author and 
critic possible can also acquire a wholly different significance. The text, as a 
manifestation of otherness, is understood in phenomenological thinking as an 
object that “calls to us; it needs a reader to ‘realize’ itself – to mean something 
it must mean something to”, as Morrissey explains the relational grounds of 
Starobinski’s criticism (xix, italics in original). If the author takes precedence 
in this encounter with the textual other, then the critic might indeed be 
conceived of as secondary from a relational perspective, for the text would be 
realized first to its own authorial consciousness. Self-referentiality would 
therefore literally indicate the author’s exercise of self-understanding, as 
though the dialogical dimension of writing were restricted first and foremost 
to the author and the medium. On this view, the communicative dimension of 
writing that involves the reader or critic would play a second-hand role in 
autobiographical examination.26 
Coetzee’s Later Oeuvre: Against Mutuality 
Coetzee turned to autobiographical issues as early as 1990 with the confession 
of the fictitious Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron.27 In the works that have followed, 
fiction and autobiography converge on his persona. The Master of Petersburg 
(1994) is a fictive account of a period of Dostoevsky’s life that explores 
thematic issues characteristic of Coetzee’s own writing. His memoirs are 
fictionalized: Boyhood (1997) and Youth (2002) recount episodes of his past life 
in the third person and in the present, and Summertime (2009) employs several 
                                     
25 Disgrace deserves special attention in this context: it is a self-referential work (as I will argue in the 
next chapter) with a very strong political appeal. 
26 I will develop this particular point towards the end of this chapter, when I discuss how Coetzee 
indirectly presents himself as a particularly authoritative autobiographer. 
27 To be sure, the focus on one consciousness that examines itself is also present in earlier works 
such as Dusklands, In the Heart of the Country, and Waiting for the Barbarians.
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character narrators as authorial voices. In Disgrace (1999), he employs the same 
narrative technique of Boyhood, published two years earlier, which accentuates 
the autobiographical undercurrent in the characterization of David Lurie. The 
Lives of Animals (1999), Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005) and Diary of a 
Bad Year (2007) are all works of a slippery autobiographical or autofictional 
nature, in which Coetzee attributes to the fictitious writers Elizabeth Costello 
and Señor C, with whom he allegedly has a number of ideological affinities, 
the authorship of some of his own lectures and books. 
The self-referential common thread among Coetzee’s later works binds 
them together as so-called “life narratives” or “life writing”. Scholars of 
autobiography employ those terms sometimes interchangeably, sometimes 
with slightly different connotations, on the basic assumption that authors are 
supposed to pay some respect to the self-referential rule. In reality, the extent 
to which those narratives are indeed autobiographical, and therefore the claim 
their authors make upon autobiographical truth, varies considerably in form 
and scope. Paul John Eakin actually includes “the entire class of literature in 
which people tell life stories” in his definition of life writing (1). Sidonie Smith 
and Julia Watson employ “life writing” as “a general term for writing that 
takes a life, one’s own or another, as its subject” (Reading Autobiography 4).28 
Elsewhere, they prefer “autobiography” as the umbrella term for the “widely 
diverse kinds of life narrative … literally dozens, that engage historically 
situated practices of self-representation” (“The Trouble with Autobiography” 
357). Starobinski also remarked on the breadth of the defining criteria of 
autobiographical writing, criteria which in fact “do no more than establish a 
rather ample frame within which a wide variety of particular styles may be 
practiced and exhibited … leaving it up to the writer to choose a particular 
mode, tone, rhythm, extent, and so on (Eye 172).29 
On account of the vagueness of generic criteria, it is the relational quality 
of the classical autobiographical pact between writer and reader proposed by 
                                     
28 They continue: “Such writing can be … explicitly self-referential and therefore autobiographical. 
The autobiographical mode of life writing might more precisely be called self life writing [which they 
find clumsy]. … We employ the term life writing for written forms of the autobiographical, and life 
narrative to refer to autobiographical acts of any sort” (Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting 
Life Narratives 4, italics in original). 
29 The entry on autobiography in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory also adopts a very 
broad perspective: “In a wider sense all fictional writing is autobiographical”. From this sweeping 
description, it proceeds to define autobiography against that which it is not: it is “a comprehensive 
non-fictional narrative in prose” distinct from biography (Löschnigg, Martin. “Autobiography”. The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory). 
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Philippe Lejeune that still functions as the common denominator among all 
the different types of life narratives, offering the author’s intentions as a 
guarantee that the narrative articulates some kind of truth. Put differently, the 
reader assumes that the author’s particular way of handling narrative 
conventions is that which conveys some form of truth. The reader’s part in 
the contract is to recognize the authorial commitment to autobiographical 
truth and avow (or disavow) the veracity of the narrative. This 
complementarity between writer and reader is fundamental to the genre. As 
Starobinski points out, autobiographical writing depends on “requirements of 
an ethical and ‘relational’ order” (Eye 172). Similarly, for Smith and Watson, 
autobiographical truth itself is the product of an “intersubjective exchange 
about the meanings of a life” (Reading Autobiography 16).30 
Coetzee’s autobiographical contract does not depend on this kind of 
exchange because it contains two clauses that secure him a great deal of 
control over autobiographical truth (even if, at first sight, those clauses seem 
to be antithetical). First, he urges his informed readers to look beyond the 
generic conventions of fiction and nonfiction in his writing: “All 
autobiography is storytelling, all writing is autobiography” (Doubling 391). In 
part, this is essentially a restatement of the widely held view that 
autobiography partakes of the same creative quality of fiction insofar as it 
requires that narrative coherence be imposed upon a collection of scattered 
memories. Therefore, the truth claims of nonfiction in general should be kept 
under scrutiny, for all writing is subordinated to the constructive dimension of 
narrativity (or “storytelling”, as Coetzee calls it). He does not, however, simply 
discredit the truth claims of one genre (autobiography/nonfiction) in order to 
accredit the truth claims of another (fiction). Rather, he communicates that all 
of his writings can manifest some form of truth when he grants to otherness, 
that mysterious force that he welcomes into his creative process, the power of 
revealing “what you recognize, or hope to recognize, as the true. … Truth is 
something that comes in the process of writing, or comes from the process of 
writing” (18). Here Coetzee is not simply expressing an ethical commitment to 
the openness of the creative process and celebrating its transformative 
potential on his authorial consciousness; he is also making a rhetorical move, 
                                     
30 For Smith and Watson, autobiographical truth can encompass “fidelity to the facts of their 
biographies, to lived experience, to self-understanding, to the historical moment, to social 
community, to prevailing beliefs about diverse identities, to the norms of autobiography as a literary 
genre itself” (Reading Autobiography 15). 
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namely, imparting that truth in his narratives surpasses the limitations of his 
authorial outlook and conscious intervention. This clause gives a distinct 
outline to his authorial agency, and even more so as autobiographer: it serves 
to empower the integrity of his commitment to autobiographical truth, and 
thus to assure the reader that the text can articulate the truth about the author 
despite himself. 
I will now look at two examples of how the reader’s response is affected 
both by Coetzee’s handling of generic conventions and by his comments on 
the peculiarities of his writing. In a review of Youth for The New York Times, 
William Deresiewicz notes with some consternation that Coetzee “has turned 
his back on the entire autobiographical tradition” by narrating the memoir in 
the third person and in the present (July 7, 2002). Albeit exaggerated, 
Deresiewicz’s reaction is in fact not unjustifiable. As Smith and Watson point 
out, a significant indication of the appeal to veracity in an autobiographical 
narrative is the first person narration that conveys “intimacy and immediacy” 
to the reader (“Trouble with Autobiography” 361). Towards the end of his 
review, Deresiewicz concludes that the third person and present narration in 
Youth (as in Boyhood) signals a breach of the autobiographical contract because 
it evades “the tension between the ‘then’ of the event and the ‘now’ of 
recollection”, which is a typical token of an autobiographer’s effort to enact 
the complexity of self-examination. Deresiewicz seems unsure if Coetzee is 
honoring the autobiographical pact: although he resents the disregard for the 
generic conventions of autobiography, he recognizes in Youth the narrative 
perspective with which Coetzee usually depicts his protagonists’ self-
examination: “An isolated consciousness driving ever deeper into itself, an 
extreme psychological situation followed to its bitter end – it sounds like a 
novel by J. M. Coetzee”. 
Attridge has a different understanding of the kind of communication 
between writer and reader apparently at stake in Coetzee’s fictionalized 
autobiographical pact. At first sight, his reading is perfectly attuned to 
Coetzee’s conviction that truth “comes from the process of writing”, as well 
as to his own argument for hospitality in the author’s and in the reader’s 
engagement with literature (Doubling 18). He claims that “we read Boyhood and 
Youth … to experience the pleasures of language being shaped and arranged to 
capture, for its author, for its readers, a certain form of truth” (Ethics of Reading 
161). Attridge does not take the fictional qualities of Coetzee’s autobiography 
as a disclaimer of truthfulness, but as a token of the author’s unique way of 
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conveying autobiographical truth. In other words, he does not attach the 
concept of truth primarily to the generic affiliation of the narratives (which is, 
by the way, ambiguous, because the memoirs are offered as fiction), but to 
Coetzee’s use of language. 
Before I examine in greater detail the rhetorical implications of Attridge’s 
response, I want to turn briefly to Mark Sanders’s reflections on truth and on 
the concept of implication, both of which chime in with Attridge’s view of 
what is involved in an intersubjective exchange such as the one required by 
autobiographical writing. Sanders’s focus is not autobiography, strictly 
speaking; rather, he discusses the role of South African intellectuals during 
apartheid and the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These 
are issues which inevitably intersect with the criticism of Coetzee’s works, but 
what is worthy of attention here is the natural continuity between the 
theoretical orientation of Sanders’s argument and Attridge’s, a continuity 
which entails a degree of reciprocal strengthening of their views. Once again, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (discussed in the Introduction) is illuminating. 
The affinities between Sanders’s and Attridge’s works with respect to truth 
and implication attest to the ways in which intellectual dispositions shared by 
scholars of a given field create an environment in which certain views or 
practices tend to cohere and contribute to their mutual consolidation. 
As regards “a certain form of truth”, in Attridge’s words, that implicates 
both teller and listener, the relevant parallel with Sanders’s work concerns the 
notion of a “personal and narrative truth” in the work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Personal and narrative truth “is never quite 
defined” by the commission, Sanders notes, but it is clear that the concept is 
meant to capture something in the victims’ testimonies which exceeds factual 
truth. More specifically, he argues, the TRC’s goal seemed to be to restore 
“human and civil dignity … to the teller through storytelling”; what was told, 
in other words, was secondary to the act of telling: “what is important is not 
so much what is told (which has to be verified, and is thus suspect), but rather 
that telling occurs” (Ambiguities 152, italics in original). Yet the TRC’s actual 
commitment to implicating itself with, or taking responsibility for, the truth 
produced in (and by) the victims’ testimonies, Sanders continues, is subject to 
doubt. In his view, despite the apparent openness to a personal account of 
truth, the commission tended to treat the stories of victims “as it would the 
statements of perpetrators. Although [the TRC declared] itself hospitable to 
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storytelling, it [proved] more at ease with statements that [could] be 
forensically verified or falsified” (153). 
When it comes to the key aspect of implication, which Sanders finds 
lacking in the TRC’s final position in relation to the testimonies of victims, I 
want to call attention to the very broad and generalized conception of human 
responsibility that he develops out of the notion of complicity. Sanders goes 
far beyond the narrow sense of complicity as allowing some injustice to 
happen or taking part in some injustice or crime. By drawing mainly on 
Derrida and Heidegger, he arrives at the ontological notion of “a folded-
together-ness (com-plic-ity) in human being (or the being of being human)” 
(Complicities 5, italics in original). In the specific context of how South African 
intellectuals have negotiated their involvement in apartheid, the crucial insight 
provided by complicity as folded-together-ness is that “when opposition takes 
the form of a demarcation from something, it cannot … be untouched by that 
to which it opposes itself. Opposition takes its first steps from a footing of 
complicity” (9, italics in original). This is a perspective that can be fruitfully 
applied to works such as Waiting for the Barbarians and Age of Iron, for instance, 
but it also impacts on my critique of Attridge’s implication in Coetzee’s 
autobiographical truth (which will be developed in greater detail in Chapter 3). 
Insofar as what Sanders understands as complicity functions as a minimal 
condition of possibility for intersubjective relations, complicity understood as 
a form of responsibility that implicates all would be the ontological 
foundation of the stance that Attridge adopts in relation to Coetzee’s 
autobiography. 
What I want to examine here, however, is the rhetorical basis of Attridge’s 
understanding of Coetzee’s use of language in his autobiography. Recently, 
Walsh has put forward an argument that can accommodate an assessment of 
truth in fictional narratives such as the one that Attridge makes. He disputes 
the notion of fiction as a generic category that does not lay claim to truth and 
argues instead for fictionality as a rhetorical resource or communicative 
strategy. On this view, an author’s recourse to fictionality does not necessarily 
signal a non-commitment to truth, but a unique way of conveying meaning 
that depends on a contextual negotiation between writer and reader. More 
specifically, Walsh claims that the concept of truth in fictionalized narratives 
attaches primarily to the contextual inferences made about the authorial 
communicative act, rather than to the literalness of the fictive utterances. He 
builds on the pragmatic theory of linguistic communication proposed by 
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relevance theorists, according to which we produce and expect utterances that 
are primarily relevant to ensure successful communication.31 In the case of an 
autobiography, the authorial communicative act is inextricably tied with the 
assumption that it is committed to autobiographical truth, but when one 
engages with the utterances of the communicative act, one does so expecting 
that they are first of all relevant for the apprehension of autobiographical truth, 
rather than literally or unambiguously true in themselves. Therefore, truth 
does not necessarily have to be attached to the literal content of the utterances 
themselves (that is to say, to the text), but it always attaches to the 
assumptions made about the communicative act, insofar as those assumptions 
express how one accounts for what the speaker intended to communicate: 
The propositional criterion of truth is a subordinate consideration to the 
contextual, pragmatic criterion of relevance. This is not to say that the truth 
or falsehood of assumptions is a matter of indifference (as one might be 
tempted to say, precipitously, is the case with fiction): rather, it is decisively 
to detach those criteria [truth or falsehood] with regard to assumptions 
from any necessary direct relation with the encoded form of an utterance. 
(27) 
To detach truth from the narrative itself, as Walsh suggests, impinges directly 
on the autobiographical contract because truth becomes not so much an issue 
for the autobiographer as for the reader, who expects to find the relevant 
clues which lead to autobiographical truth not necessarily in the narrative itself 
(in the fictionalized utterances) but in a much wider interpretive context. In 
other words, the reader is thus compelled to gauge authorial agency, or the 
expression of the autobiographer’s commitment to veracity, by looking for 
input that exceeds the text itself. 
In essence, the underlying logic of Attridge’s reading is the notion of an 
“intersubjective exchange” between author and reader, as Smith and Watson 
referred to it (Reading Autobiography 16). It is, however, in the context of a 
communicative exchange between writer and reader that the second clause of 
Coetzee’s autobiographical contract will function, as I will argue below, as a 
potential instrument of authorial control over the meanings of his 
autobiography. This second clause undermines the very principle of a pact by 
directly disavowing the reader’s significance in the so-called intersubjective 
exchange. 
                                     
31 See Walsh, p. 23 – 32. 
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The essay “Confession and Double Thoughts”, included in Doubling the 
Point and underscored by Coetzee himself as a “pivotal” piece for his 
intellectual development in that transitional phase of his career, is an 
indispensable extratextual source that touches upon two central aspects for 
the interpretation of the later, self-referential works (Doubling 392). It provides 
a very specific frame of reference for the concept of autobiographical truth 
and it functions as an instrument that, in principle, disempowers the reader or 
critic. The kernel of the argument brings together the political/allegorical 
earlier oeuvre and the self-referential later one (the mere fact of its publication 
in Doubling the Point puts the essay strategically in between those two phases). 
“Confession and Double Thoughts” recaptures essential conceptual issues of 
Coetzee’s novels from Dusklands to Foe but also anticipates the relationship 
between fiction and autobiography as modes of writing and narrative 
understanding that predominates in the later works. The self’s inscription in 
history and the problem of cultural authority that preoccupied the earlier 
novels is articulated in the essay as a problem inherent, and particularly acute, 
in autobiographical writing as well. Autobiographical writing as textual 
representation of the history of the self cannot in principle attain a position of 
authority from which the truth about the self can be narrated. 
In “Confession and Double Thoughts,” Coetzee argues that truth-telling in 
autobiography is encumbered by the potential endlessness of self-knowledge, 
which results in a problem of closure. He finds the parameters of self-
examination in Augustine’s Confessions. Augustine relates a childhood episode 
in which he stole pears from a neighbor’s garden for the excitement of 
committing a forbidden act. What troubles the adult Augustine when he tells 
this story is the knowledge that what in fact motivated him was a desire for 
shame. Awareness of this desire for shame brings Augustine even more 
shame, and yet it feeds and satisfies this same desire endlessly. Augustine 
seeks in his confession an essential truth about himself but his self-
consciousness unfolds indefinitely, always finding behind one explanation 
another one, always deceiving itself, thus not allowing him to reach the truth 
that could release him from guilt. 
Coetzee identifies this displacement of truth in confessional self-
examination in works by Rousseau, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky, and concludes 
that truth is unreachable as an epistemological certainty; therefore, a 
confession is always bound to fail. Despite the inevitable inconclusiveness of 
confession in this sense, however, Coetzee suggests that the commitment to 
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search one’s soul is valid as an ethical effort. This is what he refers to as the 
confessant’s “truth-directedness”, a concept which reintroduces the typical 
paradox intrinsic to the self’s impulse towards the other that recurs in his 
fiction (Doubling 261). Truth might be hopelessly beyond reach (and therefore 
beyond the text), but we are nevertheless born with an intuition of truth that 
lies at the heart of the effort to make sense of one’s life, and this intuition 
sustains the autobiographical project. 
The impact of the argument of “Confession and Double Thoughts” on the 
autobiographical pact goes beyond the creation of the specific concept of 
truth-directedness. This concept, in fact, is fundamentally a reformulation of 
Coetzee’s assumption that an author can only “hope to recognize the true” in 
the writing process (Doubling 18). It is to the “double thought”, as the title of 
the essay suggests, that one should pay attention: it serves to endow Coetzee 
with considerable authority as autobiographer and, at the same time, to 
disempower the reader or critic. 
Coetzee’s detailed analysis of the various ways in which confession 
ultimately fails projects him as a writer fully aware of the limitations of self-
examination, and therefore, as Sheila Collingwood-Whittick points out, it 
implicitly guarantees that he, as autobiographer, “is unlikely to be susceptible 
to … the risks that threaten the autobiographer’s quest for the truth” (17). 
Coetzee himself pursues a similar line of reasoning when he discusses the 
problematic lack of self-doubt in Tolstoy’s The Kreutzer Sonata, which he 
interprets as a result of Tolstoy’s weariness of the complications of self-
examination. Tolstoy creates a protagonist who is seemingly incapable of 
reflective distance, unaware of how one can deceive oneself, and this 
unawareness, Coetzee concludes, undermines his authority as a confessant: 
For whatever authority a confession bears in a secular context derives from 
the status of the confessant as a hero of the labyrinth willing to confront 
the worst within himself (Rousseau claims to be such a hero). A confessant 
who does not doubt himself when there are obvious grounds for doing so 
(as in Pozdnyshev’s case) is no better than one who refuses to doubt 
because doubt is not profitable. Neither is a hero, neither confesses with 
authority. (Doubling 263, 64) 
In contrast, Coetzee’s acute awareness of the treacherousness of the double 
thought empowers his ethical and intellectual authority as autobiographer. 
The other implication of the double thought in Coetzee’s autobiographical 
writing concerns not himself, but his readers. The inescapable tendency to 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT WRITER 
70 
undermine one’s own judgment is also a feature of the confessor’s 
psychology; hence, anyone who intends to assess autobiographical truth is, in 
principle, unfit for the task. To put it differently, readers of an autobiography 
can at best be self-deceived or at worst have a hidden agenda (conscious or 
not) when they pass judgment on the autobiographer’s truth.32 
Finally, there is yet another aspect that tilts the balance of authority in 
matters of self-examination and truth towards Coetzee: years of practice. To 
elaborate on that, I want to look briefly into the function of mimesis in fiction 
and nonfiction as Walsh understands it. He explores Paul Ricoeur’s notion of 
“configuration”, that is, “the making of plot, understood as a systematic 
synthesis, which is not the reproduction of something already given but 
creative production”. Mimesis is thus not an aspect of “the representational 
content, or referential world” of a narrative, as in the Aristotelian conception 
of the imitation of action, but “an aspect of the construction of narrative”. 
Therefore, “mimesis doesn’t mediate the narrative content, but the narrative 
act”. (49) In the case of nonfiction, mimesis as configuration is suited to the 
notion of a relation of coherence between the text and the world: the 
nonfictional narrative does not imitate the real world (as in a relation of 
correspondence), but rather constitutes the author’s effort of making sense of 
it by means of writing. Put differently, the writing itself constitutes the 
authorial process of understanding (self-understanding in the case of an 
autobiography). In fiction, however, mimesis as configuration would lack an 
object, that is to say, a real world of which to make sense. Thus, Walsh 
explains mimesis in fiction as a configuration that “has no object (no data) on 
which to act other than what it proposes to itself … [It] lacks the direct 
purpose of nonfictional narrative understanding” (50). On this view, mimesis 
                                     
32 Coetzee draws mainly on Dostoevsky’s The Idiot when he argues for the inexistence of an ideal or 
adequate confessor. Prince Myshkin, a Christ-like figure who would in theory neither be too severe 
in his judgment nor too cunning to have double motives when hearing a confession, admits that he 
is himself not immune to the spiral of double thought. The auditors of Ippolit’s confession, who 
could be described as the opposite of Myshkin in that they are all-too-aware of deception, are 
essentially indifferent to Ippolit’s truth. Coetzee also examines whether one can confess without a 
confessor. The underground man of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground proposes to confess only 
to himself; since there will not be an audience to his confession, he claims his narrative will produce 
the truth. His confession fails because there seems to be a lack of scrutiny in the narrative process 
itself. Within the parameters of the underground man’s hyperconsciousness (his exceptional 
capacity for self-examination), his narrative is flawed because there are moments in which his 
hyperconsciousness seems to slip. For Coetzee, the major problem about the confessional 
undertaking of Notes from Underground is precisely how to bring the story to an end in light of its 
potential eternal unfolding, a problem which he claims the novel fails to articulate. 
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in fiction would have the indirect purpose of exercising the capacity for 
narrative understanding (for both the writer and the reader). From this 
perspective, Coetzee’s memoirs, produced late in his novelistic career, would 
be the product of an authorial consciousness that has exercised its capacity for 
narrative understanding over many years, and now applies this trained, 
sharpened faculty to understand himself and his own story in the world. 
In the following chapters, I will bring “Confession and Double Thoughts” 
to bear on two works of Coetzee’s later oeuvre, Disgrace and Summertime. The 
focus of my discussion lies on the assumption that Coetzee’s conception of 
autobiographical writing as an utterly private and self-contained project 
dismisses the mutuality between author and critic. Since Summertime is a 
memoir, it undoubtedly lays some claim to autobiographical truth. Its 
narrative technique, however, renders the notion of autobiographical truth 
highly dubious. In the narrative world, the author himself is introduced as a 
dead character, so that his story is told by people who were once close to him. 
My reading draws attention to the unreliability of these accounts, which I 
interpret as Coetzee’s representation and critique of the methods with which 
readers and critics have assessed the story of his life. I argue that all the 
narrators, to a greater or lesser extent, are presented as unreliable, which 
hence disqualifies their assessments of the truth about him. 
The next chapter dwells on Disgrace. My reading of the novel assumes that 
one can rethink the mutuality between narrative and critical discourse in terms 
of an internal dialogue within Coetzee’s own literary production, that is to say, 
between his essay and his novel. Coetzee deals essentially with the same issues 
in both: self-examination, truth-directedness, and the double thought. Each 
discursive arena (critical and novelistic), given the specific set of tools that he 
has at his disposal, allows him different possibilities to bring his reflection to a 
point of conclusion: the novel, I argue, can represent the closure of self-
examination that, in the terms of the essay, would always escape the self-
examining subject. 




Chapter 2 - The Self-Sufficient Writer 
of Disgrace and “Confession and 
Double Thoughts” 
The common thread that runs through this literary chapter and the next is the 
self-sufficiency of Coetzee’s authorial discourse. The focus of this chapter lies 
on the dialogue internal to the authorial consciousness, which creates 
complementarity, or mutuality, between its novelistic and its critical 
dimensions. The conception of mutuality to which I refer here differs from 
the mutuality between authorial and critical discourse that was in focus in the 
previous chapter: here, mutuality brings to the fore the completeness of 
Coetzee’s authorial discourse, that is, its self-explanatory quality. My 
discussion of Disgrace and of the essay “Confession and Double Thoughts”, 
both of which revolve around the impasses of self-examination, aims to shed 
light on this self-explanatory quality. By reading Coetzee’s novel through the 
lenses of his essay, I will first address the construction of Disgrace as a 
fictitious conversion narrative. More importantly, however, my aim in reading 
with the author here is to argue that Disgrace carries the argument of the essay 
further, gesturing within its narrative world towards the transcendent moment 
of illumination that is required to bring self-examination to a true moment of 
closure. Put differently, the greater possibilities of novelistic writing allow 
Coetzee to go beyond the limitations of the logical argumentation of 
“Confession and Double Thoughts”. 
The Nonfictional Character of Disgrace: The 
Novel’s Mimetic and Confessional Design 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Disgrace is particularly salient among 
Coetzee’s later novels. It is probably the work that made him famous 
worldwide, so that it does naturally stand out among his novels, but it also has 
a singular transitional character in the oeuvre. At the same time that Disgrace 
shares with the earlier works an almost irresistible appeal to the South African 
reality, it also displays conceptual and formal features that align it with the 
autobiographical or self-referential mode of writing that distinguishes the later 
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works. The autobiographical aura of the novel is created most ostensibly by 
the similarities between the characterization of David Lurie as an academic 
and Coetzee’s own academic history. Lurie is a former professor of Modern 
Languages at the “Cape Technical University, formerly Cape Town University 
College” (3); Coetzee has for many years been a professor of English 
Literature at the University of Cape Town. Besides, this potential proximity 
between author and protagonist is intensified by one peculiarity of the 
narrative transmission that concerns the narrator. If one assumes that Coetzee 
employs authorial narration, he does so by means of free indirect discourse, 
whose most distinct reading effect is the impression that the authorial narrator 
has a privileged “insider” access to the psyche of the protagonist. The 
narrative transmission, in fact, also creates proximity at the other end as well, 
in the sense that it effectively brings the reader closer to the narrative world. 
This proximity is a result of the absence of a determinate narratee. Matt 
DelConte examines some of the general implications of what he calls “the 
absentee narratee” that apply to the reading effects produced by Disgrace: 
The narrative transmission seems to transcend the ontology of the fiction: 
considering that the narrator seems aware that no one within his ontology 
can access the narration, the narrator seems to narrate as if somehow 
conscious that someone outside his/her ontology can hear the story. The 
absentee narratee, then, seems to invite the reader to enter into the fiction 
more readily than might occur with narrative modes containing a 
determinate narratee … [There] is nothing within the fictional construct to 
buffer us (the authorial audience) from the narrator; thus, our (the authorial 
audience’s) role as audience becomes much more immediate than in other 
works that can accommodate a narratee. (433, 34) 
One can also, however, approach the narrative technique of Disgrace from a 
different perspective and thereby accommodate it within a mode of 
autobiographical writing that is specifically Coetzeean: one can assume that 
the fictitious protagonist Lurie is narrating his own story in the same manner 
in which Coetzee narrates his memoirs Boyhood and Youth. Analyzing the 
second sentence of the second paragraph of the novel, John Douthwaite 
shows how Lurie “is carrying out a conversation with the addressee”, which 
hence implies “the makings of a confessional novel, one in which Lurie does 
not, however, beat his breast and admit his guilt” (51).33 As I will elaborate on 
                                     
33 The sentence reads: “Technically, [Lurie] is old enough to be [Soraya’s] father; but then, 
technically, one can be a father at twelve.” 
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in this chapter, to assume that Lurie is the narrator is in fact the most suitable 
approach to the narrative voice given the conceptual features that Disgrace 
shares with so-called conversion narratives. Disgrace can be read as a narrative 
that pivots on Lurie’s quest for illumination; in this reading, the title of the 
novel immediately alludes to Lurie’s pursuit of grace in a negative way. 
The absence of a determinate narratee, as explained above, invites or 
entices the reader to engage with the events of the story in a more immediate 
manner. Put differently, it creates a greater identification, or proximity, 
between the fiction and the real world. This is certainly one of the major 
structural aspects of Disgrace that help to account for the very intense 
responses that the novel has elicited especially among readers immersed in the 
South African reality. Disgrace prompts what could be described as a 
“nonfictional mode of narrative understanding”, to borrow an expression that 
Walsh uses to describe how “the mimetic logic of fictional representation” 
compels readers to engage with a fictional story (13). 
The story of Disgrace takes place in the second half of the 1990s, part in 
Cape Town and part in the Eastern Cape. David Lurie is a middle-aged, twice-
divorced academic who sexually exploits one of his students, Melanie Isaacs. 
Their brief liaison ends when she files a report for sexual harassment against 
him. Lurie is called before a university committee to explain himself. The case, 
as one of the committee members puts it, has “overtones” which attest to 
“the long history of exploitation” of women in South Africa. Lurie is 
therefore called upon to admit to “the abuse of a young woman” before “the 
wider community” (50, 53). During the hearing, however, he questions the 
procedures of the committee and challenges their authority. He accepts the 
charges brought against him perfunctorily, refusing to make any kind of 
confession or public display of contrition. The university does not accept his 
plea and he is then dismissed. Upon his dismissal, Lurie seeks refuge at his 
daughter’s farm in the Eastern Cape. Lucy is a representative of a new and 
forward-looking generation in South Africa; a “young settler”, Lurie calls her 
(61). She is a lesbian who lives alone and cultivates a patch of land with the 
help of a black co-proprietor, Petrus, formerly her employee. They sell the 
produce of the farm in a local market and keep dogs in a kennel. She also 
volunteers at an animal welfare clinic run by a close friend, Bev Shaw, and 
shares with Bev the commitment to a more humane treatment of animals. 
The first period of Lurie’s stay with Lucy is smooth: they get along quite 
well, he helps her with the work on the farm, even gives Bev a hand at the 
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clinic. Everything changes the day three black men break into the house, beat 
Lurie, set him alight, shoot the dogs in the kennels, and gang rape Lucy. This 
brutal attack brings home to Lucy the precariousness of her progressive ideas 
about racial and social tolerance after the dismantling of apartheid. 
Reconciliation, in the terms presented in the novel, seems to be a delusion; the 
balance of power has shifted, with the consequence that she, as a member of 
the white minority in black territory, is disempowered, humiliated, subjugated 
(158, 59). To be able to keep on living on the farm, she accepts a polygamous 
arrangement with Petrus, signing part of her land over to him in exchange for 
his protection (204). But Petrus’s protection is double-edged: there are 
suspicions that he was involved in the attack, as it later turns out that one of 
the rapists is his wife’s brother (200). As for Lurie, he cannot do much for 
Lucy, who refuses to heed his advice to leave the farm. Eventually, she finds 
out that she got pregnant from the rape. The narrative ends with Lucy 
steadfast in her resolution to go on leading her life on the farm, and with 
Lurie in a state of suspension, as it were: he is unemployed, “his finances are 
in chaos”, his house in Cape Town has been ransacked (175, 6). While he 
waits for his grandchild to be born, he carries on with the searing work of 
helping Bev put down countless abandoned dogs and dispose of the corpses, 
which is a tremendously disturbing experience for him. Besides, he invests 
considerable time and effort in the composition of an eccentric musical piece 
featuring Byron and one of his mistresses, another Sisyphean task that 
“consumes him night and day” (214). 
The storm of critical commentary about Disgrace has converged on the 
novel’s bleak portrayal of social relations. What is particularly interesting in 
those critical assessments, insofar as the authorial communicative act is 
concerned, is the insight that they provide into Coetzee’s confrontational 
manner of engaging his readership. Attwell captures this side of his authorial 
agency concisely and with precision: “At a historical juncture in which the 
citizenry desperately wanted respect, Coetzee gave them disgrace” (“Social 
Life of Fiction” 107). I will begin by giving three examples that are 
representative of the kind of indignant reaction elicited by the novel among 
many commentators. Isidore Diala, for instance, interrogates how the novel 
handles historical guilt, and wonders whether “Lucy’s mode of engagement 
with history is Coetzee’s valid paradigm for white’s negotiation for a 
precarious foothold in post-apartheid South Africa” (60). Lucy Graham and 
Rosemary Jolly choose to focus on another very sensitive issue in a South 
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African context: rape. Graham resents that “most commentators have skirted 
around the issue of sexual violence as a social problem in South Africa”. She 
reacts in particular to a reading of Melanie Isaacs’s rape as an Orphic 
encounter, accusing both the novel and this specific reading of contributing 
“to a much wider and more problematic phenomenon of silencing” (7, 13).34 
Jolly also underscores that Orphic readings of Melanie’s rape reveal “a 
tendency to overlook the corporeal being of Melanie”. The degree to which she 
can tease out the possible continuities between the novel and its surrounding 
context of production and reception is most noteworthy, however, when she 
conflates the fictional narrative world with the real-world South African 
society: “I find this confusion of Eurydice and Melanie disturbing. It may be 
true that in the underworld power becomes impossible; but in this world, 
Melanie is alive, and Lurie’s power over her living body is all too evident” 
(163, italics mine). 
Is it the case that Disgrace has often been misread? As Attwell argues, when 
many critics read Disgrace “as documentary, as providing access to a social 
truth”, they often do so “without any acknowledgement that the truth it 
reveals is instantiated, contextualised, and frequently ironised, within forms of 
discourse which are being held up for scrutiny” (“Social Life of Fiction” 107, 
8). Graham Pechey shares Attwell’s point of view: he resents “the kind of 
simplistic response” that Disgrace has often received, a response “which 
precipitately allegorizes [the novel’s] paraphrasable content, reading it 
monologically as the dramatization of white guilt at its most masochistic 
extreme, and turning Lucy’s pragmatic ethical decision in the world of the 
action into a political categorical imperative for all who live in the world 
beyond it” (381). 
To speculate whether Coetzee deliberately welcomed such responses, or at 
least did not refrain from eliciting them, would be to address the authorial 
communicative act from the wrong end, for it would entail speculations about 
authorial intention, and authorial intention is, ultimately, unavailable. What 
can be said beyond doubt is that the novel has been perceived by many 
readers as provocative; to those readers, Disgrace has spoken in a trenchant and 
disturbing manner about South Africa. In Lucy’s story specifically, rape and 
white contrition, two incendiary issues in a South African context, are aligned. 
                                     
34 Graham reacts to Michael Marais’s ”’Little Enough, Less than Little, Nothing’: Ethics, 
Engagement, and Change in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee”. 
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Lucy decides to bear an illegitimate child conceived during a gang rape in what 
seems to be a sign of reconciliation, as though accepting that she must pay for 
some kind of social debt. For a male critic such as Grant Farred, this passive 
acceptance of rape carries a message: “Lucy cannot speak her violation but 
she can bear manifest testimony to it: the future mixed-race child which the 
white lesbian mother will bear enunciates her recently violated past. But it is, 
more importantly, the most enduring symbol of her refusal to resist” 
(“Borderlines” 19). For female critics in particular, however, the so-called 
message that Lucy’s rape supposedly carries is very hard to digest. Boehmer 
finds this depiction of female submission “problematic” and “ultimately male-
led” (“Sorriest” 144). Elsewhere, she argues that it is “outrageous” to 
prescribe such a model of behavior for a character who, unlike Lurie, has not 
been an agent of evil (“Not Saying Sorry” 349). For Georgina Horrell, “the 
pivotal role that Lucy plays in Disgrace and the novel’s ‘redemptive’ gesture 
towards a future, reconstituted South African society ... [demands] 
interrogation. … It is on and through her flesh, it would seem, that the 
conditions of the new South Africa are written. … An inscription of guilt is 
performed upon gendered flesh” (“One Settler” 32). 
A reading of Disgrace that ignores the social and political dimension of the 
story would fail to respond to one of the most clearly defined aspects of 
Coetzee’s communicative act. As Rosemarie Buikema points out, Disgrace “can 
hardly be read in any other way than as a commentary on [the] gigantic 
political-historical process” (189). She emphasizes specifically the similarities 
between the procedures of the university committee in which Lurie has to 
explain his involvement with Melanie and the procedures of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa: “it is difficult not to read this 
long opening scene [the hearing] as a commentary on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and on the debate that was being conducted 
about this process in South African society” (190). It seems that, for readers 
engaged in the South African context in particular, Disgrace poses the 
demanding challenge of drawing a distinction between approaching the novel 
as a participant “in the on-going dialogue on the transformation process in 
South Africa” that can contribute to an “understanding of the underlying 
implications of South Africa’s peculiar history”, as Diala puts it, and finding in 
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its representation of South African society a projection (that is to say, 
Coetzee’s projection) of the future of the country (52).35 
The reading I want to pursue here does not diminish or overlook the 
significance of South African issues in the configuration of Disgrace. 
Nevertheless, since I want to insert Disgrace among the later works in which 
Coetzee explores the possibilities and the pitfalls of self-examination and 
truth, I will approach the nonfictional mode of narrative understanding that 
the novel prompts by means of its confessional, rather than mimetic, design. 
As a point of departure, one could, for instance, consider how female 
characters such as Melanie and Lucy, whose human value is depicted as 
reduced in Disgrace, play a very specific part precisely in relation to this 
confessional design. To a great extent, their degradation makes sense within 
the mimetic construction of Disgrace, representing as it does the status of 
women in South African society as goods in “a vast circulatory system” (98). 
This treatment of women is one of the elements which, as Attwell argues, the 
novel holds up for scrutiny, instead of unreflectively reproducing it. In other 
words, to be dismayed and outraged at Melanie’s and Lucy’s fate in the novel 
is certainly a tenable response. The novel, however, tells first and foremost 
Lurie’s story; he is the central focalized consciousness and, if one draws a 
parallel between Disgrace and Coetzee’s memoirs (since the narrative technique 
is the same), Lurie is also the narrator of his story. Therefore, the instrumental 
role that women play in Disgrace must also be accounted for in relation to the 
narrative focus on Lurie. When Coetzee creates a protagonist such as Lurie or 
the Magistrate of Waiting for the Barbarians, for instance, he usually pushes the 
women into a secondary, or instrumental, role in order to emphasize how 
deficient, partial, or self-absorbed is his protagonists’ ethical outlook. Michael 
Marais is one of the critics who suggest a more perceptive reading of the 
events surrounding the female characters in Disgrace. For him, Melanie’s and 
Lucy’s rapes function chiefly as “the mechanism through which Coetzee 
challenges his protagonist’s assumptions of autonomy and the careless 
freedom with which it invests him” (“Task of the Imagination” 76). Lucy’s 
rape is the major event in the plot that punishes Lurie for raping Melanie, 
forcing him to experience his state of disgrace as repentance. Lurie’s narration 
                                     
35 See also, for instance, Georgina Horrell’s “Post-Apartheid Disgrace: Guilty Masculinities in White South 
African Writing”; Jacqueline Rose’s “Apathy and Accountability: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission”; Rebecca Saunders’s “Disgrace in the Time of a Truth Commission”; Michiel Heyns’s “The 
Whole Country’s Truth: Confession and Narrative in Recent South African Writing”; and Sue Kossew’s “The 
Politics of Shame and Redemption in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace”. 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT WRITER 
80 
of his own disgrace and journey towards an arguable secular grace entails that 
Lucy’s and Melanie’s stories, and the potential complexities of their characters, 
are constrained by his limited perspective.36 
Something similar happens in Waiting for the Barbarians, also narrated and 
focalized by its protagonist. The Magistrate’s project of soul searching is 
essentially self-absorbed, just as Lurie’s. As character narrator and focalized 
self, the Magistrate dwells on his own suffering, so that what happens to the 
other (the barbarian girl, in this case) is ultimately beyond his concern or 
capacity to grasp. In general, what might redeem Coetzee’s self-centered 
protagonists are those few dubiously enlightened moments in which they 
seem to reach out to the other and almost get a glimpse of the other’s 
interiority, or alternatively almost get a glimpse of themselves from the 
perspective of the other. The passage below, for example, shows how the 
Magistrate eventually comes to the insight that he has exploited the barbarian 
girl’s crippled body. The strange attentions he has devoted to her bear a 
disturbing resemblance to the violence that she has suffered at the hands of 
her torturers: 
Whom will that other girl with the blind face remember: me with the silk 
robe and my dim lights and my perfumes and oils and unhappy pleasures, 
or that other cold man with the mask over his eyes who gave the orders and 
pondered the sounds of her intimate pain? Whose was the last face she saw 
plainly on this earth but the face behind the glowing iron? Though I cringe 
with shame, even here and now, I must ask myself whether, when I lay head 
to foot with her, fondling and kissing those broken ankles, I was not in my 
heart of hearts regretting that I could not engrave myself on her as deeply. 
(147, 48) 
The Magistrate’s ethical awakening, like Lurie’s, is presented as a process, 
rather than as a product. The immediacy of the present-tense narration, 
among other textual elements, intensifies their soul searching with a sense of 
directedness, understood as a progression towards some kind of illumination. 
The subject matter of Disgrace, Lurie’s quest for illumination, can be 
described in secular terms as a pursuit of self-understanding and personal 
growth; therefore, the myopic inward look of the narrative technique is 
                                     
36 In the words of Gayatri Spivak, one needs to “counterfocalize”: “Disgrace is relentless in keeping the 
focalization confined to David Lurie. Indeed, this is the vehicle of the sympathetic portrayal of David Lurie. 
When Lucy is resolutely denied focalization, the reader is provoked, for he or she does not want to share in 
Lurie-the-chief-focalizer’s inability to ‘read’ Lucy as patient and agent. No reader is content with acting out 
the failure of reading. This is the rhetorical signal to the active reader, to counterfocalize” (“Ethics and 
Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching” 22).  
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inescapable, and indispensable for the interpretation of the novel. The search 
for self-knowledge is a recurrent thematic concern in Coetzee’s novels, and 
this is also the issue at the center of “Confession and Double Thoughts”, 
where his dispiriting conclusion is that self-knowledge lies irremediably 
beyond the inward look. Knowledge, or the truth about the self, is both 
central and secondary to soul searching: it is central because it is the raison 
d’être of the inward look, but it is also secondary insofar as it is hopelessly 
unavailable. What is possible in the self-examining enterprise is the quest 
itself, the self’s truth-directedness in the face of relentless doubt, which is 
inescapably triggered by the self’s own thought processes or uttered by others. 
In the context of autobiographical or confessional writing, this back-and-forth 
between truth and doubt, between truth-directedness and the double thought, 
is the most distinct aspect of Coetzee’s authorial discourse. 
As far as the relationship between the novel and the essay is concerned, my 
focus will lie on the issue of closure. My reading aims to show that the novel 
can bring closure to Lurie’s self-examination in a manner which, following 
Coetzee’s argument, a genuine autobiography cannot. The configuration of 
Disgrace does more than enact the back-and-forth between truth-directedness 
and the double thought: it also ends Lurie’s quest for illumination at a point in 
which it is possible to argue for grace beyond his self-scrutiny. In the terms of 
the essay, closure is an issue of authority: Lurie cannot bring closure to his 
self-examination and claim that he is redeemed. Put differently, the text itself 
does not articulate, from his perspective as the teller of his own story, a 
moment of definitive grace, but the narrative world contains the structural 
elements that are necessary to argue that grace might be brought upon him. 
The next section begins the analysis of Disgrace in light of “Confession and 
Double Thoughts”. It is useful to split the novel in two parts, in order to 
account for the completely different worlds in which Lurie moves and grasp 
how the relationship between both parts has a direct bearing on his personal 
growth, or on the truth-directedness of his soul searching. In general lines, the 
first part of Disgrace is devoted to delineating Lurie’s character; the second part 
brings self-examination more clearly into focus. 
Lurie’s Story: Two Universes of Discourse 
Lurie’s life in Cape Town in the first part of the novel is stable, predictable, 
structured: “he is in good health, his mind is clear” (2). He keeps his 
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professional and affective lives “within limits” (3). As a former professor of 
Modern Languages that has been downgraded to adjunct professor of 
Communications, Lurie does not have much respect for the tasks he performs 
at the university, but “he continues to teach because it provides him with a 
livelihood” (5). As regards “the problem of sex” for a fifty-two year-old 
divorcée, he thinks he has “solved [it] rather well”, after a period of 
“promiscuity”, with weekly visits to the prostitute Soraya, “a ready learner, 
compliant, pliant”, whom he finds “entirely satisfactory” (1, 5, 7). His life 
derails following his involvement with Melanie. In the second half of the 
novel, whose climactic event is the attack on the farm, Lurie’s life is radically 
changed. He feels that “he is losing himself day by day”, “stuck in the back of 
beyond … nursing his daughter” and attending to the work on the farm that 
Lucy is unable to care about; “a dying enterprise”, he calls it (121). He 
commences a sexual relationship with Bev Shaw in what seems a self-inflicted 
punishment for his womanizing. Concomitant with his work at the clinic, 
where he and Bev put down abandoned dogs in sessions that leave a deeply 
unsettling imprint on his imagination, he struggles with the composition of an 
opera about his Romantic hero, Byron, and one of his mistresses, another 
dying enterprise which, on the surface at least, gets him nowhere. 
Coetzee’s comments on Tolstoy’s writing in “Confession and Double 
Thoughts” can throw light on this dramatic shift, as well as on the role that 
eschatological themes such as death, repentance and revelation, predominant 
in the second part of the novel, play in the overall story of Lurie’s personal 
growth. Tolstoy’s writing, and particularly the later stories, according to 
Coetzee, is “concerned with truth” and centers on a “crisis”, defined as “a 
confrontation with his own death that brings about an illumination in the life 
of the central character [and] makes it absurd for him to continue in a self-
deceived mode of existence”. Coetzee is particularly interested in “the sense 
of urgency” with which Tolstoy recounts a period of personal crisis, “the 
relentlessness of the process in which the self is stripped of its own 
comforting fictions” (Doubling 262). He identifies “a contest of forces” 
between “two states of mind simultaneously present” in Tolstoy’s psyche. 
One is “a passive state” that, although “associated with reasoning”, likens “a 
strange state of mind-torpor … a stoppage, as it were, of life”. It is a state of 
“error”, a “drive to death” that manifests itself as “a gathering sluggishness, 
like the running down of life itself”. The other state is an “impulse” that 
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“partakes of the intellect” but from which “a saving truth” springs that 
“obscurely mistrusts reason” (260–1). 
In order to begin looking into how Disgrace unfolds following this pattern, 
I want to draw attention to how this “contest of forces” is prepared in the 
novel. In the analysis of Tolstoy’s fictional confession The Kreutzer Sonata, 
Coetzee reflects on how this later work fails to conform to Tolstoy’s 
conception of “a fiction centering on a crisis of illumination, retrospectively 
narrated by a speaker (now a truth-bearer) about his earlier, (self-) deceived 
self”. The problem of the Sonata, as Coetzee sees it, lies in “two crippling 
silences”: 
The first is the silence about the conversion experience, an experience in 
which … being a truth-bearer is felt most intensely by contrast with the 
previous self-deceived mode of existence. … The second and more serious 
silence [is manifested in] the function of doubling back and scrutinizing the 
truthfulness of the truth enunciated by [the protagonist]. (Doubling 262, 63) 
In the case of Disgrace, the second silence, the scrutiny of the truthfulness of 
Lurie’s utterances, is dealt with first (the first silence will be the focus of the 
discussion in the next section). Part of it is accomplished by means of the 
reflective distance that is inbuilt in his intellectual makeup. Lurie, as Pechey 
notes, “habitually lives at a distance from himself”, and a typical manifestation 
of this analytical bent is his “obsessive inward attention to words” (378). Lurie 
is a literary scholar; the intellectual distance that is a natural habit of the 
profession is deeply rooted in his personality as well, where it translates as 
emotional coolness and detachment especially in his affective life. The most 
distinguishing feature of his characterization in the first part of the novel, up 
to the episode of the university inquiry, is his intellectualized male gaze. The 
“inward attention to words” which Pechey notes is symptomatic of the 
manner in which Lurie typically defines, categorizes, or reads the other, which 
becomes particularly noticeable in his dealings with women. His habit of 
unfolding words of the same root trying out different connotations of the 
object they qualify captures this dispassionate disposition: for instance, he 
describes Soraya, the prostitute he sees once a week, as “compliant, pliant” 
(5); the sessions with her give him, as he puts it, “a moderate bliss, a 
moderated bliss” (6). Melanie, the typically exotic desirable other, is objectified 
with a “shift [of] accent” and an epithet: “Meláni: the dark one” (18).37 
                                     
37 Similar occurrences can be found, for instance, on pages 71, 164, and 166. 
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The following passage captures three typical personality traits of Lurie’s: 
the habit of contemplating an issue from different angles; his biting irony; and 
finally, the condescending and sexist view of the female body: 
Would they [Lucy and Helen] dare to share a bed while he was in the 
house? If the bed creaked in the night, would they be embarrassed? 
Embarrassed enough to stop? But what does he know about what women 
do together? Maybe women do not need to make beds creak. And what 
does he know about these two in particular, Lucy and Helen? Perhaps they 
sleep together merely as children do, cuddling, touching, giggling, reliving 
girlhood – sisters more than lovers. Sharing a bed, sharing a bathtub, baking 
gingerbread cookies, trying on each other’s clothes. Sapphic love: an excuse 
for putting on weight. (86) 
As Coetzee points out in “Confession and Double Thoughts,” the 
truthfulness of a conversion narrative, or a narrative that centers on “a crisis 
of illumination”, hinges on the scrutiny of the protagonist’s utterances 
(Doubling 262). In Disgrace, this scrutiny is performed to a great extent by the 
narrative technique itself, which is congenial to represent Lurie’s analytical and 
self-reflexive predisposition. But the reader is also drawn into Lurie’s self-
examination, particularly into the examination of his ethical standards, given 
the absence of an apparent narratee. The passage below, for example, is 
illustrative of this dual scrutiny. It is a typical instance of Lurie’s habitual self-
distance, the analytical, almost clinical detachment; at the same time, however, 
the reader is also indirectly implicated, as though invited to share the different 
point of view to which Lurie alludes towards the end: 
He ought to give up, retire from the game. At what age, he wonders, did 
Origen castrate himself? Not the most graceful of solutions, but then ageing 
is not a graceful business. … Severing, tying off: with local anaesthetic and a 
steady hand and a modicum of phlegm one might even do it oneself, out of 
a textbook. A man on a chair snipping away at himself: an ugly sight, but no 
more ugly, from a certain point of view, than the same man exercising 
himself on the body of a woman. (9) 
The scrutiny of Lurie’s conduct is also developed into a central episode of the 
novel, the hearing held by the university after the complaint for sexual 
harassment lodged by Melanie. Yet what has called the attention of most 
critics is the social critique embedded in the episode. Coetzee draws explicitly 
on the procedures of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, calling into 
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question the ambiguous authority with which it invested itself.38 The 
similarities between the fictional committee of inquiry in Disgrace and the TRC 
are visible. Neither has any legal punitive powers; their role is formally 
restricted to making “recommendations” on the best course of action (47). 
Their overt ambition, however, manifest in their discourse of public 
accountability, is to act as a kind of forum in which true soul searching is 
carried out and repentance is exposed to all. Apart from the social critique, the 
hearing scene speaks directly to the problem of knowledge in confession as 
Coetzee spells it out in “Confession and Double Thoughts”. Most obviously, 
the premises of the inquiry go against the basic requirement for confessional 
truth according to Coetzee: truth-directed soul searching is a private, not a 
public, issue. But the motives that call for confession and repentance, as well 
as the spirit in which one attempts to confess, are also in focus. 
Truth-telling is depicted in Lurie’s inquiry as a matter of rhetoric in its 
most depreciative sense, where truth is measured by the awareness of an 
audience. The members of the committee want his abasement to appease the 
angry repercussion generated by the case. For the male members, whom Lurie 
cynically thinks of as “his friends”, those who “want to save him from his 
weakness, to wake him from his nightmare”, a public statement is necessary to 
minimize the collective damage in the eyes of the media (54). The female 
members, and among them the chair of “the university-wide committee on 
discrimination”, demand public censure as an exemplary punishment (40). 
Lurie himself refuses to engage in real reflection about his conduct before 
such auditors. He appears before them “in the wrong spirit”, sarcastically 
alleging that he has “reservations of a philosophical kind” concerning its 
constitution (47). Unsurprisingly, the women begin to press him at once. One 
of them wonders whether he has consulted “a priest … or a counsellor”, 
which immediately exasperates him: “No, I have not sought counselling nor 
do I intend to seek it. I am a grown man. I am not receptive to being 
counselled. I am beyond the reach of counselling” (49). In a clearly 
provocative spirit, he offers the following confession: “something happened 
which, not being a poet, I will not try to describe … Suffice it to say that Eros 
entered … I was not myself … I became a servant of Eros” (52, 53). 
Outraged at the manner in which he evades responsibility, the committee 
                                     
38 Examining the relevant material for Disgrace in J. M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing, Attwell 
concludes that the TRC “provided the seed from which Disgrace germinated” (220). 
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demands not simply an admission of guilt, but a declaration that “comes from 
his heart” and “reflects his sincere feelings” in a “spirit of repentance”. 
Needless to say, Lurie does not recognize their authority: he mocks their 
pretension to “divine” whether truth “comes from [his] heart”; refuses to 
“shed tears of contrition” or “humble [himself] and ask for clemency” (52–
54). Finally, ascribing repentance to “another world, another universe of 
discourse”, he puts forward “a secular plea” and is invited to resign from his 
position (58). 
Lurie is also confronted with the truth of his abusive behavior even before 
the inquiry, in a conversation with his ex-wife Rosalind that prefigures his fate 
during the hearing: 
‘I don’t know what you do about sex and I don’t want to know, but this is 
not the way to go about it. You’re what – fifty-two? Do you think a young 
girl finds any pleasure in going to bed with a man of that age? Do you think 
she finds it good to watch you in the middle of your…? Do you ever think 
about that?’ 
He is silent. 
‘Don’t expect sympathy from me, David, and don’t expect sympathy from 
anyone else either. No sympathy, no mercy, not in this day and age’. (44) 
This passage is relevant not only because it foreshadows the spirit in which 
the inquiry is conducted. Most importantly, it suggests the beginning of what 
could be a potentially true self-examination and remorse because Lurie tacitly 
acknowledges that Rosalind has a point: “Perhaps it is the right of the young 
to be protected from the sight of their elders in the throes of passion.” 
Eventually, however, the change of perspective (from self to other), the 
incipient ethical insight, is curbed, for he falls back on a defense of his 
predatory behavior: “That is what whores are for, after all: to put up with the 
ecstasies of the unlovely” (44). 
Lurie will carry out a searching examination of his conscience when he 
flees the city, where the eyes of the public are upon him, and seeks refuge and 
anonymity at his daughter’s farm. His story from this point onwards is 
essentially a narrative of defamiliarization with himself, a gradual estrangement 
from the predictable world to which he was accustomed, and an admission 
into the “universe of discourse” in which repentance is not only legitimate, 
but inevitable (58). As he becomes more and more disempowered within a 
traditional patriarchal and racist structure, he gains moral authority. This is a 
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recognizably Coetzeean progression: power and moral authority do not go 
hand in hand in Coetzee’s fiction. In Lurie’s case, this progression pivots on 
his conflicted relationship with his daughter Lucy and with the “remarkably 
unattractive” Bev Shaw, with whom he will nevertheless have a sexual affair 
(82). 
Broadly speaking, the conflict between Lurie and Lucy is a generational 
one; more strictly, though, what sets them apart is the issue of moral 
authority. As Attridge notes, “Lurie is in many ways a typical white South 
African of the generation that grew up with apartheid (he would have been 
three years old when the Nationalist government won power” (Ethics of 
Reading 171). He is, in other words, a representative of the generation that has 
benefitted with the power relations established by apartheid, even if he has 
not actively endorsed racial oppression. This generation, however, is on its 
way out, which emerges most clearly when the conceptions of life and of the 
future held by Lucy are contrasted with Lurie’s. Lucy, as Horrell argues, 
“represents a new way for white people to live in Africa”: 
She is able to share property … and appears to have constructed fair and 
just terms for co-ownership with Petrus … Lucy would seem to represent a 
post-colonial “dissenting colonizer, the colonizer who refuses”, in that she 
“refuses” to take up the burdens of the master-slave, owner-worker 
relationship, fashioning instead a partnership with the black man who is at 
first employed by her … [She] exceeds and thereby refuses the structures of 
patriarchal colonialism: she is firmly inscribed in the margins of society as a 
lesbian woman, who has chosen to live alone, independent of male 
authority. (“One Settler” 27, italics in original) 
Lurie, in contrast, lives by and represents a surpassed, obsolete model whose 
privileges, particularly sexual privileges, are exposed as immoral because of the 
power relations that make them possible. The interactions with Lucy often 
make it evident. For example, when he tells her that he “wouldn’t oblige” to 
the “spectacle [of] breast-beating, remorse, tears” demanded by the university, 
Lucy’s soft and subtly ironic advice uncovers precisely the vanity behind his 
principled resistance: “You shouldn’t be so unbending, David. It isn’t heroic 
to be unbending” (66). In another conversation, Lurie wants to speak for the 
“rights of desire”. He draws the melodramatic comparison between the 
reprimand he was given by the university and the beating of a dog by its 
owners whenever the animal wants to mate. It is “ignoble” to attempt to make 
an animal hate its “own nature”, he argues, for “no animal will accept the 
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justice of being punished for following its instincts”. Lucy challenges him 
openly this time, calling into question his exploitative sexual behavior: “So 
males must be allowed to follow their instincts unchecked?” (89, 90) 
Another issue that exposes the ethical and ideological divide between 
father and daughter is the treatment of animals. On the whole, Lurie is 
basically indifferent to animals. They should be treated kindly, he says, but one 
cannot “lose perspective” of the fact that “we are of a different order of 
creation from the animals. Not higher, not necessarily, just different” (74). 
Lucy reads in his indifference yet another exercise of power; we dispose of 
animals according to their utility to us: “They are part of the furniture, part of 
the alarm system. They do us the honour of treating us like gods, and we 
respond by treating them like things” (78). On the issue of how animals 
should be treated, she has clearly elected a model of unselfish dedication to 
the other: she volunteers at the animal clinic because of people like Bev, who 
do “an enormous amount of good” by attempting to share “some of our 
human privilege with the beasts” (73, 74). Unsurprisingly, the moral authority 
that someone like Bev can inspire in Lucy upsets Lurie. On the surface, his 
reaction is scornful. “Animal-welfare people”, as he calls them, are “a 
subculture of [their] own”, without cultivation, refinement, or charm. Since 
Bev is a woman, Lurie is particularly (and predictably) attentive to her physical 
attributes: “He has not taken to Bev Shaw, a dumpy, bustling little woman 
with black freckles, close-cropped, wiry hair, and no neck. He does not like 
women who make no effort to be attractive” (72). Bev’s neglect for her looks, 
Lurie seems to believe, is an indirect attack on men like him, for whom a 
woman’s beauty is a man’s property: as he once told Melanie, “a woman’s 
beauty is part of the bounty she brings into the world. She has a duty to share 
it” (16). More deeply, though, he is unsettled by the realization that his 
daughter’s independence entails, for him, an inevitable loss of paternal 
authority (and this realization will be intensified as the story unfolds). His 
condescending remarks about her engagement with animals are a symptom of 
his uneasiness at finding himself thus surpassed, or disempowered, before her: 
I am sorry, my child, I just find it hard to whip up an interest in the subject. 
It’s admirable, what you do, what she does, but to me, animal-welfare 
people are a bit like Christians of a certain kind. Everyone is so cheerful and 
well-intentioned that after a while you itch to go off and do some raping 
and pillaging. Or to kick a cat. (73) 
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Lucy’s response makes it clear that she rejects her father’s way of life and what 
it represents, especially his lofty scholarly and artistic pursuits, which she 
emphatically discredits as paths to a “higher life”: 
You think I ought to involve myself in more important things … You 
think, because I am your daughter, I ought to be doing something better 
with my life … painting still lives or teaching myself Russian. You don’t 
approve of friends like Bev and Bill Shaw because they are not going to lead 
me to a higher life … They are not going to lead me to a higher life, and the 
reason is, there is no higher life. This is the only life there is. Which we 
share with animals. That’s the example that people like Bev try to set. That’s 
the example I try to follow. (74) 
In some respects, father and daughter can be said to be worlds apart; this 
conflict between them encapsulates on a minor scale the schism between two 
worlds that is a significant thematic component of the novel. This schism is 
fittingly situated in frontier territory: the Eastern Cape border, the site of 
“long-ago, infamous wars among the white colonists, the Afrikaner Trekkers 
and the indigenous black population”, a place which marks “if not the original 
point of conflict then certainly the most enduring site of antagonism between 
black and white” (Farred, “Borderlines” 17). The frontier where Lurie and 
Lucy remain is a symbol for a suspended state: it is neither here nor there, for 
it marks both the end and the beginning; it is the site of the encounter, or 
clash, between self and other. The frontier territory where the second half of 
the story takes place is depicted as a primitive, barbaric, superstitious world 
beyond enlightenment and, consequently, beyond the reach of the traditional 
power structures that have privileged Lurie.  
A thought that occurs to him as he is locked in a lavatory while his 
daughter is raped in her bedroom captures this change in the order of things 
swiftly; Lurie, the cultivated man of letters, is completely powerless before the 
brutality of the place in which he finds himself: “He speaks Italian, he speaks 
French, but Italian and French will not save him here in darkest Africa” (95). 
The chapter in which the attack on the farm and Lucy’s rape are portrayed, 
which marks the climactic point of the narrative, has an almost otherworldly 
atmosphere. Lucy’s opening words about three wild geese that come to the 
farm every year have a sinister tone, foreboding the arrival of the three rapists: 
“I feel so lucky to be visited. To be the one chosen” (88). The word “visit” is 
also suggestive: it evokes “visitation”, in the sense of a divine dispensation, or 
the coming of a supernatural power to judge and punish one. Lurie himself 
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also describes the attack in similarly eschatological terms: “So it has come, the 
day of testing. Without warning, without fanfare, it is here, and he is in the 
middle of it” (94). 
The frontier has a metaphorical dimension in Lurie’s progression: it is the 
place where he will undergo a slow process of disempowerment, manifested 
in the disordered intellectual and emotional state in which the attack leaves 
him. Lurie is traumatized; a gloomy and abject frame of mind settles upon 
him, which he often expresses as a relentless emptying of life and of meaning: 
“He has a sense that, inside him, a vital organ has been bruised, abused – 
perhaps even his heart … [He] feels his interest in the world draining from 
him drop by drop. It may take weeks, it may take months before he is bled 
dry, but he is bleeding” (107). On a more intellectual level, Lurie experiences a 
similar emptiness as language seems to him to have been exhausted of 
meaning. Language has “thickened, lost [its] articulations, [its] articulateness, 
[its] articulatedness … stiffened … like a dinosaur expiring and settling in the 
mud” (117). The following passage is representative of the disarray in his 
grasp on the world; the way he looks for the roots of the word “friend” 
captures his attempt to rationalize the new reality according to familiar, but 
anachronistic, conceptions: 
Bill Shaw believes that if he, Bill Shaw, had been hit over the head and set 
on fire, then he, David Lurie, would have driven to the hospital and sat 
waiting … Bill Shaw believes that, because he and David Lurie once had a 
cup of tea together, David Lurie is his friend, and the two of them have 
obligations towards each other. Is Bill Shaw wrong or right? … Has Bill 
Shaw … seen so little of the world that he does not know there are men 
who do not readily make friends, whose attitude toward friendships 
between men is corroded with scepticism? Modern English friend from Old 
English freond, from freon, to love. Does the drinking of tea seal a love-bond, 
in the eyes of Bill Shaw? Yet but for Bill and Bev Shaw, but for old 
Ettinger, but for bonds of some kind, where would he be now? (102, italics 
in original) 
His skepticism about male comradeship is understandable. In the background 
of his reflection about the obligations that friends have towards one another is 
the conduct of his male work colleagues, his “friends”, as he cynically referred 
to them in connection with the inquiry. These were the comrades who so 
readily concurred with his public exposure, disguising self-interest (since they 
wanted to safeguard their own reputations) as fellow-feeling: “We have our 
weak moments, all of us, we are only human. Your case is not unique” (52). 
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This identification of points of contact between the first and the second parts 
of the narrative is a central reading effect of Disgrace. The configuration of 
Lurie’s trajectory relies on how the key plot events are aligned by means of 
similarities, analogies, or parallels.39 
For instance, the central metaphor that Coetzee explores to depict Lurie’s 
melancholy after the attack, as well as Melanie’s and Lucy’s experiences of 
sexual violence, is death. The metaphor creates a common framework for 
their experience, for they are all victims of violence, and it also establishes the 
unbridgeable gap between Lurie and the women where sexual violence, in 
particular, is concerned. The passage below is an example of how Lurie’s 
thoughts after the attack typically revolve around personal dissolution: 
Just an after-effect, he tells himself, an after-effect of the invasion. In a 
while the organism will repair itself, and I, the ghost within it, will be my old 
self again. But the truth, he knows, is otherwise. His pleasure in living has 
been snuffed out. Like a leaf on a stream, like a puffball on a breeze, he has 
begun to float toward his end … The blood of life is leaving his body and 
despair is taking its place, despair that is like a gas, odourless, tasteless, 
without nourishment. You breathe it in, your limbs relax, you cease to care 
… (107, 8) 
Lurie is in mourning for himself because of what he describes as an 
“invasion”, a significant word because of the chain of associations that it can 
create. It calls to mind his own unexpected and unwanted appearance at 
Melanie’s apartment in the first part of the novel: “He has given her no 
warning; she is too surprised to resist the intruder who thrusts himself upon 
her”. It is precisely after Lurie’s invasion that the text depicts Melanie’s 
powerlessness before him most explicitly as a kind of death: “When he takes 
her in his arms, her limbs crumple like a marionette’s” (24). Within Lurie’s 
psychological and ethical makeup, his advance does not amount to rape (“not 
quite that”), but the words that Coetzee uses to portray Melanie’s subjection 
are unambiguous: “As though she had decided to go slack, die within herself 
for the duration…” (25). 
                                     
39 Michael Marais and Alyda Faber also underscore the importance of these parallels for the understanding of 
the novel. In Marais’s words, “by constructing a parallel between the two rape scenes in the novel, Coetzee 
thus places his protagonist in a number of roles and positions which are ironic reversals of those he has 
previously occupied. In so doing, the writer introduces his protagonist to realms of experience from which he 
has previously been excluded” (“Task of Imagination” 78). Faber notes that “a number of broadly parallel 
events play off each other in the novel, creating a dialogical dynamic … Language in Disgrace is dialogical in 
the sense that reiterated words – like ‘disgrace’, ‘save’, ‘impersonal’ and ‘love’ – reveal changing shades of 
positive and negative meaning depending on contexts of shifting negotiations of power in and through race 
and gender relations” (306). 
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One can continue to pursue the implications of the death metaphor with 
reference to Lucy, whose reaction is similar to Melanie’s. Her remoteness 
while being consoled by her father immediately reenacts Melanie mimicking 
death. Lurie “takes [Lucy] in his arms. In his embrace she is stiff as a pole, 
yielding nothing” (99). Coetzee uses identical words in the first part of the 
novel in the scene where Lurie invites Melanie to spend the night with him: 
“she does not withdraw, but does not yield either” (16, italics mine). Finally, 
“she slips his embrace and is gone” (17, italics mine). Two other passages also 
render Lucy’s experience as analogous to dying. The first one occurs when she 
reports the assault, the killing of the dogs, and the robbery but does not 
mention the rape to the police officers. Lurie interprets her silence as an 
admission of defeat; out of shame, he thinks to himself, she is conceding the 
rapists a “victory” by not laying charges: “The men … will read [in the news] 
that they are being sought for robbery and assault and nothing else. It will 
dawn on them that over the body of the woman silence is being drawn like a 
blanket” (110). The second passage is Lucy’s most explicit account of her 
experience: “I am a dead person and I do not know yet what will bring me 
back to life” (161). 
The trauma caused by the attack accentuates the differences between 
father and daughter, and their estrangement increases after a number of 
confrontations. For Lurie, those confrontations make it painfully explicit that 
Lucy does not need her father’s protection; indeed, she does not want his 
protection. Despite his struggle to reach out of his self-centeredness, his 
attempts to understand what she is going through constantly fail. These bitter 
exchanges follow a pattern: Lurie often gauges Lucy’s situation in terms of his 
own response to the events; she, on the other hand, asserts her difference 
from him time and again, challenging him to reach beyond his usual modes of 
thinking. Lurie wonders, for instance, if Lucy is trying to remind him “of what 
women undergo at the hands of men” by not speaking about the rape, which 
is revealing of his inchoate awareness of being himself a violator (111). She 
cuts him short: “This has nothing to do with you, David” (112). Upon her 
curt reply, he tries another recognizable Lurie-like approach and reads her 
attitude against a wider context of interpretation. Her silence is a symbolic 
gesture, he ventures; she is making reparations for the historical crime of 
apartheid: “Is it some form of private salvation you are trying to work out? 
Do you hope you can expiate the crimes of the past by suffering in the 
present?” To some extent, he might have a point; Lucy is a forward-looking 
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young South African whose rejection of the colonial past has created a new 
landscape of social relations around the life on the farm. But, again, she is 
categorical: “No. You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are 
abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions” (112). 
Within the historical dimension to which Lurie alludes, Lucy’s words spell 
out for him that historical guilt belongs with his generation, not hers. But 
there is a more personal aspect of the difference between them that is implied 
by her response as well: Lurie is the intellectual who deals in abstractions; the 
pragmatic Lucy does not. This exchange is also significant on the level of the 
overall configuration of the narrative, since it functions as a metacommentary 
on Lurie’s journey towards some form of illumination (and not without a 
tinge of irony). Lucy disowns abstractions such as guilt and salvation, but guilt 
and salvation lie in fact at the heart of her father’s story in the novel. Another 
such metacommentary is implicit when she accuses him of being selfish: “You 
behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main 
character, I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until 
halfway through” (198). 
Lurie’s loss of paternal authority is intensified when “fatherly Petrus” 
emerges as the figure of power to which Lucy chooses to appeal (162). As 
Petrus rises as Lucy’s protector and Lurie finds himself impotent, archaic, 
anachronistic, the animosity between both men grows. Lurie is particularly 
aggrieved at Petrus’s reticence to acknowledge that Lucy has been raped, 
which for him is evidence of Petrus’s connivance: 
You are whipping yourself into a rage, he admonishes himself: Stop it! Yet at this 
moment he would like to take Petrus by the throat. If it had been your wife 
instead of my daughter, he would like to say to Petrus, you would not be tapping 
your pipe and weighing your words so judiciously. Violation: that is the word he 
would like to force out of Petrus. Yes, it was a violation, he would like to hear 
Petrus say; yes, it was an outrage. (119, italics in original) 
Lurie wants from Petrus an unequivocal admission of his collaboration with 
the rapists. “Violation” is the specific word that he wants to hear, and that 
Petrus “so judiciously” avoids. This passage, like others, harks back to a 
counterpart in the first half of the novel. Petrus’s silence about Lucy’s rape 
recalls Lurie’s own refractory stance during the inquiry about Melanie’s abuse. 
The outrage that Petrus’s maneuvers elicit from him is similar to the anger 
that Dr. Rassool, the chair of the committee for discrimination, manifested at 
Lurie’s evasive responses during the inquiry, when she demanded a confession 
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of sexual abuse: “Abuse: he was waiting for the word. Spoken in a voice 
quivering with righteousness. What does she see, when she looks at him, that 
keeps her at such a pitch of anger?” (53, italics in original) As with the death 
metaphor, silence creates a common framework for victims and perpetrators, 
both aligning and dissociating them. Male silence, as both Lurie and Petrus 
make use of it, is an index of power, and an eloquent expression of their guilt, 
whether by action or omission. Female silence, in contrast, as both Melanie 
and Lucy resort to it, is a token of their powerlessness and victimization. 
Lurie refuses to talk about rape during the inquiry because he is a 
perpetrator of sexual violence, whereas Lucy refuses to talk about rape 
because she is a victim of sexual violence. Yet underlying both refusals is a 
common purpose: the wish to avoid public disgrace. This parallel between 
Lurie’s and Lucy’s disgrace emerges clearly for the first time when Lurie 
listens to Lucy’s partial account of the events to the police and thinks: “Lucy’s 
secret; his disgrace” (109). A little later, it appears again more elaborately in 
the passage in which he reflects on her decision to skip the Saturday market, 
where she sells the produce of the farm, a couple of days after the attack:  
She would rather hide her face, and he knows why. Because of the disgrace. 
Because of the shame. … Like a stain the story is spreading across the 
district. Not her story to spread but theirs [the rapists’]: they are its owners. 
How they put her in her place, how they showed her what a woman was for 
(115).  
Lurie is trying to create a common ground for himself and Lucy, mainly to 
gauge her experience. The narrative itself, however, calls this common ground 
into question: by means of Bev, the novel suggests that it is a mistake to 
measure Lucy’s experience of being disgraced by the same yardstick with 
which one could measure Lurie’s. She is a victim of sexual violence; he is a 
perpetrator. The following passage spells it out clearly. The number of questions 
that Lurie asks himself is also significant; his confusion peaks at this point in 
the novel, and he is on the brink of a radical transformation: 
You weren’t there. You don’t know what happened. He is baffled. Where, 
according to Bev Shaw, according to Lucy, was he not? In the room where 
the intruders were committing their outrages? Do they think he does not 
know what rape is? Do they think he has not suffered with his daughter? 
What more could he have witnessed than he is capable of imagining? Or do 
they think that, where rape is concerned, no man can be where the woman 
is? Whatever the answer, he is outraged, outraged at being treated like an 
outsider. (140, 41, italics in original) 
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I have resorted to Coetzee’s analysis of Tolstoy’s work in “Confession and 
Double Thoughts” in order to shed light on two major structural elements of 
Disgrace that evince the novel’s confessional design. The first element has been 
dealt with in this section: it is the scrutiny of the protagonist’s consciousness, 
performed both by the narrative voice itself, which enacts Lurie’s 
characteristic reflective distance, and by the characters with whom he 
interacts, notably the female ones. The second confessional element of the 
novel will be the object of the next section: it is the “conversion experience”, 
as Coetzee puts it in connection with the protagonist of the Sonata, “an 
experience in which … being a truth-bearer is felt most intensely by contrast 
with the previous self-deceived mode of existence” (Doubling 262). 
“Not a Good Man, but not a Bad One Either” 
The Kreutzer Sonata, in Coetzee’s view, fails as a confessional work because 
Tolstoy was seemingly not interested in portraying the process by means of 
which his protagonist attains illumination. To outline what this process would 
be like in the conception of a writer such as Tolstoy, Coetzee turns to 
Tolstoy’s own Confessions, an autobiographical narrative of a turbulent period 
in his life. Coetzee sees in Tolstoy’s personal account of his suicidal thoughts 
the presence of two simultaneous states of mind: 
Though associated with reasoning, the condition of mind that leads him to 
“[hide] away a cord, to avoid being tempted to hang myself” … is described 
as a passive state, “a strange state of mind-torpor … a stoppage, as it were, 
of life” … Conversely, the impulse that saves his life is not simply a physical 
life-force but partakes of the intellect: it is “an inkling that my ideas were 
wrong”, a sense that “I [had] made some mistake; it is “doubts” … Thus 
the opposition is not between a clear and overwhelming conviction that life 
is absurd, and an instinctually based animal drive to live: error, the drive to 
death, is a gathering sluggishness, like the running down of life itself, while 
the saving truth springs from an instinctive intellectual power that mistrusts 
reason. (Doubling 260, 1) 
One can bring the features of these concomitant states of mind to bear on 
Lurie in Disgrace. After his dismissal from the university, and most intensely 
after the attack on the farm, Lurie feels “a gathering sluggishness”, as Coetzee 
puts it above, a profound sense of disempowerment that he often describes as 
a drying up, or a draining, of life itself. The catalyst of his transformation, 
however, is a concrete and life-changing experience of death: his work with 
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Bev at the animal clinic, where both put down abandoned dogs. Lurie starts 
giving Bev a hand at the clinic before the attack and, already at this early stage, 
he is unsettled by what happens there: 
Things are beginning to fall into place. He has a first inkling of the task this 
ugly little woman has set herself. This bleak building is a place not of 
healing – her doctoring is too amateurish for that – but of last resort … Bev 
Shaw, not a veterinarian but a priestess, full of New Age mumbo jumbo, 
trying, absurdly, to lighten the load of Africa’s suffering beasts. Lucy 
thought he would find her interesting. But Lucy is wrong. Interesting is not 
the word. (84) 
The uncertainty, as well as the ambiguity that Lurie seems to sense in relation 
to what Bev does “to lighten the load of Africa’s suffering beasts”, is a 
symptom of his gradual identification with animals as powerless creatures. 
Initially, what prompts this identification is his experience of having been 
deprived of his “rights of desire”: as I quoted previously, he draws a parallel 
between himself and a dog beaten for following its mating instincts; besides, 
he also identifies with a goat that has had its testicles savaged (106). One 
passage that alludes to the identification between Lurie and animals is 
particularly more significant in the context of the failure of reason that, as 
Coetzee suggests in “Confession in Double Thoughts”, is potentially 
transformative. Lurie is disturbed by the impending slaughter of two sheep for 
Petrus’s celebration of his acquisition of part of Lucy’s land: 
A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two 
Persians, he does not know how. The bond is not one of affection. It is not 
even a bond with these two in particular, whom he could not pick out from 
a mob in a field. Nevertheless, suddenly and without reason, their lot has 
become important to him. (126) 
The empathetic impulse that manifests itself “suddenly and without reason”, 
seemingly at odds with Lurie’s habitual indifference to animals, escapes his 
rational grasp. Along the lines of the argument in “Confession and Double 
Thoughts”, it seems that a transformation slowly “takes place in the site of the 
self”, and something like a “saving truth” insinuates itself (Doubling 261). 
Lurie’s saving truth becomes more palpable as he works at the animal 
clinic, helping Bev put down abandoned dogs. If the sacrifice of the sheep 
gave Lurie an intuition of death, the work at the clinic in contrast will bring 
home to him its concrete and hugely unsettling reality. On the one hand, the 
killing of the dogs could be deemed a charitable act; Bev releases them from a 
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miserable existence of disease and neglect, giving the animal “her fullest 
attention” in its last moments, “stroking it, talking to it, easing its passage” 
(Disgrace 142). It is not a task that she takes lightly; as Lucy puts it, “it cuts her 
up terribly” (79). Lurie himself, however, is overwhelmed by the ambiguity of 
what is actually happening, and cannot help falling back into his scholarly cast 
of mind when he describes it as “sessions of Lösung (German always to hand 
with an appropriately blank abstraction): sublimation, as alcohol is sublimed 
from water, leaving no residue, no aftertaste” (142, italics in original). His 
experience of death at the clinic can be said to be both first-hand and 
surrogate. It is first-hand in the sense that the dogs are killed in his arms: “he 
is the one who holds the dog still as the needle finds the vein and the drug hits 
the heart and the legs buckle and the eyes dim” (142). Strictly speaking, 
though, despite the directness of his participation, his experience is obviously 
a surrogate one. 
Lurie identifies with the dogs to the point that he projects his own 
powerlessness onto their fruitless efforts to escape the lethal injection. He sees 
in the animals’ instinctual resistance a vivid picture of his own inexorable 
dissolution: 
They flatten their ears, they droop their tails, as if they too feel the disgrace 
of dying; locking their legs, they have to be pulled or pushed or carried over 
the threshold. On the table some snap wildly left and right, and some whine 
plaintively; none will look straight at the needle in Bev’s hand, which they 
somehow know is going to harm them terribly. 
Worst are those that sniff him and try to lick his hand. He has never liked 
being licked, and his first impulse is to pull away. Why pretend to be a 
chum when in fact one is a murderer? (143, my italics) 
But the disgrace of death to which he alludes implicates him in another way as 
well: Lurie is ashamed of what he forces the animals to undergo: “he gives off 
the wrong smell …  the smell of shame” (142). Though not aware of how his 
thought processes work, on some level he realizes that shame, or disgrace, 
attaches both to the powerful and the powerless. 
The change that the sessions of Lösung gradually enact in Lurie’s psyche is 
enormous. Upon knowing that the dogs’ rigid limbs are beaten before the 
hospital crew feed the corpses into an incinerator, he decides to dispose of 
them personally, one by one; his care borders on the absurd. Towards the end 
of his reflection on what motivates him to do so, Lurie has, in fact, an 
epiphany: 
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Why has he taken on this job? To lighten the burden on Bev Shaw? For that 
it would be enough to drop off the bags [which contain the corpses] at the 
dump and drive away. For the sake of the dogs? But the dogs are dead; and 
what do dogs know of honour and dishonour anyway? 
For himself, then. For his idea of the world, a world in which men do not 
use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing. 
(146) 
His new “idea of the world” seems to spring from “an instinctive intellectual 
power that obscurely mistrusts reason”, as Coetzee puts it in “Confession and 
Double Thoughts” (Doubling 261). Lurie’s concern with the animals’ fate is not 
purely irrational. Not only does he acknowledge that, given the abandon in 
which they live, Bev’s devoted, even loving care in their last moments 
manifests a profound respect for the animals’ existence; Lurie also scrutinizes 
his and Bev’s roles, recognizing the undeniable exercise of power that, in 
truth, makes their charity possible. However, he is, more importantly, atoning 
for his actions, and not only for his participation in the sessions of Lösung. 
The excessive dedication to the dogs’ corpses, which he does not want to see 
handled according to one’s convenience, is a displaced atonement for the 
ways in which he himself has handled other bodies, violating their integrity. 
As Boehmer puts it, 
we see him taking the quality of sympathy beyond its conventional limits, 
the divides between the living and the dead, between humans and other 
animals, without being precisely sure why he is doing so. He achieves, in 
Elizabeth Costello’s terms, an unconscious redemption from evil: his self 
becomes a site on which pity is staged. Fundamentally, this evil is the evil of 
having objectified others through reason as entirely different from ourselves 
and therefore to be used as we see fit. (“Sorriest” 141) 
Lurie’s “new idea of the world”, in light of the remarkable contrast between 
the old and this new self, is something akin to illumination. At this point in 
the story, he is indeed a very different character from the one in the first half 
of the novel. The rationalizations, the objectifying ironies, the habitual way of 
treating people, and especially women, as instruments have given way to an 
irrationality, almost a naiveté, that is unprecedented: “Curious that a man as 
selfish as he should be offering himself to the service of dead dogs. There 
must be other, more productive ways of giving oneself to the world, or to an 
idea of the world. … He saves the honour of corpses because there is no one 
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else stupid enough to do it. That is what he is becoming: stupid, daft, 
wrongheaded” (146).  
In the overall configuration of Disgrace, Lurie’s “new idea of the world” 
carries great thematic significance. The insight that human and animal 
suffering, as depicted in the novel, is both commensurate and impossible to 
compare pivots on Lurie’s illumination. Different human bodies in the 
narrative (Melanie’s, Lucy’s, even Lurie’s) suffer some form of violence (an 
“invasion”) which they internalize as a form of death. The animal bodies, 
however, are those upon which the violence is in reality most extreme because 
it is irreparable, beyond processing, as it were: unlike Melanie, the dogs cannot 
mimic death; unlike Lucy and Lurie, they cannot allegorize the trauma of their 
violations as a form of death. The animals are indeed put to death; strictly 
speaking, the true correlation between death and disgrace applies, in the novel, 
to them. 
Lurie has certainly come a long way in his journey towards illumination. 
Yet one can hardly talk about character reformation without acknowledging 
that, for every step forward towards a new improved self, Lurie also takes a 
step backwards, falling back into the same old pattern of behavior. What 
happens at the clinic breaks him down, so to speak, and ushers in the moral 
insight that is most immediately imperative to him: the recognition that he has 
used women sexually. Another manifestation of Lurie’s surrogate experience 
of death is the death of desire that takes place in his subjectivity. Again, the 
eschatological aura over the events of the second half of the novel is 
noticeable here. The similarities between Lurie’s dispassionate involvement 
with Bev and Melanie’s involvement with him evince some form of retributive 
justice, as if a superior power brought upon him the same kind of suffering 
that he has inflicted upon Melanie (though arguably not the same degree of 
suffering that he has caused, since Lurie, unlike the women, is not being 
forced to have sex). One can also account for this superior punitive force in 
terms which would be more in line with Lurie’s abjection: he is compulsively 
bringing this death of desire upon himself, unconsciously abasing or reducing 
himself. “Of their congress”, as he describes it, “he can at least say that he 
does his duty. Without passion but without distaste either”. And the relapse 
into the old objectifying self is clear: “Let me not forget this day, he tells 
himself, lying beside her when they are spent. After the sweet young flesh of 
Melanie Isaacs, this is what I have come to. This is what I will have to get 
used to, this and even less than this” (150). 
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To some extent, more or less consciously, Lurie does seem to grasp what 
Melanie has gone through with him, and he relives it with Bev, this time by 
becoming the object of desire. He will, however, go even further in his 
empathetic identification with women once Lucy hints that, since he is a man, 
he is a potential rapist or, at least, potentially complicit: 
When it comes to men and sex, David, nothing surprises me any more. 
Maybe, for men, hating the woman makes sex more exciting. You are a 
man, you ought to know. When you have sex with someone strange – when 
you trap her, hold her down, get her under you, put all your weight on her – 
isn’t it a bit like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting afterwards, leaving the 
body behind covered in blood – doesn’t it feel like murder, like getting away 
with murder? (158) 
Lurie is very disturbed by her words: “You are a man, you ought to know: does 
one speak to one’s father like that?” (italics in original). Nevertheless, “Lucy’s 
words echo in his mind” and eventually prompt another remarkable 
imaginative effort for someone like Lurie: 
Lucy was frightened, frightened near to death. Her voice choked, she could 
not breathe, her limbs went numb. This is not happening, she said to herself as 
the men forced her down; it is just a dream, a nightmare. While the men, for 
their part, drank up her fear, revelled in it, did all they could to hurt her, to 
menace her, to heighten her terror … 
You don’t understand, you weren’t there, says Bev Shaw. Well, she is mistaken. 
Lucy’s intuition is right after all: he does understand; he can, if he 
concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill 
them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does he have it in him to 
be the woman? (160, italics in original) 
Not only does he admit that he knows what it is like to abuse a woman 
sexually, but he also recognizes that it is impossible for a man to be fully 
empathetic with a woman. This is another epiphanic moment of his, and one 
about which one could also argue for a measure of truth-directedness on 
Lurie’s part. Full empathy, or real knowledge of what a victim of sexual abuse 
experiences, is out of reach for him; nevertheless, it is the recognition itself 
that might redeem him. 
The chapter that follows this passage, however, complicates the picture of 
Lurie’s truth-directedness considerably. He decides to pay a visit to the Isaacs’, 
to “speak his heart” (165). Arriving in their house, he is met by Desiree, 
Melanie’s younger sister. At once, he knows that he is down the same path 
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again. Noticing that Desiree “is, if anything, more beautiful” that Melanie, he 
wonders: “God save me, he thinks – what am I doing here?” (italics in original). He 
cannot refrain from being his usual self: “He thinks: fruit of the same tree, 
down probably to the most intimate detail. Yet with differences: different 
pulsings of the blood, different urgencies of passion. The two of them in the 
same bed: an experience fit for a king” (164). 
Lurie does utter an apology to Melanie’s father: “I am sorry for what I 
took your daughter through. You have a wonderful family. I apologize for the 
grief I have caused you and Mrs. Isaacs. I ask for your pardon” (171). Once 
again, one could argue for a measure of truth-directedness in his apology, 
given the transformation in his character. The problem with confessions and 
apologies in Coetzee’s writing is that they are always tainted by the conscious 
effort of producing the truth. So it is with Lurie’s apology: immediately after 
asking for pardon, he is subject to the double thought: “Wonderful is not right. 
Better would be exemplary” (171, italics in original). Pressed further by Isaacs, 
he tries to be even more truth-directed, that is, to articulate with more 
sincerity what he has in his heart: 
In my own terms, I am being punished for what happened between myself 
and your daughter. I am sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not 
be easy to lift myself. It is not a punishment I have refused. I do not 
murmur against it. On the contrary, I am living it out from day to day, 
trying to accept disgrace as my state of being. (172) 
But Isaacs thinks that this apology is not enough, and indirectly urges Lurie to 
apologize to Melanie’s mother. Lurie humbles himself even more before 
Melanie’s mother and sister: “With careful ceremony he gets to his knees and 
touches his forehead to the floor”. Arguably, this is an even more truth-
directed effort, and one that evades words. His self-consciousness, however, 
betrays truth yet another time: “Is that enough? he thinks. Will that do? If not, 
what more? (173) Finally, Isaacs scrutinizes Lurie’s sincerity once again. In his 
hotel room at night, Lurie receives a call from Isaacs, first wishing him 
“strength for the future”, then pointedly questioning his motives to apologize: 
“You are not hoping for us to intervene on your behalf, are you, with the 
university?” (173) 
An inconclusive back-and-forth between the man he has always been and 
an incipient reformed self: the oscillation that Lurie experiences between these 
two dispositions is comparable with the two concomitant states of mind that 
Coetzee identifies in Tolstoy’s grappling with his own conflicted self in the 
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Confessions. Lurie has certainly changed, but is at the same time all too human 
to attain redemption for his sins, the grace that the title of the novel negatively 
points to. Most obviously, “disgrace” is an allusion to Lurie’s downfall and 
abasement both on a public and on a private sphere, but the title is also 
consistent with the argument in “Confession and Double Thoughts”, in 
particular with the discussion of Dostoevsky’s works. Coetzee identifies a 
progression in Notes from Underground, The Idiot, and The Possessed insofar as the 
hopelessness of the double thought is concerned. In The Possessed, he argues, 
Dostoevsky not only restages the potentially infinite self-doubt of a 
confessant, but brings it to a point of closure within the narrative. The 
solution is, essentially, a matter of directedness, that is, of gesturing towards 
grace without asserting that the confessant has achieved, or has been granted, 
it.40 
However incomplete or unsatisfactory Lurie’s progression, the narrative 
does provide elements to argue for his redemption. His startlingly irrational 
dedication to the dogs, the ambiguous act of charity, is one of them, especially 
if it is seen against the background of one of Coetzee’s comments about the 
influence of Dostoevsky’s writing on his own fiction. What draws Coetzee’s 
attention in the self-examination of Dostoevsky’s characters, apart from their 
exacerbated self-awareness, is the fact that Dostoevsky is ultimately “not 
interested in the psyche, which he sees as an arena of game-playing”, but in 
what can bring self-examination to an end: “Against the endlessness of 
skepticism Dostoevsky poses the closure not of confession but of absolution 
and therefore of the intervention of grace in the world”. Further, he suggests 
a parallel between his own writing and Dostoevsky’s by alluding to a secular 
counterpart of grace: “a measure of charity [is], I suppose, the way in which 
grace allegorizes itself in the world”(Doubling 249). 
Grace, in a theological conception, and charity, in Coetzee’s novel, are 
both bestowed freely when one needs them most. Lurie can be said to grant 
the dogs a measure of grace, understood as benevolence or charity, when he 
allows them to leave this world in a more dignified manner. In turn, Lurie 
himself, by practicing an unselfish action, without expecting some benefit or 
                                     
40 In Notes from Underground and The Idiot, Coetzee traces the heightened level of self-awareness that 
often compromises the confessions offered by Dostoevsky’s characters. The term “double 
thought” is coined by the protagonist of The Idiot, but Coetzee identifies the phenomenon first in 
Notes from Underground, whose protagonist is trapped in his so-called “hyperconsciousness” (Doubling 
275). 
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advantage, might possibly be granted forgiveness for his past actions. Since 
grace transcends a secular world, the narrative itself does not portray him as a 
reformed man. Rather, it portrays his atonement as a possible path towards a 
redeemed self. 
There is yet another element of Lurie’s story that gestures towards grace, 
and with more emphasis: his effort to compose an opera. Along with the work 
at the animal clinic, this is a task to which he devotes himself wholeheartedly. 
The next section carries this argument for Lurie’s grace further by elaborating 
on how artistic creation can be read as another allegory of grace in the novel. 
On the whole, the opera can be described as a truth-directed piece because it 
is underway, and Lurie does not seem to be able to conclude it. Most 
importantly, the opera, originally conceived as an exuberant piece with “lifting 
melodies” and “lush arias”, is in fact depicted as an almost ridiculous work, 
something to laugh at: it is composed with a toy banjo and will possibly 
include the howling of a lame stray dog that sings along with the protagonists, 
Byron and one of his mistresses (Disgrace 183−84). It is, however, precisely 
this diminishment or descent of art, as it were, a stripping down of greatness 
or magnificence in the artistic creation, that has the potential to manifest 
grace. In order to develop this argument, I will make a parallel between 
Disgrace and The Master of Petersburg, whose subject matter is, in contrast with 
Lurie’s minor or failed artistic achievement, the creation of a masterpiece. 
Artistic Creation: Disgrace and The Master of 
Petersburg 
The Master of Petersburg is a work about artistic creation, a fictional account of 
the genesis of The Possessed, one of Dostoevsky’s major works. Coetzee distorts 
the historical record to explore the troubled relationship between Dostoevsky 
and his stepson Pavel Isaev. In reality, Pavel outlived Dostoevsky; in 
Coetzee’s novel, he dies in his early twenties, after falling from a shot tower in 
St. Petersburg. The novel depicts artistic creation as the means whereby 
Dostoevsky tries to come to terms with loss and guilt.41 The circumstances of 
                                     
41 In the chapter devoted to The Master of Petersburg, Attwell examines the circumstances of the death 
of Coetzee’s son and how they informed the novel’s composition: “The autobiographical move in 
The Master of Petersburg is to propose that at the centre of Dostoevsky’s creativity in The Possessed was 
an episode of disorienting grief. Coetzee has remarked that he found the record of the relevant 
period in Dostoevsky’s career ‘absorbing and very humbling to follow’ because it speaks of 
Dostoevsky’s struggle with indirection and uncertainty. The sense of affinity Coetzee speaks from 
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Pavel’s death are sinister and particularly painful. It was apparently a suicide, 
but rumors of his involvement with anti-Tsarist revolutionaries lead the police 
to suspect that he has in fact been murdered. Pavel’s untimely death 
overwhelms Dostoevsky, who had been a distant, indifferent father figure to 
him after his mother passed away. Although overrun with guilt for not having 
been present in Pavel’s life, Dostoevsky is also deeply resentful at his 
presumed collusion with the revolutionaries, the loathed “nihilists”, as he calls 
them. 
Death, in Coetzee’s novel, is that which prompts Dostoevsky to write what 
will become The Possessed. In its original conception, the work that the fictional 
Dostoevsky wants to produce is meant to be a gift of love to Pavel’s memory, 
as well as an apology for his negligence. For the largest part of Coetzee’s 
novel, however, Dostoevsky gets nowhere; the writing simply does not flow. 
It is only when he abandons the conception of the project as a tribute to the 
dead that the writing finally advances. The pivotal chapter of The Master of 
Petersburg is the last one, entitled “Stavrogin” after the protagonist of The 
Possessed. The chapter revolves around the terrible imaginative effort that 
relieves Dostoevsky from his writer’s block. His creation is a “betrayal” of the 
dead, a “perversion” of the bond between father and son (Master 235). 
Dostoevsky recreates Pavel in his writing by blemishing his memory: he “gives 
up his last faith in Pavel’s innocence”, rejects the thought that he was a loving 
child and reconceives him instead as a hateful revolutionary, one of the 
“restless” youths “who responded without reserve … not just to the 
adventure of conspiracy but the soul-inflating ecstasies of death-dealing too” 
(238, 39).  
Coetzee portrays the creative process as partly purposeful, partly 
independent from Dostoevsky’s efforts: sitting at “Pavel’s table, his eyes [are] 
fixed on the phantasm opposite him … whom it has been given to him to 
bring into being”. Dostoevsky knows that the emerging character, a “vision of 
Pavel grown beyond childhood and beyond love … a figure [in which] he 
detects no love, only the cold and massive indifference of stone”, is not “the 
truth” (240). Once this destructive creative process has been started, the 
                                                                                                          
 
 
here includes another empathic leap: imagining his own grief as Dostoevsky’s. … Certain passages 
in The Master of Petersburg are written straight out of a father’s grief” (Life of Writing 194, 96). 
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deformation of Pavel’s memory goes beyond the deliberate misconstruction 
of his personality, and not even his physical integrity is spared in Dostoevsky’s 
imagination: “An image comes to him that for the past month he has flinched 
from: Pavel, naked and broken and bloody, in the morgue” (241). From these 
perversions Stavrogin is created, the arrogant, nonchalant, cold-blooded 
nihilist and child abuser of Dostoevsky’s novel who, in Master, is a synthesis of 
Pavel and Dostoevsky himself (242). 
In The Master of Petersburg and in Disgrace, artistic creation is intricately 
involved with death, or mourning, both in concrete and in metaphorical 
terms. The most intense phase of Lurie’s creative process coincides with the 
period in which his frame of mind is dominated by death images: he works at 
the animal clinic and mourns his continuous loss of desire. The opera itself is 
a work about death, a memorial to Byron sung by his mistress Teresa. As in 
Master, and in keeping with Attridge’s argument about artistic creation in The 
Singularity of Literature, Lurie is transformed by the creative process and by the 
work that gradually comes into being. At the same time, the creative process 
itself also feeds and intensifies the transformation of his character. 
Lurie’s sexual affair with Bev provides the background real-life context 
that most immediately changes the conception and the direction of the opera, 
permeating his creative process and manifesting itself in the piece. Like 
Dostoevsky, Lurie cannot carry out the project as he has originally planned, 
for the present circumstances of his life keep intersecting with it, altering its 
course. In particular, he cannot write the music for a  “young, greedy, wilful, 
petulant” Teresa, as he initially conceived of her. In this form, the work 
“[fails] to engage the core of him. There is something misconceived about it”, 
he thinks, “something that does not come from the heart”. The Teresa that 
eventually appeals to his imagination is a middle-aged, “plain, ordinary” 
woman, “a dumpy little widow … with [a] heavy bust, [a] stocky trunk, [and] 
abbreviated legs” (Disgrace 181, 82). Clearly, it is Bev, the “dumpy, bustling 
little woman” with a “sturdy, almost waistless” body, “like a squat little tub”, 
that indirectly shapes Teresa thus in his mind (72, 149). 
As in Master, creator and creation become, to some extent at least, 
indissociable in Lurie’s opera. The piece manifests or incorporates his 
presence on different levels. Most obviously, Lurie chooses a hero whose life 
and temperament seem to be more naturally amenable to his imagination. 
Simply put, Byron was a reputed womanizer, like Lurie himself; a man “who 
doesn’t act on principle but on impulse”, to whom “the source of his 
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impulses” remains “dark”, and whose name was often attached to “notoriety 
and scandal” (31, 33). The period of Byron’s life that absorbs Lurie is also 
self-revealing. At first, he wants to capture Byron in the last years of his 
philandering: “a once passionate but now less than passionate older man”, 
leading a “becalmed” life, “obscurely … [longing] for a quiet retirement” or 
“failing that, for apotheosis, for death” (180). Thus conceived, Lurie feels that 
he “can find words for Byron”, though not for the young Teresa who will sing 
with him. As he downgrades Teresa, as it were, by divesting her of youth and 
beauty, he kills Byron: his new hero is “long dead”, lost in the “caverns of the 
underworld”, and the older, lamenting Teresa wants to reclaim him (181, 83). 
Despite the affinities between Byron and Lurie, it is Teresa that becomes 
his leading character, literally carrying the work forward. Singing or humming 
her vocal line is like “[following] the Contessa into her underworld”, as Lurie 
puts it; as Teresa gives “voice to her lover … he [gives] voice to Teresa. The 
halt helping the lame, for want of better” (183, 84). Creation and creator grow 
into each other here as well. Like Lurie, Teresa clings to memories of lost love 
and youth, trapped in an old house taking care of her debilitated father, 
struggling to make the dead speak. Her conjuring up of Byron from the 
underworld replicates Lurie’s creative trance, as well as Dostoevsky’s in The 
Master of Petersburg. Dostoevsky stares at a “phantasm” as he sits and struggles 
to write; Teresa, as Lurie imagines her, “sits staring out over the marshes 
toward the gates of hell, cradling the mandolin on which she accompanies 
herself in her lyric flights”; Lurie himself, in turn, back in his plundered house 
in Cape Town, sits “at his own desk looking out on the overgrown garden” 
and “marvels at what the little banjo is teaching him” (Master 240; Disgrace 
184). 
At the heart of Lurie’s creative path towards an art form that can truly 
respond to his “dried up” state of being lies his unexpected choice of 
instrument (107, 183). The elated love story that he initially imagined goes 
through a process of diminishment, a reduction or emptying out that 
responds to and parallels his psychological state. What inspires his artistic 
creation appears to him as belittled, stripped of grandeur, minor. At first, 
Lurie imagines a full, effusive, lavish music, with a “lushly autumnal” melody 
that would be composed at the piano. But the sound of the piano strikes him 
as “too rounded, too physical, too rich” for the aged Teresa and Byron, 
“exiled from life, pale as a ghost” (184, 5). They seem to require a music that 
is dispossessed of exuberance, or of grand aesthetic aspirations. In fact, as he 
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recognizes, “it is not the erotic that is calling to him after all, nor the elegiac, 
but the comic” (184). The chant of a “woman in love, wallowing in love” 
sounds to him like “a cat on a roof, howling”; immortal love boils down, so to 
speak, to a chemical reaction: “complex proteins swirling in the blood, 
distending the sexual organs, making the palms sweat and the voice thicken as 
the soul hurls its longings to the skies” (185). In this frame of mind, Lurie is 
unable to create the magnificent or lofty piece that he first imagined; so he 
chooses “the odd little seven-stringed banjo” from Lucy’s childhood, and 
finds, to his surprise, that the instrument becomes “inseparable” from 
Teresa’s voice (181, 4). 
As in The Master of Petersburg, the dominant metaphor for Lurie’s artistic 
creation in Disgrace is a fall. In Master, Dostoevsky wants to write out of love, 
but truly writes out of “resentment”; tainting Pavel’s memory and turning him 
into the vicious Stavrogin is a “fall”, a “plunge into darkness” that corrupts 
him as well (234, 5). In Disgrace, the metaphor of the fall is most apparent in 
Lurie’s fall from grace, but it encompasses his creative process as well. Apart 
from the comical banjo (in place of the noble piano), the fall is most clearly 
evoked in the choice of Byron as the protagonist of the opera (a fallen man, as 
it were). But there are other aspects of Byron’s and Teresa’s characterization 
that convey a descent, or dissolution: Byron “wanders among the shades” in 
the underworld; his voice is “wavering and disembodied”, “faltering”, a 
“cracked monotone”, “a reluctant recall from the long sleep of oblivion” 
(182–185). Teresa, “the girl of nineteen with the blonde ringlets who gave 
herself up with such joy to the imperious Englishman”, is “lost too”; Lurie’s 
heroine has become “a woman past her prime, without prospects, living out 
her days in a dull provincial town … sleeping alone” (182). 
Differently from Master, however, the fall in Lurie’s artistic creation has an 
overriding redemptive connotation. In Master, Coetzee depicts the creative 
process of a classic; yet what the work brings to its creator is damnation, 
epitomized in the terrible Stavrogin who sexually corrupts a child. 
Dostoevsky’s great work, in Coetzee’s novel, can only come into being as a 
perversion of the dead, of the writer himself, and of others close to him: 
“everything and everyone [must] be turned to another use … gripped to him 
and fall with him” (235). Lurie’s opera, in contrast, is depicted as a failed 
work, “pinched, stunted, deformed”, going “nowhere”; it is an obscure piece 
that will never reach the heights of a Dostoevskyan masterpiece: “His hopes 
must be more temperate: that somewhere from amidst the welter of sound 
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there will dart up, like a bird, a single authentic note of immortal longing. As 
for recognizing it, he will leave that to the scholars of the future … for he will 
not hear the note himself, when it comes, if it comes” (214). 
Again, unlike the creative process as it is portrayed in The Master of 
Petersburg, Lurie imagines himself in his creation not as one of the characters, 
but as the artistic expression itself, the medium. To be sure, his characters are 
projections of himself to some extent, but what in fact reproduces in the 
opera Lurie’s dried up, abased, disgraced state of being is the sound of the 
banjo: “He is in the opera neither as Teresa nor as Byron nor even as some 
blending of the two: he is held in the music itself, in the flat, tinny slap of the 
banjo strings, the voice that strains to soar away from the ludicrous 
instrument but is continually reined back, like a fish on a line” (184, 5). This is 
probably the passage that captures most concisely Lurie’s “crablike” 
movement towards grace (186). 
In the context of how artistic expression might manifest the truth, the last 
passages about the opera are very suggestive. Once again, the focus lies on 
how the novel sets the scene for the possibility of closure with the revelation 
of truth but does not, in effect, represent a moment of definitive truth. Lurie 
is considering to “bring a dog into the piece”, to let the howling of a lame 
stray dog he is particularly fond of join in “the strophes of lovelorn Teresa’s”. 
This dog “is fascinated by the sound of the banjo”; when Lurie “hums 
Teresa’s line … the dog smacks its lips and seems on the point of singing too” 
(215). The novel ends, however, with Lurie “giving him up” to be put down, 
“bearing him in his arms like a lamb” (219).42 If the dog’s howls do enter the 
opera, a work that “will never be performed”, his creation will in effect give 
voice to the most disempowered beings in the world of the narrative, “the old, 
the blind, the halt, the crippled, the maimed” (218). Most importantly, the 
dogs do not have a language or reason, that is to say, they are the beings who 
lack the rational faculties which, as Coetzee conceives of it in “Confession and 
Double Thoughts”, constantly defer truth. As the journey towards 
illumination is configured in Disgrace, if the dog speaks in Lurie’s opera, it 
might be a messenger of truth. 
*** 
                                     
42 If the dog’s howls become music, the baseness of its death in a session of Lösung will indeed have 
been “sublimed”, as Lurie puts it, but in the sense of being elevated into something sublime, into 
art (142). 




I have read Disgrace as a work that shares the self-referential orientation of 
Coetzee’s later narratives, all of which experiment with life writing and, most 
importantly, with autobiographical truth. The narrative technique that Coetzee 
employs is crucial to understand how the novel’s configuration as a story of 
soul searching resumes and extends his analysis of self-examination and 
autobiographical truth in “Confession and Double Thoughts”. One can 
assume that Disgrace is narrated by its protagonist in the third person and in 
the present tense, the same narrative technique that Coetzee adopts in his 
memoirs Boyhood and Youth. If we accept that Lurie is the teller of his own 
story, the moment of illumination, or grace, towards which he progresses 
remains beyond the horizon of his perception. From his limited perspective, 
which the reader is forced to share, his story is a necessarily incomplete (or 
not yet completed) progression towards a better self. 
In the larger context of my characterization of Coetzee’s authorial 
discourse as self-sufficient, and of his assertion of the discourse of the 
novelist as superior to the discourse of the literary critic, the depiction of the 
power of artistic creation in Disgrace is significant. It is by means of the 
composition process of his eccentric opera that Lurie might be granted grace. 
The contrast between the old and the new self is in focus here: illumination 
escapes the intellectual, the former professor of Modern Languages, but it 
might manifest itself to the struggling but truth-directed artist.  
A final issue to be considered concerns the implications of closure in a 
fictional narrative of self-examination, as opposed to a nonfictional one such 
as a memoir. As I mentioned towards the end of section 1, a process of self-
examination in the terms of “Confession and Double Thoughts” can only be 
brought to a closure by a transcendent authority, that is, an authority that 
transcends the inward look of the self. Since this authority, in the case of real 
soul searching, inevitably does not exist in this world (for the interpreter is 
excluded), self-examination cannot be closed other that on false or arbitrary 
grounds. The impossibility of closure becomes a precondition for the ethical 
value of self-examination; from this perspective, the deferral of truth acquires 
in fact a very positive connotation for the self-examining subject in the sense 
that, for Coetzee, the only path to truth is through relentless doubt. Put 
differently, without doubt, there is not even the possibility of truth. 
In the case of a fictitious self-examination as in Disgrace, bringing closure to 
Lurie’s soul searching carries no ethical consequences for the subject, for the 
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obvious reason that the subject does not exist. In the case of a real project of 
self-examination, such as the memoirs Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime, the 
ethical implications of bringing closure to Coetzee’s soul searching become 
inescapable in light of the argument in the essay. The next chapter will look 
into the closure of Coetzee’s autobiography. 
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Chapter 3 – The Self-Sufficient 
Autobiographer of Summertime 
This chapter reflects on the self-explanatory quality of Coetzee’s authorial 
discourse, to which I refer as his self-sufficiency, from another angle: the role 
of the interpreter. The focus of attention here is the characterization of the 
author with emphasis on how one sees the implication of the reader in 
autobiographical truth. Attridge sees this implication as an encouragement to 
partake of Coetzee’s self-examination and autobiographical truth. I propose a 
different reading: Coetzee’s autobiographical project first rejects the 
interpreter, in “Confession and Double Thoughts” and in Boyhood and Youth. 
In Summertime, this rejection is accentuated: the interpreter is inevitably 
involved with the autobiographical self, but is discredited as an authority on 
autobiographical truth. 
Coetzee’s Communicative Act in Boyhood and 
Youth 
The most salient feature of Coetzee’s memoirs Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime 
is their hybrid quality: although they are offered as fiction, the narratives are 
undoubtedly autobiographical. This hybrid quality obviously affects the 
narratives’ appeal to autobiographical truth, but it does not necessarily weaken 
or invalidate it. Fictionality, as Walsh suggests, does not equate with fiction as 
generic category; understood instead as a token of the author’s particularized 
way of conveying meanings, fictionality requires a negotiation between the 
text itself (the fictive utterances contained in it) and the context within which 
it was produced.43 The common approach to autobiographies of writers as 
records of formative experiences that have influenced the fiction is an 
example of this kind of negotiation: the fiction becomes a natural interpretive 
context, or frame of reference, to read the autobiographies. Boyhood and Youth, 
like many other autobiographies, have often been read as works that give 
glimpses into the origins of central themes in Coetzee’s novels. Indeed, the 
                                     
43 See Walsh, Chapter 1, “The Pragmatics of Narrative Fictionality”. 
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memoirs suggest that this is a valid starting point. Youth revolves to a great 
extent around John’s struggle to become a writer, and it ends with him in the 
British Library perusing manuscripts that are supposedly the materials of 
Coetzee’s first novel, Dusklands. Summertime also builds on the theme of the 
writer’s development, picking up from the end of Youth. The biographer 
chooses to interview people who had close contact with Coetzee around the 
time he released Dusklands, a period which the biographer believes is critical to 
understand the emergence and development of Coetzee’s writing career. 
A number of scholars have approached the self-referentiality of the 
memoirs from this perspective. Jean Sévry, for instance, draws several 
thematic parallels between Boyhood, a number of Coetzee’s novels, and the 
interviews in Doubling the Point. Poyner also looks for the connections between 
the memoirs and the fiction:  “aspects of Coetzee – the intensely private 
author and guarded academic – are evident in many of the writers-as-narrators 
he portrays”, she claims, and concludes that Boyhood and Youth “give insights 
into the darker side of ‘Coetzee’ the author, and into the inspiration behind 
many of his writers-as-protagonists” (Poyner, “The Lives of J. M. Coetzee” 4). 
Similarly, Collingwood-Whittick argues that the “fabulating qualities of 
memory” that Coetzee explores in works such as In the Heart of the Country are 
“the focal point of the episode in which the young Coetzee [in Boyhood] … 
recounts his ‘first memory’ to his schoolmates” (16). Head also recognizes 
traits of the authorial consciousness in John’s depiction in Boyhood: “There are 
several elements in the portrayal of the young Coetzee that contribute to his 
sense of independence, or, the refusal to conform; and this prefigures the 
sense of resistance that becomes the key characteristic of the writer” 
(Cambridge Introduction 5). The boy’s love for the family farm, he suggests, 
constitutes the formative experience “honed into an ethical vision” in Life and 
Times of Michael K (5). In his reading of Youth, Head traces the passage in which 
John discovered Beckett to Coetzee’s own “inspiration and development” as a 
writer: like Beckett’s Watt, Coetzee’s Youth “is characterized as the flow of a 
voice fitted to the author’s mind, and constantly checked by doubts” (14). 
Apart from the continuities between the fiction and the memoirs, another 
recurrent element in the critical reception is the consensual view that Coetzee 
is a truth-directed writer. This is a typical response to the “feel” of the writing, 
or to the distinct quality of the creative consciousness that emerges from the 
narratives. Qualities such as authenticity, frankness, candor, and honesty have 
been frequently attributed to Coetzee’s writing. In the biography A Life in 
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Writing, Kannemeyer quotes a number of critics and authors who use those 
terms to describe their experiences of reading Boyhood and Youth (507 – 509). 
Other sources of praise for his truth-directedness are also easily found. The 
Swedish Academy’s Press Release announcing Coetzee as the Nobel laureate 
in 2003 celebrates him as “a scrupulous doubter” whose “intellectual honesty 
… distances itself from the tawdry drama of remorse and confession” (“The 
Nobel Prize in Literature to John Maxwell Coetzee”). Kermode, commenting 
on Disgrace, detects in the writing “resources of purity” that evoke the religious 
(London Review of Books, Dec 8, 2014). Even critics who are less prone to 
praise Coetzee’s literary achievements remark on the authenticity of the 
writing. James Wood, for example, in a famous negative review of Disgrace, 
grants that the novel has “vigorous honesty” and that “few writers are as … 
repetitively honest” as Coetzee. Lay readers have also underscored the 
honesty and truthfulness of Coetzee’s writing. For blogger Richa Kedia, 
“Coetzee offers an honest piece of himself in every book. Reading every book 
makes me feel closer to him; akin to the intimacy you feel on meeting a 
person several times and still enjoy hearing his/her honest opinions”. Richard 
Strachan, commenting on the edited single volume Scenes from Provincial Life 
which comprises the three memoirs, is vehement: the memoirs “are incredibly 
vivid and almost forensically honest … If these volumes do offer an accurate 
account of Coetzee’s early life, then he has been utterly brutal with himself”.44 
Once again, Attridge stands out among the interpreters of Coetzee because 
of his empathetic response to the thrust of the writing, his acute awareness of 
the kind of honesty at stake in it, and his impact on the critical field. Attridge 
was the first critic who brought the novelist and the theorist of autobiography 
together when he published an article on Boyhood in 1999.45 Before turning to 
an explanation of how “Confession and Double Thoughts” informs the 
memoirs, Attridge notes the distinctness of the text in relation to the genre it 
appeals to, as well as its distinctness in relation to Coetzee’s previous writings. 
“As a novelist”, Attridge begins, “Coetzee is not known for confessional self-
                                     
44 This might be another example of mutual influence among interpreters. Strachan’s description of 
Coetzee’s inward look as “forensically honest” echoes what Grant Farred calls an 
“autopbiography”, a “scalpel-sharp” form of self-analysis (“Autopbiography” 832). I will return to 
Farred’s concept later on. 
45 I will explore Attridge’s reading of Coetzee’s memoirs as he presented it in the chapter 
“Confessing in the Third Person”, in his J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (2004). An earlier 
version of this chapter (without the analysis of Youth) appeared in 1999 as “J. M. Coetzee’s Boyhood, 
Confession, and Truth”. 
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revelation” (Ethics of Reading 138). The effect created by the writing, 
nevertheless, is unmistakably confessional: “The reader can testify to what we 
might call, following Roland Barthes on the subject of realism, a confession 
effect – the experience, in the reading, of a truth-directed articulation of an 
author’s past life” (148). Attridge explains this seeming contradiction via 
“Confession and Double Thoughts”: Boyhood “exemplifies the project of 
confession as presented by Coetzee” in the essay (148). The third-person 
present narration conveys the author’s lack of interest in presenting 
justifications for his past actions, which in turn speaks for his commitment to 
a form of truth that is not biased by retrospection and ulterior motives.46 On 
this view, Coetzee aims at a kind of truth that could confront the limitations 
of traditional autobiographical writing. Offering the memoirs as fiction does 
not weaken their autobiographical truth; instead, it singles out Coetzee’s 
distinguished conception of what autobiographical truth is. 
Attridge expands on how the truth-directedness of the text is felt in the 
conjunction of “unflinchingness and forgivingness” that sustains Coetzee’s 
self-analysis (Ethics of Reading 148). He finds those terms in an interview where 
Coetzee suggests that one needs “a cruel enough eye” to “look at the past … 
Forgivingness but also unflinchingness: that is the mixture I have in mind, if it 
is attainable. First the unflinchingness, then the forgivingness” (Doubling the 
Point 29). After identifying unflinchingness and forgivingness as proof of 
Coetzee’s truth-directedness, Attridge makes a bold statement about the 
confessional power of Youth: 
[T]he protocols of confession are more severely tested where the 
awkwardness and shame experienced by the young man cry out for the 
complement of later regret and repentance. [Embarrassing episodes] are all 
described in language which conveys the shame and distaste felt at the time 
but gives no hint of how the author now regards them. Yet there can be no 
doubt of the truth-directedness of the writing: these passages expose the moral 
failings of the author as a young man all the more unblinkingly for not 
                                     
46 Lars Engle also resorts to Coetzee’s nonfiction to evaluate the absence of the mature author’s 
judgment and the consequent emphasis on clarity and objectivity that it conveys, though via a 
different take on the narrative technique. He refers to Coetzee’s narration as “a globalizing third-
person present that makes eternizing claims … put before the reader to be skeptically scrutinized”. 
This is a device which Coetzee “frequently employs as a reviewer, especially when he is getting to 
what he thinks the heart of another author’s message”, and it allows him to highlight “the 
certainties or God-terms of others – certainties he does not need either to refute or espouse once 
they have emerged with such clarity as if by themselves” (Engle 34). 
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including anything that could be taken to be excuse or attenuation. (Ethics of 
Reading 160, italics mine) 
Attridge’s certainty about Coetzee’s truth-directedness in Youth must be seen 
in light of the kind of readerly engagement that he advocates. For him, the 
memoirs (indeed, Coetzee’s works in general) call for an ethical reader, 
someone conscious of his or her role and responsibility in deriving meanings 
from the text. Consequently, he stresses the reader’s responsibility for the 
judgments pronounced on the autobiographical subject and for confidence in 
autobiographical truth: the reader is implicated “in the ethical web spun by the 
work” (143). Being a theorist and practitioner of an ethically responsible 
reading, Attridge cannot but be unambiguous when he claims that “there can 
be no doubt about the truth-directedness of the writing”, as he puts it in the 
passage above concerning Youth, and he also implicates himself in the 
construction of the truth claims of Boyhood. Vouching for the “general” truths 
of growing up in South Africa, he attests to the veracity of the particular, 
“singular” truths that Coetzee reveals (or seeks) about himself: 
The truth that Boyhood offers, then, is first and foremost that of testimony: a 
vivid account of what it was like to grow up as a white male in the 1950s in 
South Africa as the Nationalist government set about institutionalizing its 
particular brand of racism and entrenching the power of Afrikanerdom, an 
account that combines general truths about that experience (and having shared 
it, I can vouch for its accuracy and penetration) and of singular truths about one 
highly unusual child. (155, italics mine)47 
The proximity that Attridge appeals to above, as well as the assertiveness with 
which he outlines the autobiographical truth of Boyhood, introduce at least two 
contentious issues. The first, as I discussed in Chapter 1, is the creation of a 
model reader of Coetzee and the dominance of one interpretive perspective 
among critics.48 To claim that “there can be no doubt about the truth-
directedness of the writing” is not simply a very strong claim about the 
authorial communicative act; it is conceivably the strongest claim one could 
make for Coetzee’s truth-directedness, made by his most influential critic, one 
                                     
47 In the earlier published version of this reading, Attridge continues: “[The truth that Boyhood 
offers] is also, and by virtue of the same accomplished handling of literary language, the truth of 
confession, without transgression, repentance, or absolution, and the truth, or a truth, about 
confession, about confession and writing, confession as writing, writing as confession” (“J. M. 
Coetzee’s Boyhood, Confession, and Truth” 91, italics in original). 
48 Section “Attridge’s Ethical Discourse about Coetzee’s Novels: Passivity vs. Agency” 
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who has indeed shared part of that truth, as he puts it in the quote above. The 
influence of Attridge’s account in the reception of the memoirs is apparent, 
for instance, in Head’s reading in The Cambridge Introduction to J. M. Coetzee, as 
well as in readings of Summertime.49 Head also interprets the combination of 
child and adult perspective in Boyhood that would normally evince the 
unreliability of recollection as a form of genuine truth-telling. The presence of 
the adult’s sensibility in the child’s perspective “inevitably colours our 
perception of the book as a portrait of the artist as a boy”. However, precisely 
in calling the reader’s attention to the adult author’s reconstruction of his 
childhood, this dual perspective also advocates the memoir’s reliability and, 
hence, Coetzee’s truthfulness. The author’s fictional style “is refashioned [in 
Boyhood] to engage with personal memory, and this makes the effects of the 
book very uncertain, but not necessarily less ‘believable’ than in a more 
conventional memoir” (Cambridge Introduction 8). Boyhood is “believable”, in 
other words, because the synthesis of child and adult perspective is evidence 
of Coetzee’s intention to tackle the inherent unreliability of self-reflexivity, 
which is the nub of “Confession and Double Thoughts”. The more the boy’s 
perspective is felt as a “fabrication”, the more “the later artist’s 
consciousness” comes across as genuine to the reader (9). 
A significant difference between Head’s and Attridge’s readings, it is 
important to note, has to do with the kind of reader projected by Head. To 
begin with, Head’s reader is a variation on Attridge’s: it also subscribes to 
Coetzee’s “unflinchingness and forgivingness” as the marks of his truth-
directed self-assessment. This reader, however, is also well aware of the fact 
that among the apparently genuine moments of truth seeping through, as it 
were, here and there, Coetzee is calling attention to his own manipulation of 
autobiographical truth. The memoirs call for a “resistant reader”, as Head 
refers to it, attentive to a possible dubiousness in the “excoriating self-
analysis” that the author seems to be conducting especially in Youth (16). 
Coetzee’s unblinking portrait of his ethical shortcomings in Youth is unsettled 
by “mitigating circumstances” in the narrative, which thus suggests “that John 
is being subjected to an extreme form of condemnation” by the mature author 
(16). 
The second contentious issue raised by Attridge’s claim relates to the 
critical “betrayal” or “overpowering” of the authorial discourse (Doubling 61). 
                                     
49 I will have more to say about that in my reading of Summertime.  
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There is certainly a great deal of deference to Coetzee in Attridge’s work. In 
the particular case of the memoirs, his reading casts Coetzee as something like 
an ideal autobiographer: a combination of the truth-directed writer of fiction, 
whose reputation for being truth-directed is largely recognized and well 
established, with the lucid judge of the problems of autobiographical writing 
revealed in the essay. Yet precisely in light of the importance of “Confession 
and Double Thoughts” in defining the authorial communicative act, Attridge’s 
claim also subverts, or breaks the autobiographical pact itself. The essay, as I 
have mentioned previously, has two functions, so to speak: it undermines the 
authority of the autobiographer, the reader, and of the genre in relation to 
truth, but also establishes Coetzee’s credentials as an autobiographer who will 
not be susceptible to making the same old mistake that the genre usually 
compels upon autobiographers, namely, to pin down the truth. This is, in fact, 
precisely the gist of Attridge’s reading, up to the point at which he 
reintroduces truth (the truth of testimony in Boyhood, the unquestionable truth-
directedness of Youth) as something that can be described, or paraphrased. By 
doing so, he erases the ambiguity that is a trademark of Coetzee’s double 
gesture and, most importantly, fills in the essential gap in the narrative that 
Coetzee arguably wishes to keep as a gap: autobiographical truth itself. 
Finally, the question is whether it is at all possible to present a properly 
‘close’ reading of the memoirs that takes “Confession and Double Thoughts” 
into account. On the one hand, one cannot simply disregard the appeal to 
truth intrinsic to the memoirs, especially since this appeal is felt even more 
strongly in the works of a renowned truth-directed author. Such a reading 
would fail to respond to the heart of the writing; it would yield an 
impoverished experience of the oscillation between skepticism and belief in 
the search for the truth. On the other hand, one cannot vouch for the truth-
directedness of the writing either, or make any claims about the kind of truth 
that one reads in Coetzee’s autobiography without confronting the 
provocative trait of his communicative act, that is, the double thought and the 
shadow that it casts over the interpreter. It seems that proximity is out of 
question when one reads the memoirs, unless one accepts the thoroughly 
passive and subservient position of a silent reading, literally allowing Coetzee 
to have the last (or the only) word about his autobiography. 
The oscillation between skepticism and belief is present in Coetzee’s third 
memoir as well, Summertime, which closes his autobiographical project. What 
distinguishes it from the previous memoirs, however, is that Summertime shifts 
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the focus from how Coetzee deals with autobiographical truth to how his 
interpreters deal with it. In the next section, I will examine how the text 
encourages the construal of a coherent system of beliefs around the notion of 
autobiographical truth. Beliefs, however, are not the same as truth; what 
Coetzee has his character narrators convey about him in Summertime are 
opinions, presuppositions, judgments devoid of proof or conclusive evidence. 
Autobiographical truth remains suspended once again, which in turn 
rearticulates resistance, rather than truth-directedness, as a more appropriate 
definition of Coetzee’s communicative act as autobiographer. 
 The Interpreter and Summertime as the “Coda” 
to Boyhood and Youth 
Mr. Vincent: Was that how it ended, then[?] … 
Julia: Not quite. There was a coda. I’ll tell you the coda, then that will be 
that (Summertime 71). 
A “coda”, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is “a passage of more 
or less independent character introduced after the completion of the essential 
parts”, supposedly in order to bring “a more definite and satisfactory 
conclusion” to the project as a whole. It is certainly suitable to approach 
Summertime as a passage “introduced after the completion of the essential 
parts”: the end of Youth already connects its protagonist with the author J. M. 
Coetzee (John is doing research for what would become Dusklands). As a coda 
to Boyhood and Youth, Summertime would therefore “form a more definite and 
satisfactory conclusion” to the previous memoirs. The question is: what kind 
of definite and satisfactory conclusion does Summertime provide to Coetzee’s 
autobiography? 
Coetzee’s fictitious death in the text is the conceit that most obviously 
represents a definite conclusion to the story of his life, but it also brings 
closure, or offers a solution, to the problem of endless self-reflexivity that 
preoccupies him in “Confession and Double Thoughts”. On the level of the 
three autobiographies as a unitary project, the story of his life is fictively 
closed from the outside, so to speak, by someone ‘other’ than himself, that is, 
by the fictitious biographer who is going to write about the famous late 
author. Summertime plays with the illusion of being the definitive record of 
Coetzee’s life, a narrative not open to rewriting or revision, at least not by its 
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subject. Coetzee’s life and oeuvre are represented as a coherent and finalized 
project (a representation that only works within the fictionalized frame of the 
narrative, since Coetzee published another novel after Summertime, The 
Childhood of Jesus, in 2013). Even his literary achievements are ‘summed up’: 
one of the character narrators is a literary scholar who evaluates his writing 
career (and the accuracy of those evaluations is carefully called into question 
as the narrative progresses). 
The general mood of Summertime also recalls Boyhood and Youth, thereby 
closing the whole project on a more satisfactory note, by bringing again into 
focus the widely held assumption that Coetzee is a truth-directed 
autobiographer. “Coda” is a word used by Julia, one of the author’s lovers in 
the narrative world (Summertime 71). Her story, which is the first one 
presented, furnishes the reader with the most compelling argument to 
naturalize the fictionalization of the author’s death into a token of his truth-
directedness, in the same vein of the previous memoirs. Julia claims to have 
no qualms about revealing embarrassing stories about John because he is 
dead: “Since he is dead, it can make no difference to him, any indiscreetness 
on my part” (37). Accordingly, she does tell a few indiscrete episodes which 
cast him in a very disreputable light and which, crucially, make the biographer 
wonder whether she is not being too hard:  “No, I’m not”, she retorts. “I am 
just telling the truth. Without the truth, no matter how hard, there can be no 
healing” (84).50 
Julia’s reply can be read as an appeal to take Summertime as yet another 
truth-directed memoir. If the revelations that Coetzee discloses about himself 
in Julia’s story (and, hence, in the stories of all the other narrators) have 
indeed some truth in them, he is persisting in and deepening the self-
condemnation that he carried out mainly in Youth. Farred’s description of 
Summertime as a form of ‘autopbiography’ attends precisely to this aspect of the 
memoirs. As a “scalpel-sharp” mode of self-scrutiny, autopbiography abides 
by the imperative of looking at one’s past “with a cruel enough eye”, in 
Coetzee’s own words (Farred, “Autopbiography” 832; Coetzee, Doubling the 
Point 29). Farred reads Coetzee’s “cruel eye” on himself in Youth and 
Summertime as evidence of truthfulness in both narratives, so that both 
memoirs validate one another: 
                                     
50 Note the surname that Coetzee gives her: Frankl (19).  
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After all, what can be left to say of the dead if they have already disparaged 
themselves as lovers? … Lacking distinction as a lover is a self-evaluation 
Coetzee first makes not in Summertime but in its predecessor, Youth. As a 
judgment, however, it not only retains but intensifies its veracity on the later 
work, where all the women remark on it. (835, 6) 
A reading such as Farred’s presumes that the most distinct fictional devices in 
Summertime (the author’s death and the several character narrators) become the 
necessary vehicle for that kind of unflinching soul searching that Coetzee 
claims for himself in Doubling the Point. Otherness, represented both as the 
author’s significant others and as his death, serves as the vantage point for the 
inward look, as though Coetzee could adopt the perspective of the other and 
look into himself, thus endowing his last memoir with a particularly poignant 
form of truthfulness. “[W]hat kind of strength, what kind of self-
unpossession, self-forbearance, self-love, self-loathing, girds such a project 
[?]”, Farred asks (“Autopbiography” 833). The fact that the significant others 
in Summertime are very likely made-up characters whose referents in the real 
world are beyond either the reader’s capacity or interest to pursue does not 
affect the rhetoric of veracity of the narrative, quite the opposite, in fact: it 
enhances it. In such a reading, the self-distance already enacted in the free 
indirect discourse of Boyhood and Youth is taken one step further, as it were, 
giving the impression that Coetzee’s characteristic inclination to keep his 
subjects at an ambiguous distance is intensified. Once again, distance is a 
fundamental condition of truthfulness. Dooley’s review of Summertime 
responds precisely to this narrative element: “How, when [Coetzee] has 
ostensibly constructed the narrative to be so distanced from his own apparent 
point of view, does it come to seem so extraordinarily solipsistic and self-
lacerating?” (“Review of Summertime, by J. M. Coetzee”).51 
                                     
51 David Parker’s reading of Boyhood as what he calls a relational narrative explores how “authorial 
self and significant others tend to be co-subjects”. A relatively recent mode of autobiographical 
writing, relational narratives depart “from the structural pattern of the ‘canonical’ autobiographies 
with their teleological unfolding into epiphanies of the autonomous self”, for the “self is 
understood in relation to the recognition of [those] significant others” (9). Parker makes a case for 
Boyhood as a relational narrative by referring to an episode in which Coetzee hints that, as a boy, he 
had an intuition of a particular responsibility towards those who stand close to him. He suggests 
that Coetzee had a glimpse of his “special responsibility to remember and to speak, to write, which 
is both a responsibility to himself, to define and realize that which is unique in him; and [to] … 
those others and those stories. These are not two responsibilities but one” (17). This is the passage 
on which Parker draws: “How will he keep them all in his head, all the books, all the people, all the 
stories? And if he does not remember them, who will?” (Boyhood 166) He concludes that “in place 
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The Unreliability of Summert ime  
And the sources you have selected have no axes to grind, no ambitions of 
their own to pronounce final judgement on Coetzee? (Summertime 217) 
Dooley’s question in the closing of the previous section is particularly 
revealing from a narratological perspective: it attests to Coetzee’s exploration 
of what Susan Lanser describes as the reader’s propensity to “accord the 
character(s) so privileged a relationship to the author’s consciousness that [it is 
barely necessary] to distinguish one from the other”. Readers are likely to 
associate a narrator’s utterances to the “voice” of the (implied) author by 
gauging “the authorization [that emerges] internally as the narrative establishes 
the credibility, wisdom, and reliability of various narrators and characters” 
(emphasis in original): 
A blend of diegetic and mimetic factors creates pointers encouraging 
readers to identify authorial positions with particular narrators and 
characters or with specific aspects of these narrators and characters. I think 
this process may operate even when I “know” that the historical author is 
different from the authorized narrator or character, for it is not that I 
believe one to be the same as the other, but that I accord the character(s) so 
privileged a relationship to the author’s consciousness that I barely need to 
distinguish one from the other. (13, 4) 
Distance is certainly the crucial aspect of Summertime to which one must 
respond. However, whereas Farred and Dooley interpret the increased 
distance of the narrators as a token of intensified truth-directedness on 
Coetzee’s part, I want to suggest that this increased distance can be read as an 
intensified suspicion of truth-directedness. In the communicative exchange 
that Summertime establishes between Coetzee and his informed readers, the 
fictitious character narrators have to be negotiated as authorial mouthpieces. 
In other words, the reader must assess the narrators’ fictional utterances in 
relation to inferences about the authorial communicative act. In this respect, 
Summertime is clearly distinct from Boyhood and Youth as regards the relationship 
between the narrators and the author. In Boyhood and Youth, Coetzee is 
                                                                                                          
 
 
of solitary flight, Coetzee puts an intuition of connection, which draws the hero out of solitude” in 
Boyhood (18). 
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narrating a representation. The distance between the narrator and the 
autobiographer (who is both the writer and the subject of the story) can be 
approached, as Walsh suggests, as a matter of narratorial slant, that is, as an 
idiosyncrasy of Coetzee’s mode of self-presentation (79). In Summertime, in 
contrast, Coetzee is representing several instances of fictional character 
narration, except in the opening and closing sections, when he is again 
narrating as in Boyhood and Youth. The implication, therefore, is that the 
distance between the fictional narrators and himself as autobiographer in 
Summertime might be greater than the distance between the extradiegetic but 
homodiegetic narrator of Boyhood and Youth and himself. As with a character 
such as David Lurie (but also with autofictional characters such as Elizabeth 
Costello and Señor C), Coetzee faces his readers with the task of figuring out 
the points of convergence and divergence between his characters and himself, 
that is to say, figuring out whether, when, and to what extent he is ‘speaking 
through’ his fictional creations in Summertime. 
In Boyhood and Youth, it is feasible to conclude that author and narrator are 
the same. This is not the case in Summertime, however, even though the reader 
may practically conflate author and character narrator in those passages in 
which the communicative situation in the narrative world simulates a possible 
real-world communication between Coetzee and his informed reader. This 
example comes from Julia’s narration: 
You must be getting worried. What have I let myself in for? you must be asking 
yourself. How can this woman pretend to have total recall of mundane conversations 
dating back three or four decades? And when is she going to get to the point? So let me 
be candid: as far as the dialogue is concerned, I am making it up as I go 
along. Which I presume is permitted, since we’re talking about a writer. 
What I am telling you may not be true to the letter, but it is true to the 
spirit, be assured of that. Can I proceed? 
[Silence.] (32, italics in original) 
Julia is justifying the fictionalization of her story with an assurance of being 
“true to the spirit” of her acquaintance with John in order to preempt any 
misgivings that Mr. Vincent, her interlocutor, might have about possible 
distortions of the historical record and, therefore, about her version of the 
truth. The passage is a perfect representation of what Coetzee, the actual 
author, is doing in Summertime: offering a fabulated narrative of his life on the 
arguably dubious plea (grounded on the generic affiliation of the narrative and 
on his reputation) to be taken as a truth-directed storyteller. Apart from the 
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italicized words (which are Julia’s reproduction of what she presumes to be 
the biographer’s thoughts), the rest of the passage could literally be taken to 
be Coetzee’s words to his reader, who has to come to terms with his assertion 
(his words in Julia’s mouth, as it were) that what he is telling in Summertime 
“may not be true to the letter, but it is true to the spirit”. 
Passages like the one above can be read as an authorial commentary on the 
dynamics of the communicative exchange between writer/autobiographer and 
reader. It is significant that Coetzee has Mr. Vincent respond with silence to 
Julia’s reassurance that the narrative she creates for herself and John will be 
“true to the spirit” of their life together (32). Mr. Vincent’s cryptic silence 
could perhaps be an indication that he accepts to take Julia’s story in the terms 
she is proposing (since he does not interrupt the flow of her narration), but it 
is much more appropriate to assume that his hesitation reflects suspiciousness 
of Julia’s appeal. Mr. Vincent’s silence is representative of what James Phelan 
calls a “second track of communication” in the primary communication 
between the narrator (Julia) and the narratee (Mr. Vincent). For Phelan, 
character narration necessarily presents the reader with two tracks of 
communication: that from the narrator to the narratee, and the indirect 
communication from the narrator to what he calls the authorial audience 
(which amounts to an implied knowledgeable reader). “Character narration is 
an art of indirection because the implied author must use the narrator to 
communicate with the authorial audience and the narrator is unaware of that 
audience” (Living 214, 5).52 
The double communication from the narrator (to the narratee and to the 
authorial/informed audience) is a distinguishing feature of unreliable 
narration. Since Booth first addressed unreliable narration in The Rhetoric of 
Fiction, the concept has received attention by a number of other theorists. For 
Phelan, as for Booth before him, unreliability is inextricably tied to the 
informed reader’s projection of authorial intention, that is, to the informed 
reader’s conception of what the author might in fact be conveying in the 
second track of communication of a narrator’s utterance. Accordingly, the 
                                     
52 Margaret Lenta and Anthony Uhlmann take up the issue of an “immanent” or “middle” voice in 
Coetzee’s memoirs akin to the second track of communication that Phelan identifies in character 
narration. Lenta refers to the “immanent voice” as a “quality … appropriate in Coetzee’s extensive 
use of free indirect discourse [to indicate] to the reader without overt authorial intervention that it 
is necessary to go beyond the words of the text” (166). Uhlmann distinguishes an authorial middle 
voice: “The subject cannot be approached directly: it is only through the relation of elements 
adjacent to the absent object that the absent object might be sufficiently evoked” (755). 
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informed reader construes what Booth and Phelan call “the implied author” 
as the agent responsible for the values imbued in the text (Living 216). Phelan 
considers a character narrator to be unreliable “when he or she offers an 
account of some event, person, thought, thing, or other object in the narrative 
world that deviates from the account the implied author would offer” (Living 
49). Walsh has a similar understanding of unreliable narration, but he discards 
the implied author in favor of a narrative logic that provides “some means of 
accounting for the narrator’s self-contradictions or manifest distortions” (79). 
The logic that Summertime suggests for the unreliability of its narrators as 
spokespersons for a truth-directed Coetzee hinges, once again, on the 
equation of narratorial distance and autobiographical truth introduced in 
Boyhood and resumed in Youth. Coetzee displaces his authorial voice in Boyhood 
and Youth by means of free indirect discourse to suggest his truth-
directedness. In Summertime, he displaces it even more: the distance between 
the narrators and the autobiographical subject is increased, since Coetzee has 
indeed created fictional narrators to speak for him. However, the explanation 
provided for Mr. Vincent’s choice of interviewees within the narrative world 
casts doubt on the assumption that the increased distance between the 
narrators and the autobiographical subject intensifies Coetzee’s truth-
directedness. 
The interviewees/narrators are supposedly knowledgeable interpreters of 
Coetzee’s life and work, chosen by Mr. Vincent precisely on the basis of their 
closeness to the author (217). They lay claim to a kind of inside knowledge 
that guarantees the validity of their assumptions, or the “truths” they tell, 
about the late Coetzee. As the narrative progresses, however, the narrators’ 
own accounts of their life with John raise suspicions about their versions of 
the events, and therefore compromise the supposed truths they tell about him. 
Coetzee shows his narrators/mouthpieces in Summertime helplessly revealing 
their own unreliability as a result of their involvement with John. Unreliability 
is revealed in the domain of what Phelan calls disclosure functions. Phelan 
distinguishes between narrator functions and disclosure functions to address 
how readers can detect an indirect authorial message being passed on. 
Narrator functions “refer to the communication along the track from the 
narrator to the narratee”, whereas disclosure functions “refer to the 
communication along the track from the narrator to the authorial audience” 
(Living 214, 5). 
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Lack of objectivity, or potential unreliability, is of course intrinsic to every 
first person perspective, and this is particularly obvious in Summertime. All the 
women interviewed were emotionally involved with John, though in different 
ways. The biographer’s own story is also compromised by the admiration he 
nurtures for his works and for the “more human” man that emerges from the 
accounts of the interviewees (Summertime 235). Martin, a former colleague and 
the only male interviewee, is apparently the most reliable (or least unreliable) 
of all the narrators, but the very possibility of his reliability is unsettled in light 
of the unreliability of all the other narrators. In other words, this is the work 
of the double thought again: an account of Martin as a reliable spokesperson 
for Coetzee could simply be an effect of a particular reader’s incapacity to 
detect signs of unreliability (the reader’s own blind spot). As Phelan observes, 
however, one particular instance of a narrator’s unreliability does not 
necessarily render this narrator unreliable or suspect throughout the whole 
narrative: “narrators exist along a wide spectrum from reliability to 
unreliability” (Living 53). Accordingly, a narrator can be perceived as reliable at 
times, and as unreliable at other times, and some narrators, like Martin, can in 
fact be gauged as more reliable than others, which brings into focus the 
construal of autobiographical truth itself. 
The Truth of Summert ime  
Julia: I warn you most earnestly: if you go away from here and start fiddling 
with the text, the whole thing will turn to ash in your hands (Summertime 44). 
The central ideational aspect of Summertime that directly concerns 
autobiographical truth is the construction of a system of beliefs which 
authorizes the fictionalized utterances as bearers of some notion of truth 
about the real Coetzee. Once again, Coetzee compels the reader to account 
for fictionality in the autobiographical contract. The fictional quality of 
Boyhood and Youth already diminished the relevance of assessments of 
autobiographical truth based on reference to facts of the world but it did not 
rule them out entirely, for the episodes in the narratives are, to a great extent, 
factually accurate to the historical record of Coetzee’s life.53 The same applies 
to the character narrators in Summertime: the possibility that they have 
“originals” in the world is not ruled out entirely, but this is a line of reasoning 
                                     
53 See Kannemeyer’s biography of Coetzee, A Life in Writing (9). 
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that the fictionality of the text renders secondary or insignificant. The only 
fact that will eventually bear an assessment of truth on the basis of 
correspondence beyond any question is Coetzee’s death, which certainly 
creates an aura of severe truth-directedness around his narrative. 
The propositions made by the narrators about Coetzee appeal primarily to 
other propositions made about him, so that the truth of such propositions is 
essentially not “a matter of whether the world provides a suitable object to 
mirror” them, but “a matter of how beliefs are related to each other” 
(Glanzberg, “Truth”). As a function of the fictionality of Summertime, 
autobiographical truth arises within a set of contextual assumptions that can 
be made to validate one another on the basis of coherence. A reader such as 
Farred, for example, who establishes a connection between Summertime and 
Youth (or indeed between Summertime and any other of Coetzee’s writings, for 
all of them can be read as autobiographical records of a kind) does not gauge 
the truth of the proposition under consideration in strictly ontological terms, 
that is, looking for a referent in the real world. Rather, every proposition 
under consideration can in principle provide a “potential explanatory 
framework”, to borrow Walsh’s phrase, for another proposition in another 
narrative, which thus establishes a mutual aura of truthfulness between both 
propositions (and narratives).  
Walsh uses the term co-reference, as opposed to reference resolution, to 
explain the processing of fictional utterances. Co-reference occurs when a 
proposition presupposes rather than asserts another proposition, helping thus 
to create the “potential explanatory framework” that validates both. Narrative 
understanding, which in the case of an autobiography depends naturally on 
truth, is a result of the “processing [of assumptions] in accordance with our 
assessments of their relative strength” (Walsh 34). The coherent connections 
among the fictional or fictionalized propositions are not potentially 
inexhaustible because pragmatic relevance, the assessment of their relative 
strength, puts an end to the inquiry itself. From that perspective, 
autobiographical truth in Summertime also invokes a pragmatist theory of truth, 
according to which “we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of 
beliefs” (Glanzberg, “Truth”). 
Since Summertime is Coetzee’s last autobiography, it functions indeed as 
coda to Boyhood and Youth, that is to say, it presupposes a coherent relation 
with the previous memoirs that puts an end to his autobiographical project. 
Yet Summertime harks back to Boyhood and Youth, as well as to “Confession and 
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Double Thoughts”, not by reenacting Coetzee’s continuing investment in a 
truth-directed mode of autobiographical writing, but by reasserting his 
resistance to life writing as a means to pin down autobiographical truth. 
Resistance, as both Head and Attridge have pointed out, is a predominant 
conceptual feature of Boyhood and Youth. For Attridge, resistance is latent in 
Coetzee’s lack of interest in making his own case as a truth-directed 
autobiographer (Ethics of Reading 148). For Head, resistance is a “key 
characteristic of the writer”, but the most significant aspect of his argument is 
that he emphasizes resistance on the part of the reader as well, who should be 
alert to Coetzee’s manipulation of autobiographical truth and therefore 
suspect his severe soul searching (Cambridge Introduction 5, 9, 11, 16). Both 
Attridge and Head outline (albeit somewhat implicitly) the mode of resistance 
characteristic of Coetzee’s authorial discourse, namely, his unwillingness to 
comply with the prescriptions of a literary genre, and therefore have his works 
measured against a pre-determined template. In effect, Summertime does not 
necessarily articulate a new form of resistance to (certain kinds of) 
interpretation, but challenges the interpretive methods with which readers and 
critics habitually construe a writer’s autobiographical truth. 
This challenge to interpretive expectations and methods is detectable 
throughout the narrative. There are several passages in Summertime from which 
it is possible to infer that Coetzee is scrutinizing the reception of his writing, 
as though anticipating what readers and critics are likely to do when assessing 
his autobiography. I will begin by discussing three passages that set the tone 
of this challenge. In one of them, Julia alludes to the truth about John as the 
result of the most informed conclusions that can be drawn against a 
contextual background: “You asked me to give an idea of John as he was in 
those days, but I can’t give you a picture of him alone without any 
background, otherwise there are things you will fail to understand” 
(Summertime 23). Coherence among the utterances of the character narrators in 
Summertime, both for Mr. Vincent in the narrative world and for the real 
readers of Coetzee’s memoir, is a matter of balancing text and context.  
The very disposition of the interviews serves to illustrate how Coetzee 
disavows traditional approaches to autobiography, as well as traditional 
expectations towards the truth about an author’s life. Mr. Vincent is still in the 
process of turning his material, which comprises diary entries similar to Boyhood 
and Youth and the interviews he is carrying out, into a biography of the late 
author. The finalized and coherent narrative of Coetzee’s life by Mr. Vincent 
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is still in medias res and its meanings, therefore, are always potentially 
provisional, insofar as he might get back to his materials and produce some 
other coherent story about Coetzee’s life out of them. The biographer’s 
engagement with the narrators’ stories in the fiction is analogous to what the 
reader or critic is doing in reality: bringing stories about Coetzee, all of them 
imbued with some kind of truth, to cohere around a narrative of the author’s 
life. 
Within the narrative world, one of the clearest allusions to the self-interest 
embedded in any account of autobiographical truth is made by Martin when 
he comments on the interviewees’ inevitable personal slant in their views 
about John: “And the sources you have selected have no axes to grind, no 
ambitions of their own to pronounce final judgement on Coetzee?” (217).54 It 
is difficult not to read in Martin’s words an authorial commentary on, and 
critique of, how one usually approaches an autobiography. Each reader has an 
interpretive agenda that informs the expectations brought to bear upon a 
narrative. Accordingly, each reader gives priority to those inferences that are 
worth pursuing in relation to this interpretive agenda. The interpretive 
process, as Walsh argues, presupposes a balance between effort and effect, so 
that its pragmatic end, in terms of deciding up to which point it is worth 
pursuing coherence, is to refrain from making inferences that can “throw [a 
narrative’s] representational logic into disarray” (36): 
As a fictional narrative progresses, further assumptions become manifest 
not because earlier assumptions have projected a fictional world within 
which the fictional truth of new assumptions can be established, but 
because the achieved relevance of the earlier assumptions itself becomes a 
contextual basis for maximizing the relevance of subsequent related 
assumptions. (32) 
For the real reader of Summertime, the narrators’ utterances can initially be 
made to validate one another as bearers of autobiographical truth across the 
individual stories, but they often surpass the narrative limits of Summertime and 
communicate with other works by Coetzee, with his interviews, or with 
critical assessments of his works. It is possible, at times, to arrive at something 
quite close to a relation of correspondence between a fictional narrator’s 
utterance and an utterance by Coetzee himself in an interview, for example, 
and thereby maximize the relevance of a narrator’s utterance and construe this 
                                     
54 I will address Martin’s (un)reliability in more detail towards the end of this chapter.  
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narrator as an authoritative, that is to say, reliable spokesperson for Coetzee. 
Still, there is no clear-cut and incontestable correspondence, only passages 
that can be taken as more strongly evocative of Coetzee speaking through his 
narrators depending on the reader’s interpretive agenda. 
In a particular passage of Julia’s interview, the authority over the meanings 
of Coetzee’s life story and over autobiographical truth is granted, in a 
markedly provocative manner, only to himself: 
You commit a grave error if you think to yourself that the difference 
between the two stories, the story you wanted to hear and the story you are 
getting, will be nothing more than a matter of perspective – that while from 
my point of view the story of John may have been just one episode among 
many in the long narrative of my marriage, nevertheless, by dint of a quick 
flip, a quick manipulation of perspective, followed by some clever editing, 
you can transform it into a story about John and one of the women who 
passed through his life. Not so. Not so. I warn you most earnestly: if you go 
away from here and start fiddling with the text, the whole thing will turn to 
ash in your hands. (Summertime 44) 
If Julia’s words are taken once again as Coetzee’s own words, the only 
authoritative interpreter competent to “fiddle with the text” and gain access to 
the truth of his life narrative is Coetzee himself. In the context of this self-
sufficient, even dismissive authorial consciousness, Farred’s comment about 
the critic’s task after Summertime is very telling. He raises the idea that, once the 
critic has accepted as true the brutal exposition carried out in the text, all that 
is left for the critic is to save Coetzee from himself: 
[It] is precisely because Summertime does the autopbiographical work of 
analyzing, declaiming, and subjecting the author to a thorough humiliation 
that this genre creates, after itself, a paradoxical time. After the (seemingly 
unrelenting) self-indictment of the autopbiography, it appears that only 
veneration, or something proximate to it, can follow the autopbiography. 
With the author declaimed, by himself, what is there to do but rescue him 
from himself? Restore him? What is left to do but imagine the possibility of 
a hagiography, that most hallowed and therefore hoary form of the 
biography, for the writer? (“Autopbiography” 837) 
As Farred expresses it above, Coetzee puts the critic in a difficult position in 
Summertime. The next section looks into the critic’s difficult task in greater 
detail. As I argued in this section, Summertime compels the reader to construe a 
coherent system of beliefs that sustain the assumptions of Coetzee’s 
autobiographical truth. The next section carries this argument further by 
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providing examples of how assumptions of autobiographical truth presuppose 
both parallels between utterances made by the fictive narrators in Summertime 
and parallels between these fictional utterances and publicly available 
information on Coetzee. Whichever way one attempts to construe this 
coherent system of beliefs, however, the outcome is problematic because it 
exposes the limitations and the fallibility of the interpretive process. 
Coetzee’s Autobiographical Truth and a Narrator’s 
Mimetic Authority 
Mr. Vincent: Because the story you told was so long I dramatized it here 
and there, letting people speak in their own voices. … Am I taking too 
many liberties? 
Margot: I don’t know. Something sounds wrong, but I can’t put my finger 
on it (Summertime 87, 91). 
Reading Summertime entails that one is constantly looking for the author in the 
voices in the text. In more technical language, this process can be described as 
such: a reader aligns a narrator’s mimetic authority and reliability with 
“authorial positions” by means of “diegetic and mimetic factors” (Lanser 13). 
Diegetic factors are intrinsic to the narration itself and are noticeable, for 
example, in stylistic features, such as words and expressions representative of 
Coetzee’s narrative habits. Mimetic factors are associated with particular 
aspects of the presentation of characters or narrators. For instance, the 
combination of unflinchingness and forgivingness characteristic of the 
narrative perspective in Youth also applies to the characterization of Julia and 
Adriana in Summertime. 
But as one finds tempting signs of a narrator’s reliability by construing a 
coherent system of beliefs that sustains the assumption of their reliability, one 
also finds plenty of evidence that their accounts are colored by personal bias, 
distortions, or even potential lies. The most significant index of the character 
narrators’ reliability as mouthpieces for Coetzee, and therefore of the alleged 
truth-directedness of Summertime, is precisely the combination of 
unflinchingness and forgivingness.55 The stories narrated by Julia and Adriana, 
                                     
55 This combination functions as something like a theme as well, insofar as unflinchingness and 
forgivingness apply to the motivations underlying Julia’s and Adriana’s narrations, offering a 
vantage point from which to understand their stories. “Narrative themes have at least three 
functions”, one of which being that “they help readers sketch the plot’s semantic skeleton by 
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mainly marked by this combination, cohere primarily around John’s inaptitude 
as a lover. Julia, for example, admits that John was “important” to her and 
that she can “look back on him with affection”, but her unflinchingness often 
outweighs her forgivingness (81, 63). According to her, John was “socially 
inept” and “repressed”, “not easy to take to”, “too wary” and “defensive”; 
“his mental capacities, and specifically his ideational faculties, were 
overdeveloped, at the cost of his animal self”; he was physically “unattractive” 
and had “an air of seediness [and] failure”; he was “scrawny, he had a beard, 
he wore horn-rimmed glasses and sandals”  (20, 21, 25, 58). She does not 
refrain from sentencing that “in his lovemaking … there was an autistic 
quality” (52).  
One of the most embarrassing and amusing episodes that Coetzee has Julia 
tell about John (and therefore supposedly about himself) is his unsuccessful 
attempt to synchronize sex to the Schubert string quintet: 
He wanted to prove something to me about the history of feeling, he said. 
… Because music was the trace, the inscription, of feeling. … If, instead of 
resisting, I had let the music flow into me and animate me, I would have 
experienced glimmerings of something quite unusual: what it had felt like to 
make love in post-Bonaparte Austria. (69) 
Julia’s (and therefore Coetzee’s) unflinchingness is potentially validated by 
another character narrator, Adriana. Despite not having had a love affair with 
John, she uses harsh words on her speculations about his talents as a lover. 
“Perhaps this is how these Dutch Protestants behave when they fall in love: 
prudently, long-windedly, without fire, without grace. And no doubt that is 
how his lovemaking would be too, if he ever got a chance” (172). Coetzee has 
Adriana mention that John sent her a letter about Schubert, claiming that 
“listening to Schubert had taught him one of the great secrets of love: how we 
                                                                                                          
 
 
indicating its strategic points, which describe those events, actions, intentions, and results of actions 
that keep it moving and that are indispensable for understanding the totality it forms”. A related 
function of themes concerns “their synthesizing capacity: they may be used as shorthand 
expressions for the abstract plot schemata subtending narratives” (Pyrhönen, Heta, “Thematic 
Approaches to Narrative”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory). 
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can sublime love as chemists in the old days sublimed base substances”, which 
she considers “worse than nonsense” (175).56 
The element that calls into question the reliability of the narrators most 
clearly is their proximity to John, and this is particularly evident in the 
women’s stories. The unrelenting frankness of narrators such as Julia and 
Adriana is compromised by the nature of their relationship with John. Julia 
and another character narrator, Sophie, were John’s lovers; as Coetzee has 
Julia put it, lovers “can’t be too analytic” (59). In point of fact, Adriana was 
not John’s lover, but she could hardly come across as impartial due to her 
excessive preoccupation with her teenage daughter who, she suspected, was 
infatuated with him. Julia claims she “was determined to avoid emotional 
entanglement”, but there is textual evidence that she did have feelings for 
John (38). The sense of disappointment over her affective investment is 
recognizable in a number of passages. After one of the nights they spent 
together, the night which Julia believes “could have marked the beginning of a 
new life” for them, John gets cold feet and steals into the night: 
In the middle of the night John woke up and saw me sleeping beside him 
with no doubt a look of peace on my face, even of bliss, bliss is not 
unattainable in this world. He saw me – saw me as I was at that moment – 
took fright, hurriedly strapped the armour back over his heart, this time 
with chains and a double padlock, and stole out into the darkness. 
Do you think I find it easy to forgive him for that? (83, 4) 
In another passage, she resents his passivity: “[H]e might actually have yanked 
me out of a marriage that was bad for me then and would become worse later. 
He might actually have saved me, or saved the best years of my life for me, 
which, as it turned out, were wasted” (59, 60). Her admittance of not being 
able to forgive John makes her evaluation of their relationship thoroughly 
unreliable, in fact. The affair with John, she says, “was hardly an affair at all, 
more of a friendship, an extramarital friendship with a sexual component 
whose importance, at least on my side, was symbolic rather than substantial. 
Sleeping with John was my way of retaining my self-respect” (75).57 
                                     
56 Julia makes a proleptic reference to Adriana’s daughters as John’s “scatterlings from the ex-
Portuguese empire”, and wonders whether the girls “had to suffer for his nocturnal excesses” with 
her (52). 
57 Julia is alluding to her husband’s infidelity by referring to her involvement with John as a means 
to “retain her self-respect”. 
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Apart from the combination of unflinchingness and forgivingness, another 
significant theme in the women’s stories that suggests the potential reliability 
of some of their utterances is John’s relationship with his father. The story 
Coetzee creates for himself and his father in Summertime is another clear 
example of disregard for the historical record that has to be negotiated as a 
form of truth-telling. At that time of his life depicted in the memoir, Coetzee 
was not living with his father, but had a wife and children. One can, 
nevertheless, legitimize this distortion by thinking of it in terms of “a higher 
truth”, which is yet another concept bearing on autobiographical writing 
floated by Coetzee himself.58 The assumption would be that Coetzee might 
have elaborated the fiction that he was living with his ailing father to indicate 
regret for their troubled relationship, which is one of the main themes 
explored in Boyhood. Uhlmann’s reading, for instance, relies precisely on this 
assumption: the end of the narrative suggests “an identification between the 
father and the son”, since Coetzee himself at the time of writing is an ageing 
man and parent (760). 
There is surely textual evidence to support such reading but, once again, 
the interpretive assumption is tied to a particular system of beliefs within 
which the narrators’ utterances can be made to cohere with one another. In 
Julia’s story, there is a clue to support the claim that Coetzee’s fictional 
treatment of his story with his father betokens his personal filial regret: “Of 
course John did not love his father, he did not love anybody, he was not built 
for love. But he did feel guilty about his father. He felt guilty and therefore he 
behaved dutifully” (48). Julia’s claim is later substantiated by another 
interviewee, John’s cousin Margot:  John behaved towards his father “if not 
with affection, that would be saying too much, then at least with respect” 
(130). Margot’s indirect vindication of Julia’s claim invests Julia with a degree 
of mimetic authority and reliability because it provides support to Julia’s belief 
that what lies behind John’s dedication to his father is guilt rather than love. In 
the particular question of the reason why John is taking care of his father (and 
not on the issue of whether Julia is a reliable spokesperson for Coetzee 
throughout the narrative), Julia’s and Margot’s statements cohere with one 
another and, by so doing, contribute to the establishment of their authority, or 
presumable reliability, as spokespersons for the autobiographer. 
                                     
58 “[W]e should distinguish two kinds of truth, the first truth to fact, the second something beyond 
that, … a “higher” truth. … [T]o call autobiography – or indeed history – true as long as it does not 
lie invokes a fairly vacuous idea of truth” (Doubling the Point 17). 
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Julia’s mimetic authority and reliability as regards John’s care for his father 
is also consolidated in tandem with the mimetic authority of the extradiegetic 
narrator of the opening and final fragments of Summertime, which have 
supposedly been written to comprise a third memoir in the style of Boyhood 
and Youth. Since this is, in all likelihood, the same extradiegetic but 
homodiegetic narrator of the previous memoirs (that is to say, Coetzee, whose 
peculiar habit of self-presentation is to refer to himself in the third person), 
this is the voice which, according to Lanser, presumably occupies “the text’s 
highest level(s) of authority” in speaking for the author (14). This 
narrator/autobiographer admits he has felt “the bitterest remorse” about his 
conduct towards his father (Summertime 249, 50). 
Nevertheless, the reliability of this extradiegetic narrator as the authorizing 
agent of Julia’s views does not go unchallenged. At the end of some of the 
episodes narrated by this extradiegetic narrator, there are italicized notes with 
comments about how to turn the memory into a story and, more importantly, 
about the ethical characterization of the autobiographer: “Features of his 
character that emerge from the story: (a) integrity (he declines to read the will as she wants 
him to); (b) naiveté (he misses a chance to make some money)” (Summertime 12). Since 
those traits are not necessarily the traits that emerge overtly from the story, 
the question of authorial manipulation of autobiographical truth comes 
immediately and inevitably back into focus. Indeed, at the end of the entry in 
which Coetzee (the homodiegetic extradiegetic narrator) expresses regret 
about his story with his father, the notes allude precisely to their relationship 
as a “theme to carry further: his father and why he lives with him” (252). 
One can expand the system of beliefs that sustains one interpretive 
assumption by turning to extratextual sources as well. It is possible to grant 
Julia reliability as a mouthpiece for Coetzee on the issue of filial regret by 
means of an external authorizing agent, that is, an agent outside of Summertime, 
to support the claim of a “higher truth” (that is, repentance) about Coetzee’s 
relationship with his father. Coetzee has not spoken unambiguously in his 
own voice about his regret towards his father, but he has spoken about his 
mother, first in Boyhood and then in his Nobel Banquet Speech. Coetzee’s 
mother, as he depicts her in Boyhood, was likewise a difficult presence in his 
life: 
Her blinding, overwhelming, self-sacrificial love, for both him and his 
brother but for him in particular, disturbs him. … She loves him absolutely, 
therefore he must love her absolutely: that is the logic she compels upon 
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him. … The thought of a lifetime bowed under a debt of love baffles and 
infuriates him to the point where he will not kiss her, refuses to be touched 
by her. … [H]e deliberately hardens his heart against her. (Boyhood 47) 
Against the background of passages like this, Coetzee’s Nobel Banquet 
Speech, in which he speaks in a tone of regret about his mother, can indirectly 
validate what he is doing in Summertime (making his characters speak for 
himself) as a kind of apology to his father as well: 
My mother would have been bursting with pride. My son the Nobel Prize 
winner. And for whom, anyway, do we do the things that lead to Nobel 
Prizes if not for our mothers? … Why must our mothers be ninety-nine and 
long in the grave before we can come running home with the prize that will 
make up for all the trouble we have been to them? ("Banquet Speech") 
The truthfulness of Julia’s utterance about Coetzee’s guilty feelings can be 
maximized by means of several different implicatures, that is to say, by means 
of inferences based on a given interpretive context. In the particular case of 
John’s relation with his father, however, despite the strong coherence between 
Julia’s utterance and Coetzee’s Nobel Banquet Speech, the pragmatic end of 
inquiry entails, literally, putting words in his mouth, for Coetzee has in fact 
not spoken explicitly about his father. 
With Sophie, another narrator, it is possible to establish a very strong co-
reference, or almost correspondence, between some of her utterances and 
Coetzee’s interviews. Nevertheless, even when a narrator’s particular utterance 
can be construed as reliable, their reliability is brought into question by 
surrounding circumstances that weaken it.59 Once again, emotional attachment 
to John is what betrays the women’s accounts. Sophie, for example, who is an 
academic and literary critic, also had a love affair with him. She interprets her 
absence from his artistic works as a form of absence from his private life, and 
therefore as an indication of her affective insignificance to him. Never 
entering Coetzee’s books is a complaint first made by Julia: “[To] me [it] 
means I never quite flowered within him, never quite came to life” 
(Summertime 36). Sophie voices the same kind of disappointment: 
                                     
59 Those surrounding circumstances are revealed by means of what Phelan calls disclosure 
functions. Head, in his reading of Youth, also responded to an authorial message passed on by 
means of disclosure functions. He detected “mitigating circumstances” in Youth that called 
Coetzee’s severity towards his younger self into question (Cambridge Introduction 16). 
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[I]t seemed to me at the time, now I realize how naïve this was – I believed 
you could not be closely involved with another person and yet exclude her 
from your imaginative universe. 
And did you find yourself in the book [In the Heart of the Country]? 
No. (…) 
Were you upset to find yourself excluded from his imaginative universe? 
No. It was part of my education. Shall we leave it at that? I think I have 
given you enough. (234, 5 italics in original) 
Sophie is eager to hide her hurt feelings for not having been portrayed (or not 
finding herself portrayed) in John’s books, but her abruptness with Mr. 
Vincent betrays her. A clear indication of her resentment surfaces in the 
passage in which she passes judgment on Coetzee’s works even though she 
“did not read all of [his novels]”: 
After Disgrace I lost interest. In general I would say that his work lacks 
ambition. The control of the elements is too tight. Nowhere do you get a 
feeling of a writer deforming his medium in order to say what has never 
been said before, which is to me the mark of great writing. Too cool, too 
neat, I would say. Too easy. Too lacking in passion. That’s all. (242) 
As with Julia’s utterances, it is possible to make Sophie’s utterances cohere 
with extratextual sources to construe her as a reliable authorial voice. Her 
judgment can sound representative of some of Coetzee’s political views. The 
relationship that can be established between Sophie’s utterances and Coetzee’s 
words is quite akin to correspondence in such cases, since Coetzee has indeed 
spoken in his own voice concerning politics. The following passage gives an 
example: “I would rather say [he was] anti-political”, she says. “He thought 
that politics brought out the worst in people. It brought out the worst in 
people and also brought to the surface the worst types in society. He 
preferred to have nothing to do with it” (228). Sophie is very close to 
paraphrasing the last interview in Doubling the Point, in which Coetzee 
anticipates Boyhood and Youth by referring to himself in the third person. As a 
child, he recalls, “he [had] seen enough of the Afrikaner right, enough of its 
rant, its self-righteousness, its cruelty, to last him a lifetime”. In his student 
years, he continues, although he “steers clear of the right”, he “moves on the 
fringes of the left without being part of the left. […] He is alienated, when the 
crunch comes, by its language – by all political language, in fact” (394). 
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In another passage, Sophie assesses Coetzee’s political disposition in terms 
that would be consonant with the mainstream critical reception of works such 
as Age of Iron and Disgrace: “Nothing is worth fighting for because fighting only 
prolongs the cycle of aggression and retaliation. I merely repeat what Coetzee 
says loud and clear in his writings, which you say you have read” (Summertime 
230). Yet in this same passage, there are more signs of her lack of objectivity. 
She is curt with Mr. Vincent and questions whether he has read Coetzee’s 
works, which exposes an underlying friction in their exchange. Mr. Vincent is 
an academic who admires Coetzee’s works;60 Sophie, for reasons which very 
likely do not solely concern Coetzee’s literary merits, does not show the same 
appreciation. 
As Farred suggests, Sophie “is incapable of understanding herself as a 
parody of the critic … she reveals the limited imagination and destitute 
vocabulary of the critic” (“Autopbiography” 835). Her critical assessment of 
Coetzee’s work up to Disgrace (after which she “lost interest”) coheres, for 
instance, with a well-known unfavorable review of the novel by literary critic 
James Wood. Sophie’s appraisal of “the control of the elements” as “too 
tight” and of the writing as “too cool” and “too neat” echoes Wood’s words: 
“Coetzee’s books eschew loosened abundance”; Disgrace is “spare” and 
“written in a language that, even by Coetzee’s standards, is savagely reduced”; 
“the novel always feels tightly poised”, “so firmly plotted and shaped, so 
clearly blocked out” (“Parables and Prizes”). 
Interestingly, when Coetzee undermines Sophie’s authority as a critic, he 
endows her with credibility as his authorial voice. By paraphrasing Wood’s 
words as the words of a critic such as Sophie, who makes half-informed 
critical assessments, Coetzee brings to the fore the bias and the deficiencies of 
criticism. Besides, he also devises Sophie’s utterances to mirror his own 
utterances about writing in Youth. Her opinion that the writing is “too lacking 
in passion” evokes a passage in Youth in which he ponders on how prose, as 
opposed to poetry, seems more suitable to his temperament. The passage 
sounds particularly truthful because it captures how the aspiring author could 
already detect what would become the distinctive qualities of the mature 
author’s writing: 
He has a horror of spilling mere emotion on to the page. Once it has begun 
to spill out he would not know how to stop it. It would be like severing an 
                                     
60 I will have more to say about Mr. Vincent in connection with Margot’s story. 
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artery and watching one’s lifeblood gush out. Prose, fortunately, does not 
demand emotion: there is that to be said for it. Prose is like a flat, tranquil 
sheet of water on which one can tack about at one’s leisure, making patterns 
on the surface. (Youth 60, 1) 
Another subject on which Sophie comes across as a reliable voice for Coetzee 
is autobiographical writing: “[he] believed [that] our life-stories are ours to 
construct as we wish, within or even against the constraints imposed by the 
real world” (Summertime 227). This chimes in well with his assertion that all 
writing is a kind of autobiography. Julia also makes a reference to Coetzee’s 
autobiographical or autofictional writing, when she claims that John became a 
vegetarian “as part of a larger project of self-reformation” (58). This is almost 
a rewording of how Elizabeth Costello, one of Coetzee’s autofictional 
characters, explains her vegetarianism as coming out “of a desire to save [her] 
soul” (Elizabeth Costello 89). 
However, the assumption that Coetzee’s characters are autobiographical in 
some way, or to some extent, is also called into question: this is the case with 
the ‘air’ of Disgrace hovering about Adriana’s story. Adriana is a Brazilian 
dancer, mother of two daughters, to one of whom John gives private lessons 
in English. The girl in question, Maria Regina, has developed some affection 
for him, and Adriana suspects that John will take advantage of that and seduce 
the girl. The main lines of the plot involving David Lurie and Melanie Isaacs 
are clear: the older male teacher (apparently, in John’s case) keen on taking 
advantage of the younger female student, which might in turn reintroduce 
suspicions about the real-life sources of Disgrace. Coetzee’s characterization of 
John in Adriana’s story clearly recalls Lurie, even when the resemblance is 
negative. In some respects, John is very unlike the self-assured womanizer 
Lurie: Adriana describes him as physically unattractive, “incompetent with 
women”, “not made for the company of women”. But, like Lurie, John tends 
to act without thought: she defines him as a “weak man … worse than a bad 
man, [for a] weak man does not know where to stop. A weak man is helpless 
before his impulses, he follows wherever they lead” (Summertime 160, 168, 
171). Adriana’s words recall Lurie’s words in the hearing: “As for the impulse 
[seducing Melanie], it was far from ungovernable. I have denied similar 
impulses many times in the past, I am ashamed to say” (Disgrace 52). 
These allusions to Disgrace distinguish another typical double gesture by 
Coetzee, along the lines of his undermining of Sophie’s authority as a critic to 
accredit her as his authorial voice. The dry humor of Summertime as a whole 
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can function as a token of forgivingness, that is, of his capacity to look at the 
past with some amusement and come to terms with his shortcomings in a 
positive way. Nevertheless, such humor could also be taken as a hint that 
Coetzee finds ludicrous those interpretations that assume that his characters 
are autobiographical creations of some sort. The comically degrading 
development of the tale involving John, Maria Regina and Adriana in 
Summertime, for example, casts into doubt any serious claim about John’s story 
with Adriana as the reworking of a real-life, or formative experience, for 
Disgrace. Indirectly, then, this comical denouement undermines the authority 
of the characters. 
Another humoristic allusion to Disgrace is particularly effective to discredit 
assumptions that Lurie is a kind of autobiographical creation. It appears in the 
Schubert episode involving John and Julia. The episode brings to mind Lurie’s 
opera about Byron and his Contessa, one of the central elements in his ethical 
progression in the novel. In Disgrace, Lurie struggles to hear the notes that will 
join harmoniously the voices of Byron and of the Contessa. During the 
creative process, he hears a third voice insinuate itself: it is Byron’s daughter 
Allegra, who evokes to Lurie his own daughter Lucy’s voice (180-6). In 
Summertime, Coetzee turns this opening of the self to the other by means of art 
into a farce: 
When a man and a woman are in love they create their own music, it comes 
instinctively, they don’t need lessons. But what does our friend John do? He 
drags a third presence into the bedroom. Franz Schubert becomes number 
one, the master of love; John becomes number two, the master’s disciple 
and executant; and I become number three, the instrument on whom the 
sex-music is going to be played. That – it seems to me – tells you all you 
need to know about John Coetzee. The man who mistook his mistress for a 
violin. (83) 
Summertime compels its readers to hear the truth-directed, unflinching but 
forgiving author in its narrators’ stories. Nevertheless, one can also hear a 
fiercely ironic and challenging authorial voice that exposes the self-interest, 
the limitations, and the arbitrariness of its interpreters. I have already singled 
out a passage from Julia’s section in which one could arguably hear the 
authoritative writer warn his readers to stop “fiddling with the text”, or “the 
whole thing will turn to ash” in their hands (44). Apart from this particular 
instance, it is in the stories told by the male characters that one discerns the 
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major challenges posed against interpreters of Coetzee’s autobiography. The 
male characters, Martin and Mr. Vincent, are in focus in what follows. 
*** 
Unlike all the other narrators, Martin is the only narrator who does not show 
signs of emotional involvement with John, which immediately speaks for his 
potential reliability. Given the lapses of unreliability in all the accounts in 
Summertime, however, the apparent lack of signs of unreliability in Martin’s 
interview could in itself count as a sign of unreliability: would Coetzee 
authorize the only male interviewee, a white South African professor of 
English Literature, as his most reliable spokesperson in Summertime? Once 
again, the issue here is balancing text and context: the signs of unreliability in 
Martin’s story have to be accounted for in relation to the unreliability of other 
characters, as well as in relation to the narrative logic that, as Walsh puts it, 
allows for an explanation of the contradictions that surround a character’s 
narration (79). Martin’s interview appears late in Summertime (on page 205, of 
266 pages), after several signs of unreliability in the other narrators’ accounts 
have been exposed. In terms of balancing text and context, there are three 
indications of Martin’s relative reliability: the absence of emotional 
involvement between John and Martin; the affinities between them; and 
Martin’s critique of the truth claims of life narratives. 
Mr. Vincent begins his interview with Martin by reading an entry intended 
to be part of Coetzee’s third memoir, the one “that never saw the light of 
day” (205). In the entry in question, John describes his meeting with Martin in 
an interview for a teaching position at the University of Cape Town. Towards 
the end of the entry, John speculates about the choice of the candidates 
(himself, Martin, and a third one): 
Why have the two of them [John and Martin] (or the three of them, if the shadowy third 
is included) been selected to be interviewed for a lectureship in English literature, if not 
because they are the same kind of person, with the same formation behind them 
(formation: not a customary English word, he must remember that); and because both, 
finally and most obviously, are South Africans, white South Africans. (208, italics in 
original) 
There is a curious inverted similarity between both. Martin’s initials are M. J., 
the inverse of Coetzee’s. Their temperaments seem also diametrically 
opposed: compared to John’s description (by Julia) as “socially inept”, Martin 
has an “easy, straightforward manner” with strangers (20, 208). The 
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assumption of Martin’s reliability gains strength in light of his unwillingness to 
engage in speculations about John’s affective relationships, unlike all the 
women. He counters both Julia’s and Sophie’s ideas about the correlation 
between literary themes and an author’s personal life: “It would be very, very 
naïve to conclude that because the theme was present in his writing it had to 
be present in his life” (215). Martin is evasive about John’s personal life on 
two occasions: when Mr. Vincent asks whether John’s lack of emotional 
commitment “extended beyond relations with the land into personal 
relations”, and when he asks about John’s “special friendships among 
students” (211, 15). 
Martin’s focus on such subjects as John’s academic career or his feelings 
about South Africa suggests that his account is reliable because it coheres with 
publicly available information about Coetzee. For example, he addresses 
John’s and his own “attitude toward South Africa”: “Our attitude was that, to 
put it briefly, our presence there was legal but illegitimate. … We thought of 
ourselves as sojourners, temporary residents …” (209, 10). His words cohere 
with the description of the Coetzees as “seasonal”, which appears in the story 
told by John’s cousin Margot (87). Martin also comments on John’s 
admiration for the nineteenth-century Russian novelists (211). Two instances 
of potential unreliability, or discrepancy with what is publicly known about 
Coetzee, are noteworthy, nevertheless. First, Martin believes that Coetzee 
“rarely discussed the sources of his own creativity” for fear that “being too 
self-aware might cripple him”, which is arguable in view of the critical pieces 
that Coetzee has written about formative literary influences (213). Second, he 
comments that “if [John] hadn’t wasted so much of his life correcting 
students’ grammar and sitting through boring meetings, he might have written 
more, perhaps even written better”, which is an odd observation, given that 
Coetzee is in fact a very productive writer (215). Admittedly, those are not 
strong instances of unreliability. The first one could refer to Coetzee reflecting 
on his literary influences with people close to him, rather than in public 
interviews or academic pieces. The second one could reflect Coetzee’s own 
opinion about his literary output, regardless of the fact that he is considered a 
productive writer. 
The strongest sign of Martin’s reliability as an authorial mouthpiece is, 
nevertheless, his direct attack on the interpreters of Coetzee’s life: “And the 
sources you have selected have no axes to grind, no ambitions of their own to 
pronounce final judgement on Coetzee?” (217) The response that Coetzee has 
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Mr. Vincent produce is significant: he has nothing to say to that. Martin’s 
words are a particularly authoritative instance of the author speaking through 
his character because it expresses distinctly the internal logic of Summertime as 
the closing chapter (the coda) of Coetzee’s autobiographical project: accounts 
of autobiographical truth might, in fact, amount to unreliable and self-
interested judgment calls. 
The presence of this resistant writer is intensified in the story of the other 
male character, Mr. Vincent. In fact, what I am referring to as Mr. Vincent’s 
story is his retelling of the interview he conducted with Margot, John’s cousin. 
Before I turn to how one can read Mr. Vincent in Margot’s story, I will 
address the most obvious aspect of his unreliability, which is of a piece with 
the women’s: he is emotionally attached to Coetzee, though in a different way. 
Biographers, like critics, are drawn to writers in ways that involve both 
intellectual and emotional investment. Evidence of Mr. Vincent’s fondness 
and admiration is clear in this exchange with Sophie: 
There was an image of [Coetzee] in the public realm as a cold and supercilious 
intellectual, an image he did nothing to dispel. Indeed one might even say he encouraged it. 
Now, I don’t believe that image does him justice. The conversations I have had with 
people who knew him well reveal a very different person – not necessarily a warmer 
person, but someone more uncertain of himself, more confused, more human, if I can use 
that word. (235, italics in original) 
Coetzee’s real-life biographers, the late Kannemeyer and Attwell, do not 
conceal their personal admiration either. Attwell, in fact, writing The Life of 
Writing years after Summertime, expresses himself with words very similar to 
Mr. Vincent’s above: “The Coetzee who emerges from his papers turns out to 
be a little more like the rest of us: more human or, at least, less Olympian, 
though only up to a point, because the question remains: if he started here, 
how on earth did he get there? (25, italics in original) Kannemeyer confessed to 
being “impressed” by Coetzee: 
The life story of this writer with his exceptional achievements is valuable in 
its own right, and his extraordinary novels stimulate an interest in him as a 
person. … He answered all my questions meticulously, and impressed me as 
a man of integrity. … I also got the impression of an incredibly hard 
worker… [and] developed a certain compassion with this intensely private 
and reserved man. … One stands amazed that someone could experience 
so much unhappiness and yet sustain himself and continue his work. (A Life 
in Writing 6, 10, 615) 
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Mr. Vincent’s apparent bias is disguised, however, by the ingenious 
embeddedness of his perspective in Margot’s story.61 He meets Margot, John’s 
cousin, for the second time to read to her his transcription of their previous 
interview. The narrative that Mr. Vincent created reads as though Margot 
were retelling her memories in the same style (or spirit) of Coetzee’s 
recollections in Boyhood. This is one example of what Mr. Vincent has Margot 
say, that is, of what Coetzee has his characters Mr. Vincent and Margot 
convey about him: 
They [John and Margot] are in a minority, a tiny minority, the two of them, 
of souls that are stirred by these great, desolate expanses. If anything has 
held them together over the years, it is that. This landscape, this kontrei – it 
has taken over her heart. When she dies and is buried, she will dissolve into 
this earth so naturally it will be as if she never had a human life. (Summertime 
129) 
The words attributed by Mr. Vincent to Margot above bear a strong 
resemblance with what Coetzee, the homodiegetic extradiegetic narrator of 
Boyhood, says in the following passage: “Whatever dies here [in the Karoo] dies 
firmly and finally: its flesh is picked off by the ants, its bones are bleached by 
the sun, and that is that. …When he dies he wants to be buried on the farm” 
(Boyhood 97). 
Equally evocative of the authorial voice in Boyhood is the first person 
narration in one of the dialogues that Coetzee has Mr. Vincent create for John 
and Margot in Summertime: 
‘I can’t help remembering the first conversation you and I had, the first 
meaningful conversation. We must have been six years old. What the actual 
words were I don’t recall, but I know I was unburdening myself, all my 
hopes and longings. And all the time I was thinking, So this is what it means to 
be in love! Because – let me confess it – I was in love with you. And ever 
since that day, being in love with a woman has meant being free to say 
everything on my heart.’ (Summertime 97, italics in original) 
Again, the relationship of coherence is established between Boyhood and 
Summertime: 
Agnes occupies a place in his life that he does not yet understand. He first 
set eyes on her when he was seven. … They began to talk. She had pigtails 
                                     
61 There is an intriguing discrepancy about the name of John’s cousin that calls the reader’s 
attention to the manipulation of autobiographical truth: in Boyhood, her name is Agnes (93); in 
Summertime, her name is Margot.  
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and a lisp, which he liked. He lost his reserve. As he spoke he forgot what 
language he was speaking: thoughts simply turned to words within him, 
transparent words. 
What he said to Agnes that afternoon he can no longer remember. But he 
told her everything, everything he did, everything he knew, everything he 
hoped for. … Even as he spoke he knew the day was special because of 
her… 
Is this love – this easy generosity, this sense of being understood at last, of 
not having to pretend? (Boyhood 94, 5) 
What makes this relationship of coherence particularly persuasive is the 
expectation that an author’s own words could occasionally slip through the 
many words of a fictional character, as though an author’s narrative style 
could betray authentic personal expressions here and there. In other words, 
diegetic elements play an important part in giving the reader clues to a 
narrator’s reliability. Apart from the resonances in the passages above, there 
are several other passages in which one can recognize stylistic features 
distinctive of Coetzee’s narrative habits. Those features contribute to endow a 
character’s utterances with a tone of autobiographical truth because they 
create the impression that the characters’ words are indeed Coetzee’s. 
There are a number of instances of stylistic similarities with Disgrace, for 
example. Julia’s narrative style is at times reminiscent of Lurie’s characteristic 
doubling of words: “He had no sexual presence whatsoever. It was as though 
he had been sprayed from head to toe with a neutralizing spray, a neutering spray” 
(24-5); “If he had allowed himself to be a little more impetuous, a little more 
imperious, a little less thoughtful…”  (Summertime 59); “He was what I would call a 
gentle person, a gentleperson” (58, italics mine in all examples). Mr. Vincent shows 
the same tendency to unfold words of the same root in Margot’s story, that is 
to say, Coetzee applies the same technique (and similar words) in Julia’s and in 
Margot’s stories: “there is something cool or cold about him, something that 
if not neuter is at least neutral” (101, italics mine). Julia also uses an expression 
that recalls one employed by Lurie: she claims that with John she felt “no 
pressure of the male gaze”; similarly, Lurie comments that “women are 
sensitive to the weight of the desiring gaze” (Summertime 22; Disgrace 12). An 
occasion when John quotes to Julia an obscure line from a poem also recalls 
Disgrace: Lurie quotes a Shakespearean sonnet to seduce Melanie but instead 
estranges her (Summertime 33; Disgrace 16). John also tries (or pretends to try) 
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to quote (but in fact misquotes) Beckett to Margot, with the result that she 
“has not the faintest idea what he is talking about” (Summertime 112).62 
Yet the strong identification between John and Margot that emerges from 
Mr. Vincent’s story, and which would therefore authorize the fictive 
utterances in Margot’s story as potential bearers of autobiographical truth, is 
ultimately depicted as a matter of narrative skill, not authenticity. Mr. Vincent 
informs Margot that he has “fixed up the prose to read as an uninterrupted 
narrative spoken in [her] voice”, with dialogues (87). In fact, his reworking of 
Margot’s interview is an attempt to emulate the focalized consciousness of 
Boyhood and Youth. Ironically, and provocatively, Coetzee has Mr. Vincent 
reply to Margot’s misgivings about his recasting of her answers as a narrative 
with the (at best) naïve or (at worst) plainly dishonest argument that 
“changing the form should have no effect on the content” (91).63 Margot, 
nevertheless, complains to him that his narrative technique is “confusing”: 
“Something sounds wrong, but I can’t put my finger on it” (89, 91). 
Mr. Vincent attempts to copy Coetzee’s narrative technique in Boyhood and 
Youth, as though he were following in the footsteps of the master.64 Most 
apparently, this could be read as yet another authorial indication of the 
possible manipulation of truth inherent to forms of life writing. But it is the 
difference between the aspirant storyteller and the accomplished writer that 
deserves attention. Mr. Vincent aspires, in fact, to become a storyteller, more 
than a biographer, for he attempts to create a narrator (Margot, who would 
have the same peculiar habit of referring to herself in the third person) and 
characters. His reworking of Margot’s story is, nevertheless, amateurish; the 
                                     
62 Coetzee alerts the reader of Summertime to a misquotation of Beckett in his “Author’s Note”. 
63 This is what Coetzee says about style and content in his Author’s Note to Doubling the Point: 
“While trying to respect the character of the [original essays], I have, in the interest of clarity, done 
a fair amount of local revision. Style and content are not separable: it would be disingenuous for me 
to claim that my revisions have not touched the substance of the originals” (vii). 
64 Coetzee critics, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, have often followed in his 
footsteps. One example, however, stands out: it is Karina Magdalena Szczurek’s chapter “Coetzee 
and Gordimer” in J. M. Coetzee in Context and Theory (eds. Boehmer, Eaglestone, and Iddiols). 
Szczurek suggests that Elizabeth Costello may have been inspired (to some extent at least) in 
Nadine Gordimer. To present her argument, though, Szczurek creates a fictional character, a 
distant cousin of Coetzee’s, who is reading a lecture at a conference. This is how she reveals the 
conceit in a footnote: “I trace the ‘life and times’ of J. M. Coetzee’s probably most enigmatic 
character, Elizabeth Costello. To examine her function as a persona, an alter ego, a fictional 
character and author, I imitate Coetzee’s own invention by introducing a fictional character name 
Eliza Coetzee, whom I use here to debate the issue at hand on my behalf” (45). Reviewer Peter 
Liebregts clearly did not appreciate Szczurek’s strategy: in his view, her chapter does not “result in 
anything more than a gimmicky tribute to Coetzee’s narratorial stance” (127). 
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narrative that he has made out of the interview, in Margot’s opinion, cannot 
“stand as it is” because it does not “sound like” what she had told him (152, 
91). Mr. Vincent cannot represent a subject that resorts to free indirect 
discourse and present tense to talk about his or her own past: 
Margot: I don’t understand. Why do you call me she? 
Mr. Vincent: Of the four, Margot alone, she – Margot – suspects, looks 
back with nostalgia… You can hear how clumsy it is. It just doesn’t work 
that way. The she I use is like I but is not I. Do you really dislike it so much? 
Margot: I find it confusing … (89, italics in original) 
Put differently, his lack of narrative skill suggests that Coetzee’s distinct 
autobiographical style cannot easily be copied. Besides, style is also conceived 
as something radically different from truthfulness, if truthfulness is 
understood as the unfiltered expression of one’s selfhood. Style, in contrast, is 
carefully constructed and thought-out, the result of a very conscious 
fashioning of narrative habits, a process over which Coetzee (but not Mr. 
Vincent) retains full control. In the larger context of my characterization of 
Coetzee’s authorial agency as essentially resistant and even dismissive in 
relation to his interpreters, this passage lends itself to another particularly 
incisive depiction of the superiority of the creative artist’s writing skills, as well 
as of the hopeless attempts by his admirers to be like the author, to let the 
power of the authorial discourse infuse the response and enrich it. There is a 
huge discrepancy in talent and capacity between the biographer/aspirant 
writer and the worldwide-awarded novelist. What follows from this 
discrepancy, insofar as the communicative exchange between autobiographer 
and reader or critic is concerned, is clear: the only authoritative teller of the 




I have developed an argument about Coetzee’s resistance to critical 
containment that revolves around two interconnected issues: his relationship 
with literary critics and what I have described as the self-sufficiency of his 
authorial discourse. This two-fold character of my study required a two-fold 
set of theoretical concepts. One set is provided by phenomenological 
criticism, which furnishes terms to gauge the relationship between author and 
critic. The other set of concepts comes from rhetorical theory, which allows 
me to discern the self-sufficiency I referred to by bringing to the fore the 
distinguishing traits of Coetzee’s authorial discourse that impinge on how he 
positions himself in relation to his critics. In what follows, I will outline the 
findings of this study and the arguments that it presents for a change of 
critical attitude in relation to Coetzee. 
My approach to the relationship between Coetzee and his critics has 
focused on how one negotiates proximity and distance, understood in 
phenomenological criticism as phases in the critical work. The spirit of 
proximity is empathetic and celebratory: proximity is informed by the desire 
to identify with the object of enquiry and, by understanding it as fully as 
possible, celebrate its unique qualities. From a theoretical point of view, 
proximity is certainly desirable, but it cannot be an end in itself, for that could 
imply a mere repetition, an echo, of the literary work and the discourse of the 
author. Therefore, criticism should ideally begin with proximity but always 
end with distance, that is, with the critic’s assertion of difference. Distance 
would guarantee the critic’s interpretive autonomy and authority. 
Phenomenological criticism aspires to a balance of interpretive authority 
between critical and authorial discourse in which the interdependence 
between both is predominantly positive: criticism explains or paraphrases 
literary language without appropriating or removing its uniqueness. 
Proximity is a desirable principle not only in the sense that it celebrates the 
artistic creation and the creator; there is also a particular incentive to adopt it 
when one reads Coetzee. His works interrogate what is usually described as 
critical distance, the detached stance that approaches literary works with a 
certain suspicion, enacted in a principled resistance to the subjectivity of the 
act of reading for the sake of a purportedly more objective, comprehensive, 
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and schematic knowledge of literature. As a consequence of Coetzee’s 
challenge to critical distance, a fundamentally proximal attitude has gradually 
established itself in the critical field, turning the specificities and particularities 
of his authorial discourse into the focus of attention and bringing the 
principles of detachment and impartiality into question. 
On the other hand, it is also true that critical proximity cannot easily be 
reconciled with Coetzee when one attends to his awareness of his reception, 
as well as to the refractory stance that he adopts in relation to the critic. 
Another dominant feature of his writing, apart from the challenge to distance, 
is that it overtly resists, questions, or even undermines the critic, notably by 
anticipating and thereby disarming expected interpretive moves. From this 
perspective, Coetzee clearly keeps the critic at arm’s length, projecting himself 
as a not very open or accommodating partner in the relationship between 
author and critic. 
I have painted a schematic picture of the emergence and the consolidation 
of critical proximity in Coetzee scholarship. Its emergence is, to a great extent, 
a consequence of the political and intellectual climate in South Africa in the 
70s and 80s, a period of intense political turmoil that, unsurprisingly, reached 
literary circles as well. Writers and critics alike were, in different ways, 
implicated in the struggle against apartheid. In this context, the work of David 
Attwell was decisive to prepare the ground for critical proximity in Coetzee 
scholarship. Most obviously, it is his work with Coetzee in Doubling the Point 
that, with hindsight, emerges as emblematic of the effort of establishing a 
dialogue with the author, rather than applying a pre-determined interpretive 
template to the authorial discourse. But concomitant with the interviews that 
he conducted with Coetzee in Doubling the Point, Attwell was also working on 
his monograph J. M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing, and his 
critical stance there is the same. He focuses on what is distinctive in Coetzee’s 
work in the South African context, which he describes as a very refined 
awareness that every form of resistance has to be addressed in terms of its 
relationship with historical forces. Attwell was the first critic to present a solid 
and elaborate argument about the literary political agency of Coetzee’s writing, 
changing the critical understanding of his authorial discourse. His proximal, 
open, dialogical approach to Coetzee did pay off: Politics of Writing and Doubling 
the Point have become seminal works in Coetzee scholarship. 
When it comes to the consolidation of critical proximity, I have focused 
on the role played by Derek Attridge. In part as a response to Attwell’s 
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emphasis on the political import of Coetzee’s fiction, Attridge turns to the 
ethical thinking articulated in the novels, which he further expands into a 
theory of reading. The degree of proximity that Attridge achieves in relation 
to Coetzee’s authorial discourse is notable. It is possible to say that he 
understands the fundamental aspect of Coetzee’s ethical thinking so well that 
he is able to digest it, so to speak, turning the terms of the authorial discourse 
into his own. The fundamental point of intersection between Attridge’s 
critical work and Coetzee’s authorial discourse is their conception of 
hospitality and what it can offer to the encounter with a literary work. From 
Coetzee’s perspective, hospitality, understood as the intense imaginative effort 
of expanding one’s habitual mode of thinking, is a precondition for the 
dialogism of the creative process. Hospitality ensures that the creative process 
is not simply monological because it awakens what Coetzee calls the 
“countervoices” within the self (Doubling 65). Attridge transfers hospitality as 
an essential component of the authorial creative process, as Coetzee conceives 
of it, to the interpretive process, thereby proposing that the engagement with 
a literary work is similar to the authorial creative process: opening oneself to a 
piece of literature is a means of escaping the habitual monologism of one’s 
thought processes, of widening one’s interpretive horizon by accommodating 
the new, the singular, the unexpected, the unknown. This is what Attridge 
calls a creative reading. 
Two aspects of Attridge’s theory of reading make it particularly appealing: 
one is its ethical thrust, captured in the willingness to recognize the singularity 
of the creative act and of the human being that sustained it. Another is the 
remarkable reciprocity that it achieves with Coetzee’s work. By describing the 
activity of the reader as parallel and commensurate with the activity of the 
writer, Attridge’s critical discourse presents itself as symmetrical with 
Coetzee’s authorial discourse. This complementarity between Coetzee and 
Attridge is the most telling instance of mutuality in the critical field. 
One of the reasons why proximity becomes an unstable concept in relation 
to Coetzee is the dynamics of mutual recognition that tends to predominate in 
the critical field. The success of Attwell’s and Attridge’s works has contributed 
to a dissemination of critical proximity. The recognition granted to them has 
gradually created an environment which naturally favored other critics who 
followed similar principles and adopted similar practices, thereby legitimizing 
and consolidating these principles and practices in the field. It is by means of 
this mutual recognition that Attwell’s and Attridge’s empathetic attitude in 
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relation to Coetzee’s authorial discourse has become so prominent in the field. 
The exemplary manifestation of this prominence, apart from the ethos of 
Attwell’s and Attridge’s works, is the frequency with which Coetzee’s fiction 
has been read in conjunction with, or against the backdrop of, his critical 
writing, with the aim of exploring how one can illuminate the other. This 
amounts to reading with the author, that is, finding the parameters of the 
critical inquiry in the authorial consciousness itself. Such an approach is, 
undoubtedly, very productive: it throws into relief the originality and the 
uniqueness of the creative mind in a holistic manner, uncovering different 
layers of its complexity. Besides, this is the kind of interpretive strategy that is 
very unlikely to fail, because the continuities between the authorial and the 
critical discourse will inevitably be there. The critical work comes to a 
harmonious closure, as though one could tie both ends of the authorial 
consciousness and avoid disrupting its internal coherence. 
In principle, proximity and mutuality are certainly defensible. Nevertheless, 
apart from the risk of interpretive tautology, the major issue that arises when 
one applies both concepts to Coetzee is Coetzee himself. Throughout his 
novelistic oeuvre, he has consistently asserted the priority and the superiority 
of creative writing over pre-determined interpretive agendas, political or 
otherwise. His much-cited statement “all writing is autobiography” captures in 
an almost aphoristic manner the emphasis on writing as the singular act of an 
individual; put differently, what the writing ultimately represents or reveals is 
its author (Doubling 391). Appropriating it for the purposes of a just political 
cause or for the broader knowledge of literature entails a form of violation of 
this uniqueness or, as he puts it, a “betrayal” or an “overpowering” of the 
other (61). 
This resistant feature of Coetzee’s authorial discourse is very palpably 
enacted in the self-referential thematic focus of his later oeuvre. As a function 
of this self-referential quality, these later narratives intersect with the argument 
of “Confession and Double Thoughts”, a widely known critical essay that 
Coetzee wrote in the 1980s. For an informed reader that engages with this 
later oeuvre as exercises of life writing, “Confession and Double Thoughts” 
becomes a double-edged interpretive tool. The essay surely sheds light on the 
uniqueness of Coetzee’s life writing, but it also creates a restrictive and 
disempowering interpretive framework. Coetzee’s life writing, in the terms of 
the essay, undermines the critic, that is to say, it undermines the critic’s 
participation in his self-examination, which is otherwise required and 
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sanctioned by a traditional autobiographical pact. At the heart of his life 
writing are two key assumptions, or clauses in the autobiographical pact that 
he proposes: first, self-examination is hopelessly inconclusive for the subject, 
but ethically valid anyway; second, it is completely self-interested in the sense 
of being solipsistic, so that it concerns no one but the author. 
The way in which “Confession and Double Thoughts” imposes limits on 
the interpretation of Coetzee’s life writing reveals what I have referred to as 
the self-sufficiency of his authorial discourse. This self-sufficiency has two 
distinguishing traits. One is the capacity of the authorial discourse to elucidate 
itself: the key interpretive terms to understand Coetzee’s autobiographical 
writing are spelled out in his own critical writing about autobiography. The 
other distinguishing trait of self-sufficiency is a direct consequence of the first: 
the critic loses authority as interpreter, that is to say, as the one who provides 
an explanatory vocabulary for Coetzee’s work. 
To explore these aspects of self-sufficiency and their interpretive 
implications, I proposed a reading of Disgrace and of the memoir Summertime 
against the backdrop of “Confession and Double Thoughts”. My approach to 
these works is chiefly rhetorical, for my focus lies on Coetzee’s 
communicative act and, more specifically, on what these works reveal about 
his implied views on critical proximity and mutuality. This rhetorical approach 
gauges an author’s implied views not by attempting to pin down authorial 
intent, which is an imprecise and contentious concept, but by construing a 
context of interpretation in which certain inferences about what the author 
communicates in the narrative can be considered more correct than others. 
Insofar as the authorial communicative act is concerned, the realism of the 
plot of Disgrace and the narrative technique deserve particular attention 
because they project a provocative and challenging author: Coetzee paves the 
way for the reader to fail in disengaging author and protagonist, real and 
fictional world. He produces a novel whose fictional world has a strong 
mimetic appeal to post-apartheid South Africa, and touches precisely on a 
number of very sensitive issues for readers more directly involved in South 
African reality. This identification between the fiction and the real world has 
been a major source of critique against the novel, which has often been taken 
as an excessively dark and depressing portrayal of the process of reconciliation 
after the end of apartheid. 
Coetzee also employs an ambiguous narrative technique that, depending 
on how it is interpreted, strengthens the real-world appeal of the novel. If one 
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assumes that he is employing authorial narration, as many readers have 
assumed, the result is a problematic ideological identification of author with 
protagonist, which in turn enhances the potential proximity between real and 
fictional world. I argue that it is more appropriate to view the narrative 
technique of Disgrace as similar to the one that Coetzee adopts in his memoir 
Boyhood. On this account, Disgrace is narrated by its fictitious protagonist, who 
tells the story of part of his life in the present tense. The chief interpretive 
consequence of this assumption is that one can see more clearly how the 
South African plot becomes the background against which Coetzee creates a 
fictitious narrative of soul searching. 
This perspective throws into relief the points of connection between 
Disgrace and “Confession and Double Thoughts”. The kernel of Coetzee’s 
argument in the essay, namely, how self-examination strives in vain for a kind 
of knowledge, and therefore for a reformation of the self, that is never truly 
attainable resonates directly with two central features of Disgrace: one is the 
novel’s thematic focus on repentance and grace; the other is the role played by 
its narrative technique in the configuration of the story. Grace, suggested by 
the title of the novel in negative terms, amounts to the degree of self-
awareness and character reformation that the protagonist seeks to achieve. 
Personal growth, however, is configured as a process of repentance and a 
quest for illumination, which becomes evident in the eschatological themes 
present in the novel. In this quest for illumination, the present-tense character 
narration plays a crucial role in light of how “Confession and Double 
Thoughts” elucidates Disgrace. The limited focalization on the protagonist 
Lurie, who is also the narrator, enables Coetzee to represent the 
inconclusiveness of soul searching that is the focus of the essay. Lurie 
oscillates between what could be described as an inchoate reformed man and 
the usual recalcitrant, faulty self he has always been. The possibility of a new 
true self is analogous to the concept of truth-directedness that Coetzee coins 
in “Confession and Double Thoughts”; similarly, the inevitable relapse into 
the usual patterns of behavior is parallel with the concept of double thought. 
Grace, understood as the fulfillment of Lurie’s character reformation, is 
constantly gestured at, but never definitely achieved. 
This reading brings Disgrace and “Confession and Double Thoughts” 
together in a mutual relation, since novel and essay dwell on the impasse of 
soul searching. In this respect, it is important to consider how the fictional 
discourse of the novel can go further, as it were, on the issue of grace. In the 
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terms of the essay, a self-examining subject can never achieve a moment of 
perfect knowledge; illumination necessarily transcends the rational faculties of 
the self. Yet the narrative world that Coetzee creates for his fictitious self-
examining subject contains clues to a moment of grace that, although it 
escapes the protagonist’s range of experience, can be inferred by the reader. 
More specifically, this moment of revelation could manifest itself during 
artistic creation, so that grace would be bestowed upon the protagonist when 
he is engaged in an artistic creative process. In the particular context of my 
argument about Coetzee as a writer who consistently asserts the authority and 
even the superiority of literary creation over literary criticism, this potential 
redemption of Disgrace’s protagonist is telling. As a literary scholar, Lurie can 
only wish for grace; as an artist, however, he might indeed experience grace. 
“Confession and Double Thoughts”, as I have mentioned, has a direct 
impact on the interpretation of Coetzee’s life writing and, therefore, on his 
fictionalized memoirs Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime, which are the narratives 
in which he proposes an autobiographical pact with his reader with more 
clarity. As far as the implications of reading the memoirs in light of the 
argument in “Confession and Double Thoughts” are concerned, two 
questions were posed here. First, the strength of the claims that Attridge 
makes for the truth-directedness of Coetzee’s writing; second, the creation of 
a silent reader. 
Attridge was the first critic who pointed out to the importance of the essay 
to understand Coetzee’s autobiographical writing, focusing on the 
confessional effect that Boyhood and Youth create. The gist of his reading is the 
implication of the reader in the experience of the truth-directedness of the 
writing, which leads him eventually to assert that Coetzee is sincere beyond 
doubt in Youth, as well as to paraphrase the truth of Boyhood as “the truth of 
testimony” (Ethics of Reading 155). As I argue, what defines Coetzee’s authorial 
discourse as autobiographer is not solely his truth-directedness, but the back-
and-forth between truth-directedness and the double thought. This oscillation 
is what makes self-examination inconclusive, preventing it from coming to a 
point of closure. Yet when Attridge asserts Coetzee’s truth-directedness over 
the double thought (that is to say, over the possibility that either 
autobiographer or reader might be self-deceived or deliberately dishonest), he 
brings closure to self-examination. One could argue that his claim amounts to 
a betrayal of the autobiographical pact: reading the memoirs as exemplary of 
the argument in “Confession and Double Thoughts”, Attridge disregards the 
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fact that the double thought is a feature of the confessor’s, or interpreter’s, 
psychology as well. Alternatively, one could also argue that his claim for the 
truth-directedness of the writing overpowers the discourse of the author: 
Coetzee does not pin down his autobiographical truth, but Attridge does; he is 
the one who has the final word. Besides, his word certainly counts, since he is 
the critic whose work is more prominently distinguished as an ideal critical 
counterpart to the discourse of the author. 
But one also has to consider the kind of autobiographical pact at stake for 
Coetzee’s proximal interpreters. If his self-examination is solipsistic to the 
point of dispensing with the interpreter’s judgment (because it is hopelessly 
biased and faulty), what exactly is the role of the proximal reader or critic? 
Perhaps it would be the acceptance of a perfectly empathetic attitude, so that 
one becomes, in fact, a silent reader, someone who absorbs the discourse of 
the author, gains a privileged access into the unique mental world of the other 
and, then, leaves it at that. The explanation and the insertion of this unique 
discourse into the much wider context of life writing, which should be the 
goal of the critical work, would inevitably entail a betrayal or an overpowering 
of the authorial discourse. It is possible to play the role of a silent reader if 
one is simply a reader, even though that entails a perception of the authorial 
communicative act as a one-way transmission, rather than as the beginning of 
an exchange or dialogue. Obviously, a critic cannot accept this silent role, for 
a critic is engaged in a dialogue not only with the author, but with other critics 
as well. Criticism is a project shared among many parties (in a community), 
and not only between two (in a marriage). The communicative horizon of the 
work of the critic is much wider than the horizon of the reader: criticism is 
response that engages with and elicits other responses as well. 
If it is read as a conceptual framework that elucidates the unique features 
of Coetzee’s autobiography, “Confession and Double Thoughts” in effect 
silences the critic because it projects self-examination as a thoroughly 
solipsistic project. A slightly different, though no less forceful challenge is 
posed by Summertime, Coetzee’s third memoir. The narrative shows an author 
who is always ahead of his interpreters, anticipating their moves and disarming 
them by portraying them as predictable, bitter, misinformed, even ludicrous. 
Summertime can be read as a work that discredits and even mocks the proximal 
critic by representing, in the fictional exchanges that take place in the narrative 
world, how we are likely to equate beliefs and assumptions, all of which are 
inevitably fallible and colored by personal bias
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autobiographical subject. Autobiographical truth becomes an issue for the 
interpreter, rather than for the subject that embarks in soul searching. The 
implication of the reader is at the center of the meanings of the memoir, but 
the sharply ironic depiction of how unrequited love, resentment, and 
intellectual admiration undermine the interpreters’ judgments suggests not 
only that the truth about the self inevitably includes others but, most 
importantly, that the interpreters are speaking more about themselves than 
about the author. 
*** 
The spirit of Summertime is that of a dead-end: the author is dead in the 
story of his life, and his proximal, admiring interpreters have also reached a 
dead-end in their efforts to understand him. Ironically, but also misleadingly, 
the spirit of The Childhood of Jesus, the novel which follows Summertime, is 
prominently that of a new beginning. Coetzee breaks with the self-referential 
circularity of his later works by producing an ostensibly allegorical narrative. 
Allegory, it must be said, is not new in the context of his writing. As several 
reviewers have pointed out, the allegorical mode of writing in The Childhood of 
Jesus harks back to early works such as Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and 
Times of Michael K. But the theme of a new beginning is central in the plot: 
characters without memory are thrown into a new world as they arrive at a 
town conveniently named Novilla. The overall atmosphere of the narrative 
world is one of afterlife, which is also particularly appropriate for a work that 
comes after Summertime. The choice of central character is instigating. Coetzee 
leaves the autobiographical focus, which ended with the fictive death of the 
great author, to imagine the childhood of an even greater figure, the Savior. 
One cannot, however, align the author with the Christ figure in the novel, 
except for the fact that both have many followers. 
Yet much about The Childhood of Jesus is in fact far from new for a Coetzee 
critic. The characteristically provocative authorial stance is recognizable by 
means of the dissatisfaction that reviewers have voiced when they wondered 
what Coetzee is doing in his latest novel. This dissatisfaction stems from the 
lack of a vision of what the work means, which is a direct consequence of its 
allegorical construction. A recurrent element in the responses to the novel is 
the idea that the narrative does not seem to have one central allegory that 
sustains its meanings. Put differently, reviewers have resented the absence of 
one allegorical key, as it were, that would open the work for interpretation and 
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disclose a coherent unit of meaning. The many allegorical paths that the story 
opens hinder the satisfactory completeness of the interpretive process. 
The sense that a key interpretive element is missing in the narrative is 
familiar to readers of Coetzee: it would also apply, for instance, to the two 
narratives I have considered here. Disgrace, as a conversion narrative, 
suppresses from the reader’s experience its central thematic element, that is, 
Lurie’s definitive illumination. In Summertime, it is the fragmentation of 
autobiographical truth that accounts for the potential lack of one unified 
meaning. It is not possible to paint a whole and coherent picture of Coetzee’s 
autobiographical truth; at best, one can have provisional, but unreliable, 
glimpses of it. 
In sum, The Childhood of Jesus projects an author who first entices the critic, 
offering allegory as a possible interpretive path, and then disappoints the 
critic, refusing to indicate what precisely he is allegorizing. Not a new 
beginning, in other words, at least not in the context of the argument 
developed here; one can still discern the familiar authorial interrogation of the 
aims and procedures of the critical work. 
This account of Coetzee’s authorial discourse has aimed to show how 
power is a present and pressing element with which the critic has to grapple, 
both in relation to the author and in relation to the community of interpreters. 
In this sphere in particular, power circulates in diffuse ways, embedded in 
principles and practices that seem well adjusted to their context. It would be 
unreasonable to ascribe the consolidation of critical proximity in Coetzee 
scholarship to specific agents who deliberately attempted to shape the field. 
Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that proximity came to be dominant 
because distinct intellectual inclinations and interests shared among many 
members of the field have gradually created a stable environment which 
favored a proximal approach, allowing it to thrive and consolidate itself. The 
insights that proximity has generated into Coetzee’s writing are undeniable; 
nevertheless, as I have shown here there are a number of reasons to consider 
whether Coetzee criticism should not, at this point, refrain from giving 
continuity to the proximal discourse that has prevailed thus far. The most 
apparent problem that attaches to proximity is its shortsightedness, which 
might prevent the critic from seeing that Coetzee’s solipsism, which borders 
on what I have described here as self-sufficiency, carries within it a ferocious 
interrogation of what animates literary criticism. 
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Coetzee criticism would probably benefit from a greater degree of self-
reflexiveness and accountability in relation to the ambivalent idealism that has 
engendered critical proximity, which is the dominant discourse in the field. 
Once again, this is not to say that proximity is dominant because all critics 
have adopted it; rather, proximity is dominant insofar as it is the discourse 
adopted by critics who have had a decisive role in elucidating Coetzee’s 
writing and who, because of the recognition that they have achieved, have 
become examples of good Coetzee critics. Idealism conceals the fact that the 
field of cultural production, which encompasses the literary field, is actually a 
field of forces and competition. 
It is relevant to make a parallel with what Bourdieu refers to as “interest in 
disinterestedness” (In Other Words 110). The form of interest that applies to 
literary criticism is authority that comes from recognition and prestige. This 
form of interest is, however, also disinterested to a certain extent, insofar as it 
exceeds the idea of profit strictly speaking. In other words, one does not 
become a professional literary critic for economic profit (though one can 
make a living out of an academic career); what motivates the choice of 
profession is often the belief that literature has meaning and value in itself. 
Disinterestedness for Bourdieu is a central rule of the game in the field of 
cultural production, tacitly or implicitly acknowledged as such. In the 
particular case of Coetzee scholarship, one finds disinterestedness embedded 
in the critical work in another, more conspicuous, way too: it resonates with 
the fundamental premise of proximity. Disinterestedness echoes in the ethical 
imperative to protect the discourse of the author from appropriation, giving 
priority to the other, as it were, rather than to oneself (a premise which 
originates in the conception of an essentially asymmetrical relation between 
self and other). 
The ambiguity intrinsic to Bourdieu’s original understanding of 
“disinterestedness” accounts for the way in which the term does 
accommodate a notion of interest despite its apparent aversion to interest. In 
the context of critical proximity in Coetzee scholarship, this ambiguity is 
compounded because proximity creates a form of attachment to the author 
that distinguishes its practitioners as prominent players in the field. 
Disinterestedness becomes clearly an instrument of power, regardless of the 
intention that originally motivates it, insofar as it impacts on the field as a 
whole. It creates what could perhaps be described as a center of authority in 
the critical field, a center whose gravitational force inevitably acts upon the 
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field, affecting to a greater or lesser extent the positions occupied by other 
members. 
Terms such as proximity, empathy, identification, or their counterparts 
distance, resistance, and difference could certainly be rethought and refined in 
light of the critique of criticism that is performed by Coetzee’s writing. This 
study is too limited to offer a substantial reconsideration of these concepts 
(and that would certainly have been a considerably difficult task), but I hope 
the discussion presented here has gestured towards a productive engagement 
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